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ABSTRACT 
The Innovation platforms (IPs) approach was developed to address shortcomings of linear 
approaches to agricultural research and extension. However, ‘innovation platform’ is a 
relatively new concept in agricultural research for development. There is limited knowledge 
and understanding of how best to organize IPs to facilitate numerous and multi-directional 
interaction among diverse stakeholders. The study examined how IPs are organized, the 
factors which motivated actors to participate in IPs, and the power dynamics within IPs. 
Data were collected from five IPs in Uganda and Rwanda Sept.-Dec. 2010. We conducted 
184 semi-structured interviews with farmers, 34 in-depth interviews (with traders, extension 
workers, policy makers, NGO staff, researchers, IP chairpersons and non-IP members) and 
six focus group discussions with farmer representatives. I analyzed quantitative data using 
the Statistical Package for Social Scientists. Qualitative data were analyzed using line-by-line 
coding.  
The size of IP, age and nature of landscape influenced the extent of vertical and horizontal 
decentralization. IPs that were highly decentralized both vertically and horizontally 
demonstrated high knowledge and information sharing among actors. However, 
decentralization alone was not sufficient. Other factors need to be in place to facilitate 
interaction such as good leadership and proper infrastructure.  
Actors were motivated to participate in IPs by several factors (including development, 
material, economic, social and purposive). Farmers were primarily motivated by the desire to 
acquire knowledge and skills (developmental incentives). However, development incentives 
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alone were not sufficient to encourage active farmer participation. Economic and material 
incentives encouraged farmers to continue participating. Participation of local policy makers 
and the private business sector was limited. Participation was curtailed by: expectation of 
tangible short-term benefits, poor understanding of IP concept, lack of resources, prior 
commitments and feeling devalued.  
IPs empowered farmers to prioritize issues of concern to them. However, concerns of small-
scale local traders and women were not completely taken into account. Actors who accessed 
more information, knowledge, and financial resources demonstrated more power and 
influenced the decision-making, and implementation process.  
The key policy implications are to advocate for holistic, and integrative approaches that 
promote inclusion of the scientific and non-scientific communities in research. Government 
support is required for integrating IP activities in existing government programs and 
enforcement of bylaws.  
1 
 
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Background 
Agriculture is the engine for poverty reduction and economic development in 
developing nations. The sector employs over 50% of the population and contributes over 
30% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (McCullough, Pingali, and Stamoulis 2008). Despite 
the importance of agriculture, innovation and technological change in the sector continues to 
be slow and patchy. Developing countries invest only a small portion of their GDP in 
agricultural research. Agricultural development plans exhibit little concern for staple food 
production despite its importance in developing nations (World Bank 2007b). Agriculture is 
taking place in a rapidly changing, globalized setting. The sector’s development is being 
driven more by market concerns (both local and external) (World Bank 2007a). Production 
and marketing are highly competitive and innovation based. However, food systems in 
developing nations are traditional and market chains are largely unorganized.   
The traditional approach of agricultural research and extension follows a linear 
approach where researchers and experts produce new knowledge and technology and transfer 
it to the end users who need it to innovate and change (Lundy, Gottret, and Ashby 2007). The 
linear approach assumes that agricultural research, through technology transfer, leads to 
technology adoption and increased productivity. Emphasis is placed on building capacity of 
research (through investment in scientific infrastructure, human capital, setting research 
priorities and providing operational funds to implement those priorities) and less attention is 
paid to other factors that enable new technologies to be used. Public research and extension 
institutions are considered to be the only source of knowledge and innovation required to 
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promote agricultural development. In addition, research is not linked to technology users and 
other actors in the sector (World Bank 2007a).   
As a result, the traditional agricultural research and extension approach has generally 
failed to translate research outputs into development impacts (FARA 2007) that address 
widespread poverty, hunger and malnutrition in sub-Saharan Africa (Mokwunye 2010). 
Further, the traditional approach has failed to promote a continuous learning and innovation 
process capable of helping people and their communities to cope with growing complexity 
and rapidly changing contexts because of the following (Lundy et al. 2007): 
 limited appreciation of local and indigenous knowledge  
 knowledge generated is not piloted in the actual environment where it will be used 
 lack of interaction among different sources of knowledge 
 the approach is linear, with limited interaction between knowledge experts and users 
to develop user capacity in relation to the innovation 
Scholars argue that the organization of agricultural research and extension is the 
major reason why agricultural research and development projects have failed to improve 
livelihoods of resource poor farmers (Hall 2007). The existing system of generating research 
and knowledge is not structured or organized to deal with the rapidly changing context 
(dynamic policy, market, technology and environment) for agriculture in many countries. 
The ability to cope with increased complexity and uncertainty in agri-food systems requires 
new ways of conducting research that enhance the capacity of smallholder farmers to respond 
to rapidly changing contexts through continuous innovation. Agri-food systems are 
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increasingly vertically integrated, thus requiring new approaches to engage smallholder 
farmers in markets (World Bank 2007a). 
The failure of the traditional approach to meet users’ needs has led to increased 
understanding of the need to achieve greater and more focused collaboration in agricultural 
research by involving new actors in research including non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), civil society actors, producer associations, and private business sector firms to 
respond to the new challenges for agriculture innovation. There is growing recognition of the 
need for inter-organizational corporation to solve agricultural related problems as scientists 
realize that the complex nature of agricultural problems cannot be solved by a single 
organization. Hall ( 2009:31) asserts that: 
 Innovation requires knowledge from multiple sources, including users of that 
knowledge; 
 It involves those different sources of knowledge interacting with each other in order 
to share and combine ideas; 
 These interactions and processes are usually very specific to a particular context; 
 Each context has its own routines and traditions that reflect historical origins shaped 
by culture, politics, policies and power. 
From Classical National Agricultural Research Systems to Agricultural Innovation 
Systems 
Different models of agriculture extension have evolved over the past 40 years to 
disseminate information to farmers in order to increase farm production, access to market and 
management of the natural resource base. Uganda and Rwanda, like many other countries, 
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experienced different agricultural extension approaches - both top-down (Transfer of 
Technology and Training and Visit) and bottom-up (Farming System Research, participatory 
extension, Farmer to Farmer extension, partnership extension, Agricultural Knowledge and 
Information System, privatization of agricultural extension, and contracting extension service 
delivery).  The first approach of extension was the transfer of technology model (ToT). This 
approach was prevalent during colonial times and re-emerged during the 1970s and 1980s 
when the training and visit (T&V) approach was introduced in many Asian and sub-Saharan 
African countries. The technology transfer model was a linear approach, transferring 
technologies from research to farmers, and persuaded farmers to take up specific varieties of 
crops and practices to increase food production. The aim was to speed up dissemination of 
Green Revolution technologies. Other forms of production such as livestock and horticulture 
were ignored (Swanson and Rajalahti 2010).  
The main actors in this model were the researchers, extensionists and farmers. This 
approach was primarily suitable for homogenous, low risk natural and social environmental 
conditions but was not suitable for small-scale farmers in highly variable conditions with no 
control over growing conditions. As a result, the farming systems approach emerged and the 
emphasis was on participation of farmers in technology development. The aim was to 
understand farmers’ complex environment and the interdependencies among elements of 
farming systems in order to design technologies adapted to their conditions (Biggs 1989; 
Farrington and Martin 1987). In the mid-1980s, more participatory approaches where 
introduced with more emphasis on farmers. The concept of Farmer First was introduced 
which involved approaches such as Farmer-back-to-Farmer, Farmer First and Last, Farmer 
Participatory Research, and Participatory Technology Development. Farmers were involved 
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in the process of generating, testing and evaluating technologies to promote sustainable 
agricultural production. The goal was to develop technologies suitable for small-scale, 
resource poor farmers and ensure adoption to increase farm productivity and income (Selener 
1997).  
In 1990s, the Agricultural Knowledge and Information Systems (AKIS) approach 
emerged to strengthen vertical and horizontal information flow in agricultural systems. The 
performance of the system is determined by the extent to which actors’ access information 
and technology (Röling 1992). In order to make knowledge and information available among 
actors, a continuous circulation of intermediary outputs is crucial. This is enhanced by 
knowledge networks, which are relatively stable patterns of communication and interaction 
among social actors sharing a common goal. Such knowledge networks emerge as a result of 
relationship building efforts among actors. To govern knowledge sharing and information 
exchange in networks, there should be mutual understanding and trust among actors (Engel 
and Salomon 1997).  
However, the AKIS paradigm was criticized because of its linear vision on delivering 
technology to large farms while ignoring farmers with limited land and resources, and not 
listening to farmers in terms of their problems and priorities for government and university 
researchers. Therefore, the conceptual debate has now shifted from the AKIS paradigm to 
agricultural innovation systems (Sulaiman and Hall 2006). Although the AKIS paradigm is 
simplistic, it is still a useful concept in highlighting the importance of developing a system of 
education, technology and extension institutions that are the drivers of transforming 
traditional agriculture (Bonnen 1998).  
Many developing countries are now working towards improving rural livelihoods of 
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smallholder farmers. However, achieving this goal will require transforming the traditional 
top- down, technology-driven extension model to a more decentralized, farmer-led, and 
market-driven extension system. Innovation has become a focus of many development 
projects and innovation systems are the centerpiece of many development projects. Although 
the concept has been used to improve economic development in the North, its application to 
agriculture in developing countries has been recent (Hall et al. 2001). An innovation system 
comprises the organizations, enterprises, and individuals that together demand and supply 
knowledge and technology, and the rules and mechanisms by which these different agents 
interact. The innovation systems approach is a more holistic approach to planning knowledge 
production and use (World Bank 2007a:5).  
The innovation systems framework sees innovation in a more systematic, interactive 
and evolutionary way, whereby networks or organizations, together with the institutions and 
policies that influence their innovative behaviors and performance, bring new products and 
processes into economic and social use (Hall 2005:614). More emphasis is placed on 
fostering active interaction among diverse stakeholders and enhancing human capacity to 
continuously innovate to be able to adapt to changing social economic and environmental 
conditions. This is further enhanced by favorable policies that stimulate and support 
innovation, and utilization of new innovation. An environment that supports innovation is not 
the outcome of a single policy but of a set of policies that work together to shape innovative 
behavior and, consequently, performance (Mytelka 2000). The Ugandan government’s 
commitment to overcome the challenges in agriculture is reflected in its policy documents 
(i.e., the Plan for Modernization of Agriculture and Poverty Eradication Action Plan), and in 
Rwanda it is outlined in the National Agricultural Extension Strategy. Table 1-1 shows the 
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features of different approaches that have evolved over years. 
Table 1-1 Features of Agricultural Innovation Capacity Development Frameworks 
Defining Features Classic National 
Agricultural Research 
Systems (NARS) 
Classic Agricultural 
Knowledge and 
Information Systems 
(AKIS) as defined by 
FAO-World-Bank 2001) 
Agricultural Innovation 
Systems 
Purpose Planning capacity for 
agricultural research, 
technology 
development and 
transfer 
Strengthening 
communication and 
knowledge delivery 
services to people in the 
rural sector 
Strengthen the capacity to 
innovate and create novelty 
throughout the agricultural 
production and marketing 
system 
Actors 1. National 
Agricultural 
Research 
Organizations 
2. Agricultural 
universities or 
faculties 
3. Extension services 
4. Farmers  
1. National 
Agricultural 
Research 
Organizations 
2. Agricultural 
universities or 
faculties 
3. Extension services 
4. Farmers 
Potentially all actors in the 
public and private sectors 
involved in the creation, 
diffusion, adaptation and use of 
all types of knowledge relevant 
to agricultural production and 
marketing 
Outcome  Technological invention 
and technology transfer 
Technology adoption 
and innovation in 
agricultural production 
and marketing in rural 
areas 
Combination of technical and 
institutional innovations 
throughout the production, 
marketing, policy research and 
enterprise domains 
Organizing principle Using science to create 
knowledge*** 
Invention driven** 
Accessing agricultural 
knowledge*** 
Invention driven* 
New uses of knowledge for 
social and economic change*** 
Innovation driven** 
Mechanism of 
innovation 
Transfer of technology Interactive learning Interactive learning 
Degree of market 
integration 
Nil Low High 
Role of policy Resource allocation, 
priority setting 
Enabling framework Integrated component and 
enabling framework 
Nature of capacity 
strengthening 
Infrastructure and 
human resource 
development 
Strengthening 
communication between 
actors in rural areas 
Same as NARS and AKIS, plus: 
strengthening linkages and 
interaction; institutional 
developments to support 
interaction; learning and 
innovation; creating of an 
enabling policy environment 
Source: World Bank 2007 and Hall 2009 
Degree of emphasis: * = low; ** = medium; *** = high 
If agricultural research projects are to be successful in bringing about social and 
economic change, more partners along a value chain need to be included (Duncan 2011; Hall 
8 
 
8
 
et al. 1998). Approaches that seek to elicit information and knowledge from farmers and 
promote feedback loops are seen as alternatives to the linear approach (Hall 2007). 
Successful approaches for generating community change need to build on existing 
community capitals and focus on strengths rather than needs. The existing community assets 
are used to work towards the desired goals. The Appreciative Inquiry (AI) approach focuses 
on what works and instead of problems or needs (Flora and Flora 2008). Better ways of 
integrating indigenous knowledge with scientific knowledge through interactive processes of 
innovation are required (Bell 2006). In this respect, various institutions have worked on the 
concept of innovation platforms (IPs) to provide a space where different stakeholders interact 
to understand each other better, learn and develop shared priorities, define roles and agree on 
joint actions (Hall et al. 2003). 
 Innovation platforms have their roots in the innovation systems approach. IPs are 
seen as a significant improvement over the linear, less inclusive and less interactive 
traditional agricultural research and extension approach. Involvement of multiple 
stakeholders in agricultural research is thought to generate research outputs that will increase 
food security, increase access to markets, reduce poverty and malnutrition, and promote 
sustainable natural resource management (Mokwunye 2010). An IP is an arrangement in 
which a set of relatively interdependent stakeholders are identified and - usually through 
representatives - invited to meet and interact in a forum for conflict resolution, negotiation, 
social learning and collective decision making towards concerted action (Röling 2002). In 
this study, IP is defined as a forum in which multiple actors/stakeholders with meaningful 
interests in a common issue collaborate in identification of problems, share and develop new 
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ideas to better solve those problems, and implement creative solutions to improve 
livelihoods. 
An Overview of the sub-Saharan Africa Challenge (SSA-CP) Program 
The researchers in SSA-CP designed and implemented the integrated agricultural 
research for development (IAR4D) approach to respond to the need for a more interactive 
approach that involved diverse stakeholders along a commodity chain. The approach is 
aimed at improving agricultural research by involving different actors in research to ensure 
relevance, responsiveness of research to stakeholders’ needs and create an environment that 
enhances social learning. The aim of this pilot study is to determine whether an interactive 
approach to agricultural research with multiple stakeholders involved from program 
inception onwards, in the actual farming environment for smallholder farmers, can have more 
benefits than the traditional agricultural research and development approach. Innovation 
platforms are used as a mechanism to organize stakeholders (including farmers, pastoralists, 
rural communities, researchers, extension agents, development specialists, traders and 
processors, wholesalers and retailers, policy makers, regulators and consumers) who then 
identify research issues, problems, needs and opportunities in their respective localities and 
generate strategies to address them (FARA 2007).  
The IAR4D approach employs a decentralized system of governance in which 
community members are fully involved in decision-making. Decentralized programs transfer 
decision-making power to local institutions and ensure adequate participation of community 
members. However, decentralization leads to effective participation when local communities 
are empowered with rights and when local organizations account to local communities (Irvin 
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and Stansbury 2004; Martin and Lemon 2001). Without empowerment and commitment from 
political leaders and other local community leaders, decision-making power may not be 
distributed amongst the actors, which in turn influences participation (Kull 2002).  
The program was initiated in 2004 and operates in eight countries in three pilot 
learning sites in Africa (Lake Kivu region in East Africa, Zimbabwe-Mozambique-Malawi in 
Southern Africa and Kano-Katsina-Maradi in West Africa). The key principles which govern 
IAR4D include: 1) the innovation platform must be in place before initiating the process of 
establishing solutions to an identified problem; 2) non-linear collective and collaborative 
interaction among actors; 3) research addresses key constraints and opportunities approved 
by the IP in the context of entire value chains and sustainable livelihoods systems; 4) 
research process must be multi-disciplinary and participatory; and 5) build institutional and 
human capacity for IAR4D actors to participate effectively (FARA 2009b). 
Innovation Platforms and their Importance 
Innovation platforms (IPs) are knowledge generation and governance forms that 
emerge from complex dynamic processes. They emerge either through spontaneous 
processes or can be facilitated or directed (Consoli and Patrucco 2008). IPs facilitate 
integration of perspectives, knowledge and actions of different stakeholders around a 
common issue and foster learning through interaction (Hawkins et al. 2009). IP create 
interdependences among stakeholders, promote social learning, and build confidence and 
joint action (Röling 2002). Interdependent multiple stakeholders bring in diverse knowledge 
and experience which complement each other, fostering joint problem solving (Bouwen and 
Taillieu 2004). Multi-stakeholder platforms strengthen the relationship between different 
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stakeholders and create a favorable environment where local innovations and knowledge 
interact with scientific knowledge to achieve great synergies (Hall et al. 2003). Such 
platforms have been facilitated at farmer level to promote linkages among farmers, local 
government and service providers to enable the poor categories of farmers to benefit from 
different innovations (Röling 2002). IPs are believed to provide space where relevant 
stakeholders (such as farmers, pastoralists, rural communities, researchers, extension agents, 
development specialists, traders and processors, wholesalers and retailers, policy makers, 
regulators and consumers) are organized in a manner that facilitates effective, efficient, 
targeted research for development.  
Under the SSA-CP, 12 IPs were established in each Pilot Learning Site (PLS) and 
organized at sub-county level based on common challenges, to provide opportunities for 
action, reflection and learning. They are facilitated by a team of interdisciplinary scientists 
(Task Forces) to bring together stakeholders along the resource to consumption continuum, 
with a diverse range of knowledge and skills, on principles of mutual learning, resource 
sharing and knowledge management. IPs are organized to address issues concerning 
productivity enhancing technologies, natural resource management, marketing strategies, 
livelihood enhancing strategies, enabling policies and institutional arrangements (FARA 
2007).  
Each IP focuses on a specific value chain. Of the 12 IPs, seven were established 
during the last quarter of 2008 and five in the first quarter of 2009. The process of forming 
the IPs was either research-led or market-led. The older IPs used the research-led approach in 
which stakeholders were sensitized about the agricultural problems and how they could 
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contribute to resolving the problems. In the newer IPs, the market–led approach was used in 
which stakeholders were introduced to the available market opportunity and organized to 
access that market. IPs have a governance structure at sub-county level and parish level with 
an Executive Committee (with chair, vice chair, secretary, treasurer and committee members 
representing groups from different parishes) supported by sub-committees which focus on 
marketing, research, finance, natural resource management, and monitoring and evaluation 
(Tenywa et al. 2011). The process of IP formation has influence on processes examined in 
this dissertation.  
Description of the Study Area 
This study was conducted in Lake Kivu Region (the Great Lakes Region) where 
northeastern Rwanda, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and southwestern 
Uganda intersect (figure 1-1). The region is characterized by very steep slopes, a bimodal 
rainfall pattern, high population density and fragmented smallholder plots that are intensively 
cultivated (FARA 2005; FARA 2009a). The climate ranges between semi-humid (800mm 
per year) to humid (2000mm per year) and mild temperatures at higher elevations. The 
average land holding is 0.5 acres (FARA 2005). In Uganda, the study was conducted in 
Bubare and Bufundi sub-counties in Kabale district and Chahi sub-county in Kisoro district. 
In Rwanda, the study was conducted in Gataraga and Remera sub-counties in Musanze 
district. These sub-counties were selected by the challenge program based on the level of 
agricultural research for development between 2003 and 2008. These are sub-counties which 
have had either no or limited agricultural project interventions by NGOs or government, 
experience low crop and livestock production, and have poor access to markets. (Farrow, 
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Tenywa, and Nkonya Submitted). The challenge is to increase food production and nutrition, 
household incomes while conserving the natural resource base. 
Figure 1-1: Map Showing Location of Uganda and Rwanda 
 
Kabale district is located in southwestern Uganda and lies at an approximate altitude 
of 1,200-3000m. The district has a population of approximately 460,000 people, with 93% 
residing in rural areas. It is the third most densely populated rural district in Uganda after 
Mbale and Kisoro with overall population density of 345 persons km
2
. Kabale has a montane 
climate with a bimodal rainfall pattern. The mean annual rainfall is 1,092 mm, the mean 
annual temperature is 18° C and the relative humidity ranges between 90-100% in the 
mornings and 42-75% in afternoons throughout the year (Kabale District Council 2010). It 
has a total area of 1827 km
2
 of which 93% is under cultivation. An average household has 6-
7 plots of land measuring 0.1-0.7 acres each, which are normally scattered on different hills. 
The land on hilly slopes is highly fragmented. Agriculture is the main occupation of the 
district with 86% of its population being subsistence farmers. The main crops grown are 
14 
 
1
4
 
potato, beans, peas and sorghum. Potato is the main cash crop but the yields have declined 
due to declining soil fertility from continuous cropping with no inputs, soil erosion on hilly 
slopes and sedimentation in lowlands (Kabale District Council 2010).  
Kisoro district is located in the extreme southwestern part of Uganda and borders 
with Kanungu district to the North, Kabale district to the East, Rwanda to the South and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo to the West.  The district is mountainous and hilly, lying at an 
altitude of 1981m. It is one of the least developed and smallest districts in Uganda with a 
total area of approximately 729 km
2
 of which 662 km
2
 is open land and the rest is open water 
and swamps (Kisoro District Local Government 2008).  It has a population of approximately 
240,000 people. The population density is 324 persons per km
2
. The population pressure 
resulting from rapidly increasing population and delicate nature of landscape pose severe 
threats to land degradation. The district has a bimodal rainfall pattern with two rainy seasons 
(March to May and September to December). The annual rainfall ranges between 900-2200 
mm and the deep volcano soils make the district favorable for agriculture (Tenywa and 
Fungo 2011). The minimum and maximum temperature is 10
o
C and 26
o
C, respectively. The 
relative humidity is 80%. The main economic activity is agriculture and majority of the 
people practice subsistence farming. The main crops grown include corn, potato, sorghum, 
beans and vegetables (Kisoro District Local Government 2008).  
Musanze district is in the northern province of Rwanda and is the most mountainous 
district in Rwanda. The average altitude is 1860 m.  It has the largest part of the national 
volcano park which occupies 60% of the district’s total land area (530km2). The annual 
rainfall is 1400-1800mm and the average temperature is 20
o
C. The population in Musanze 
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district was estimated to be 317, 000 habitants. The population density is 593 habitants per 
km
2
. The volcanoes enhance soil fertility, thereby making the district favorable for 
agriculture. The major crops produced are potatoes, corn, wheat, beans, bananas, fruits, 
vegetables and flowers. The livestock reared include cows, goats, sheep, poultry, rabbits and 
pigs. The high population density and the relief hinder proper cultivation and the majority of 
famers are subsistence (District du Musanze 2007). 
Objectives, Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The purpose of this research was to examine the organizational structure and 
exchange of information and knowledge within IPs, the factors that motivate stakeholders to 
participate and contextual factors which influence motivations. This study also investigated 
the decision-making process and factors which influence decision-making (such as 
knowledge, access to information, control of resources, and policy) in IPs.  
 
Research questions  
The central questions to be addressed are:  
1a. How are IPs organized?  
1b. Does organizational structure influence information sharing for innovation?  
2a. What motivates different actors to participate in innovation platforms?  
2b. Does active participation enable actors to achieve their desired goals?  
2c. What are the factors which sustain or curtain participation?  
3a. Does active involvement of farmers enhance prioritization of issues that address their 
needs? 
3b. How do knowledge, access to information and resources influence decision- making?  
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3c. Which contextual factors influence decision-making and implementation of 
decisions? 
 
Hypotheses  
The hypotheses tested include: 
1a. The level of interaction among actors within an IP is positively associated with the 
degree of vertical and horizontal decentralization in the IP. 
1b. The level of trust among stakeholders is positively related to the amount of 
knowledge and information shared. 
2a. Expectation of material and economic benefits positively affects the degree of actors’ 
participation in innovation platforms. 
2b. Active participation positively affects benefits derived from IPs. 
2c. Lack of short-term benefits has a negative effect on continued participation of actors. 
3a. Active involvement of farmers in decision-making enhances prioritization of issues 
that are of concern to farmers. 
3b. Actors with more access to knowledge, information, and financial resources have 
more influence in decision-making. 
3c. Contextual factors such as existing hierarchical structures, supportive national and 
local policies will influence decision-making and implementation of decisions. 
Methods and Data  
Data were collected from five IPs, i.e., Bubare sorghum IP, Bufundi potato IP, and 
Chahi potato IP in Uganda, and Isangano Gataraga potato IP and Remera maize IP in 
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Rwanda. This study was conducted between September-December 2010 after approval of the 
research protocol by the institutional review board (IRB) of Iowa State University. Data were 
collected using semi-structured interviews, in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. 
A team of researchers (including myself and research assistants) conducted semi-structured 
interviews with 184 farmers at parish/village level to verify information provided by their 
representatives at sub-county level. We randomly sampled farmers from up-to-date 
membership lists obtained from IP chairpersons. I conducted 34 in-depth interviews with 
members from the private business sector, researchers, non-governmental organization 
(NGO) staff, IP chairpersons, local policy makers and implementers, and extension workers. 
I also conducted six focus group discussions (FGDs) with farmers’ representatives. The in-
depth interviews and FGDS were digitally recorded and transcribed to permit detailed coding 
(open, axial and selective coding). I analyzed the transcribed interviews qualitatively using 
line by line coding to identify the major themes and categories that emerged. The Statistical 
Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) was used to analyze quantitative data.  
Organization of this Dissertation 
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the IP organizational 
structure and information sharing. The level of vertical and horizontal decentralization across 
IPs is examined. The chapter uses social capital theory to explain the factors which facilitate 
information sharing among IP hierarchies. Chapter 3 investigates the factors which motivate 
actors to participate in IPs and the role of contextual factors in influencing participation in 
IPs. Social exchange and social capital theories are used to examine the relationship between 
motivations and participation in IPs. Chapter 4 focuses on power and influence in decision-
making, articulating the type of actors who have increased or gained power and participants 
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who do not have enough power to enact their roles and accomplish their goals. Contextual 
factors within which decisions are made and their influence on decision-making are also 
analyzed.  Chapter 5 presents a summary of the empirical findings, conclusion, and 
implications for facilitators of innovation platforms, policy and theory as well as areas for 
further research. 
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CHAPTER 2. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND INFORMATION 
SHARING WITHIN INNOVATION PLATFORMS  
Manuscript prepared for submission to the Journal of Development Studies 
Abstract 
There is growing interest in design and implementation of innovation platforms (IPs) 
for agricultural research to improve farmers’ livelihoods. The study examined the 
relationship between organizational structure and interaction among diverse stakeholders 
within five IPs in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. Data were collected in Uganda and 
Rwanda Sept.-Dec. 2010 through semi-structured interviews, in-depth interviews and focus 
group discussions. The structure of IPs evolved over time to form decentralized clusters for 
innovation at different implementation levels. Size, age of IP, and nature of landscape 
determined the extent of vertical and horizontal decentralization. IPs that were highly 
decentralized both vertically and horizontally demonstrated high knowledge and information 
sharing among actors. This was enhanced by social capital, which motivates actors to 
exchange knowledge and information. Less vertically and horizontally decentralized IPs had 
less effective two-way information flow. Farmer representatives who directly accessed 
critical information and knowledge controlled the distribution of knowledge and information.  
Introduction 
There is increased interest in the past decade in design and implementation of 
innovation platforms (IPs) for agricultural research in order to generate research output that 
directly responds to the needs of smallholder farmers. An IP is an arrangement in which a set 
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of relatively interdependent stakeholders are identified and - usually through representatives - 
invited to meet and interact in a forum for conflict resolution, negotiation, social learning and 
collective decision making towards concerted action (Röling 2002). In this study, an IP is 
defined as a forum in which multiple actors with meaningful interests in a common issue 
collaborate in identification of agricultural problems, share and develop new ideas to better 
solve those problems, and implement creative solutions to improve livelihoods. The words 
actors and stakeholders are used interchangeably. 
Scholars argue that the organization of agricultural research and extension is the 
major reason why agricultural research and development projects have failed to improve 
livelihoods of resource poor farmers (Hall 2007). The traditional agricultural research and 
extension approach follows a linear approach in which researchers and experts produce new 
knowledge and technology, and then transfer it to the end users who need it to innovate and 
change. The approach lacks interaction among different knowledge sources, and there is 
limited appreciation of local and indigenous knowledge (Lundy et al. 2005). 
Improving the effectiveness of agricultural research requires complementary 
organizational, and policy changes so that research outputs are put into productive use. 
Approaches that elicit information and knowledge from farmers and promote feedback loops 
are seen as alternatives to the linear approach (Hall 2007). In addition, better ways of 
integrating indigenous knowledge with scientific knowledge through interactive processes of 
innovation are required (Bell 2006). If agricultural research projects are to be successful in 
bringing about social and economic change, more partners along a value chain need to be 
included (Hall et al. 1998; Duncan 2011). Engagement of multiple knowledge sources 
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requires dedicated coordination of activities and knowledge to generate and sustain 
complementarities across diverse competences (Ekboir et al. 2009; Hawkins et al. 2009). 
The sub-Saharan African Challenge Program (SSA-CP) has responded to the need for 
pro-poor oriented research involving diverse partners by designing and implementing an 
Integrated Agricultural Research for Development (IAR4D) approach. In this approach, IPs 
are used as forums for involvement of multiple actors (rural communities, researchers, 
extension agents, development specialists, traders and processors, wholesalers and retailers, 
and policy makers) to identify and conduct pro-poor oriented research (FARA 2007). IPs are 
seen as a significant improvement over the linear, less inclusive and less interactive 
traditional agricultural research and extension approach.  
IPs are believed to facilitate integration of perspectives, knowledge and actions of 
different stakeholders around a common issue and foster learning through interaction 
(Hawkins et al. 2009).  Organizing effective patterns of interaction between diverse 
knowledge sources is the central principle for innovation systems because it’s through 
interaction that important pieces of information and ideas are brought together to facilitate 
innovation (Hall 2007). Therefore, IPs present an interesting setting for exploring the 
relationship between structure and information sharing among actors. 
However, ‘innovation platform’ is a relatively new concept in agricultural research 
for development. There is limited knowledge and understanding of how best to organize IPs 
to facilitate numerous and multi-directional interaction among diverse stakeholders to 
collectively generate, share and utilize knowledge to address the needs of smallholder 
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farmers. Lack of this information limits the ability of researchers, development practitioners 
and policy makers to design and implement strategies that build trust, foster interaction and 
coordination among diverse actors. The purpose of this research was to examine the structure 
and the exchange of information and knowledge among multiple actors by studying five IPs 
in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. The two central questions to be addressed are:  
1. How are IPs organized?  
2. Does organizational structure influence information sharing for innovation?  
This paper uses social capital theory to explain the relationship between structure and 
information sharing within IPs.  Key elements of structure include centralization, 
decentralization, formalization and complexity. The paper focuses on centralization and 
decentralization. 
I hypothesize that IPs which are highly decentralized (both vertically and 
horizontally) have higher levels of interaction among stakeholders. The innovation sub-
clusters
1
 and high frequency of interaction between farmers and their representatives 
facilitate information sharing. This is enhanced by a high level of trust among stakeholders at 
different implementation levels. This analysis contributes to innovation systems theory by 
proposing effective ways of organizing innovation systems that enhance information and 
knowledge exchange. The study also contributes to organization theories by critically 
                                                          
1 An innovation cluster consists of groups of actors with different expertise who gather 
together to share information and knowledge to address common issues in an entire value 
chain. An innovation sub-cluster is a group of actors with similar characteristics. It’s a subset 
of an innovation cluster. 
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examining the structure of IPs that stimulate and promote knowledge and information 
exchange. This information can be utilized by policy makers and conveners of IPs to design 
and implement strategies that facilitate interaction and learning among multiple actors, and to 
modify the current linear approaches of agricultural research. The paper may have practical 
implications for conveners and members of IPs to design structures, which facilitate 
information sharing among stakeholders along a value chain. The paper also has policy 
implications for policy makers in reforming agricultural research that promotes inclusion of 
the scientific and non-scientific communities in research.  
This paper is organized as follows. The second section presents an overview of the 
sub-Saharan Africa Challenge program and IPs. Section three discusses organizational 
structure, knowledge and information exchange. Section four characterizes the methods and 
data. Lastly, section five articulates the conclusions and implications.  
The sub-Saharan Africa Challenge Program and Innovation Platforms 
The SSA-CP designed and is piloting a systems-based IAR4D approach as an 
alternative to the linear, less interactive traditional agricultural research and extension 
approach. The goal is to address low agricultural production caused by a set of factors: use of 
unimproved seeds and improper agronomic practices; low soil fertility resulting from a 
degraded natural resource base; failure to link agricultural production to markets; and 
inadequate and inappropriate policies (Mokwunye and Ellis-Jones 2010). The program was 
initiated in 2004 and operates in eight countries in three pilot learning sites in Africa (Lake 
Kivu region in east Africa, Zimbabwe-Mozambique-Malawi in southern Africa and Kano-
Katsina-Maradi in west Africa). This study was conducted in Lake Kivu Region (the Great 
29 
 
2
9
 
Lakes Region) where northeastern Rwanda, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
and southwestern Uganda intersect.  
In this region, 12 IPs – each with a specific value chain - were established (four in 
each country). Seven of the IPs were established during the last quarter of 2008 and five in 
the first quarter of 2009. The process of visioning and stakeholder analysis was either 
research-led or market-led. The older IPs used the research-led approach in which 
stakeholders were sensitized about the agricultural problems and how they could contribute 
to resolving the problems. In the newer IPs, the market–led approach was used in which 
stakeholders were introduced to the available market opportunity and organized to access that 
market (Tenywa et al. 2011). Actors in an IP work in partnership to bring about desired 
changes, are technically competent, and have incentives to jointly innovate to address 
problems along the entire value chain (FARA 2009a). 
IPs were organized at sub-county level
2
 based on common challenges to provide 
opportunities for collective action, reflection and learning. The IPs are facilitated by a team 
of interdisciplinary scientists (Task Force) to bring together stakeholders along the 
production to consumption continuum, possessing a diverse range of knowledge and skills 
regarding principles of mutual learning, resource sharing and knowledge management. IP 
address issues concerning productivity enhancing technologies, marketing strategies, natural 
resource management and enabling policies (FARA 2007).  
                                                          
2 Sub-county is the third political administrative unit in Uganda and Rwanda. The sub-county 
is subdivided into parishes or cells. Parishes contain villages, the lowest political 
administrative units. 
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IPs have an Executive Committee (with chair, vice chair, secretary, treasurer and 
committee members representing groups from different parishes) supported by sub-
committees which focus on marketing, research, finance, natural resource management, and 
monitoring and evaluation. The Executive committee, together with other actors, meets at 
sub-county level and makes operational decisions, e.g., developing the agenda, convening IP 
meetings, and following-up on decisions made (Tenywa et al. 2011). The governance 
structure at sub-county level is paralleled at lower implementation levels to ensure proper 
coordination of activities among levels. A cross-site research support team (CRST) builds the 
capacity of IP members by providing technical support in key areas, i.e., increasing 
production, access to markets, natural resource management and policy (FARA 2009b). In 
the next section, I discuss organizational structure and information sharing. 
Organizational Structure  
Organizing systems of innovation places emphasis on creating patterns of 
organization that foster information flow for decision-making. Some of the patterns are 
formed when the system is defined, and some emerge in the process of learning (Hall 2007). 
Organizational structure is not fixed for all the time. Structure emerges from interaction, but 
over time it tends to influence interactions (Giddens 1984). Structure is conceptualized as the 
arrangement of individuals in groups, and groups in networks, with special emphasis on 
patterns of interaction and information exchange among these components (O'Reilly and 
Roberts 1977). The ‘arrangement’ should be capable of coping with a rapidly changing 
environment in which sudden events can change established patterns of identity, 
organizational culture, routine and capabilities (Ciborra 1996; Hawkins et al. 2009). When 
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individuals are grouped and arranged in a certain way, they behave differently from a group 
structured in a different way (Becker and Baloff 1969). 
Previous studies have revealed organizational structure as one of the most important 
factors influencing innovation capabilities. Group structure influences group processes such 
as communication, coordination, leadership, political processes and power (Ekboir et al. 
2009). Structure affects information and knowledge exchange, which consequently affects 
performance. To enhance performance of the innovation system, proper coordination is 
needed in the process of negotiating and implementing action plans (Daane et al. 2009). 
Existing literature presents two models of organizational structure, i.e., the 
mechanical and organic structure. Organizations with a mechanical structure are more 
centralized, formalized and specialized.  The organic structure is more decentralized, less 
formalized, with low levels of specialization (Damanpour and Gopalakrishnan 1998; Ekboir 
et al. 2009; Olson and Eoyang 2001). The organic structure is built on confidence that all 
actors in their positions have the ability to make informed decisions unlike the mechanical 
structure which does not reflect trust in the capability of people at lower levels (Olson and 
Eoyang 2001). This paper focuses on centralization and decentralization. 
Centralization and Decentralization 
Centralization is “the level and variety of participation in strategic decisions by 
groups relative to the number of groups in the organizations” (p. 65). Centralization and 
decentralization are not absolute but two ends of a continuum. A more centralized structure 
has greater coordination but less flexibility (Hall and Tolbert 2005). A centralized structure is 
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essential for understanding the knowledge structures since it captures the pattern and 
direction of knowledge flow within the organization (Rulke and Galaskiewicz 2000). 
However, in centralized structures, critical knowledge and information is shared among a 
small number of individuals (Gigone and Haste 1993). Centralized structures concentrate 
decision-making authority in a small number of individuals at the higher levels of the 
hierarchy (Tsai 2002). Centralization limits participation in decision making thus reducing 
communication, commitment and involvement with tasks among members (Damanpour 
1991; Rogers 2003; Sivadas and Dwyer 2000).  
Decentralization refers to the extent to which decision-making power is concentrated 
in a few positions or dispersed throughout the organization. Decentralized structures have 
few layers of organization hierarchy to foster quick response and a high level of vertical and 
horizontal communication to ensure coordinated action (Koufteros and Vonderembse 1998). 
Decentralized structures increase the amount of information available (Rogers 2003), and 
enhance communication, interpersonal exchanges and social interactions for information and 
knowledge exchange. Decentralized groups with minimal hierarchies have maximum 
knowledge and information flow (Albrecht and Ropp 1984). Decentralized structures have a 
number of communication channels which enhance access to information (Forsyth 2010; 
Rogers 2003). However, organizations may face problems integrating ideas coming from 
different members (Hall and Tolbert 2005). The nature of decentralization depends upon who 
is able to exercise power, and the accountability relations to which they are subject. If powers 
are decentralized to actors who are not accountable to their constituents, or who are only 
accountable to themselves or superior authorities within the structure, then the interests of the 
constituencies are less represented. It is only when constituents come to exercise 
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accountability as a countervailing power that decentralization is likely to be effective 
(Agrawal and Ribbot 1999). Constituencies would be able to stop or reverse a decision/action 
which does not meet their interests. 
Mintzberg (1979) further distinguishes organizational structure into horizontal and 
vertical centralization and decentralization. Vertical and horizontal centralization is where 
power is concentrated in the hands of a single individual at the top of the hierarchy. Vertical 
decentralization is where decision-making power is distributed to managers down the 
hierarchy of authority. Horizontal decentralization is the extent to which decision making is 
distributed among non-managers at the same level (Mintzberg 1979). This paper adapts 
Mintzberg’s classification of vertical and horizontal decentralization. In this study, vertical 
decentralization refers to distribution of decision-making roles to lower level innovation 
clusters (parish/village level innovation clusters). Horizontal decentralization refers to 
distribution of decision-making roles to innovation sub-clusters at the parish/village levels.  
Information flow depends on the structure and quality of social networks. Horizontal 
networks are effective in persuading peers, support construction and the re-framing of 
meaning about a practice or technology. Vertical networks are more effective in diffusing 
codified information and authoritative decisions (Deroïan 2002). Horizontal communication 
processes help to generate internal consensus through guided discussions, easing the 
transition from an individual to a shared organizational vision. These processes generate 
collective or organizational knowledge (Ekboir et al. 2009). Organizations often face 
information distortions which negatively affect performance. Information distortion may 
result from unavailability of information, incorrect communication, unavailability of agents 
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expected to solve a problem, or lack of appropriate communication channels. The effect of 
information distortion on centralized or decentralized structures depends on the task 
environment and contextual factors (Carley and Lin 1997). 
Organizational characteristics such as size and age influence organizational structure. 
Size significantly determines the level of centralization and decentralization. Larger 
organizational size puts more pressure on top management, thereby leading to increased 
delegation of roles or decentralization (Hall and Tolbert 2005). In addition, structure reflects 
the age of the organization. As organizations grow, they change structural features that may 
improve performance. However, age alone may not explain change in structure. Other factors 
such as environment, economic and technical conditions influence organizational structure 
(Mintzberg 1979).  
Interaction and information sharing 
In innovation systems, emphasis is placed on fostering active interaction among 
diverse stakeholders and enhancing human capacity to continuously innovate to be able to 
adapt to changing social, economic and environmental conditions (Hall, Mytelka, and 
Oyeyinka 2005). The ability to effectively transfer knowledge among individuals within an 
organization is critical to the processes and outcomes of an organization (Szulanski 1996). 
Previous studies have recognized the importance of social interaction in information and 
knowledge sharing among individuals. Interaction among individuals within groups and 
organizations may build trust (Granovetter 1985; Maskell 2000). Frequent interaction 
increases the level of trust and enables actors to know each other, share information, and 
create a common understanding (Maskell 2000; Tsai and Ghoshal 1998).  
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Knowledge and information sharing is enhanced by trust and mutual understanding 
among members (Bouty 2000; Levin and Cross 2004). The existence of trust among parties 
fosters willingness to engage in cooperative interaction (Nahapiet and Ghoshal. 1998). 
Where the level of trust among actors is high, actors are more motivated to exchange 
knowledge and cooperate (Putnam 1993). The networks, norms and trust inherent in social 
relations among individuals within a group can foster cooperation and information exchange 
both within and between groups (Flora and Fora 2008). To build the necessary level of trust 
among stakeholders, representation, inclusiveness and transparency are very critical. 
Involvement of stakeholders in meaningful dialogues in which they feel ownership and the 
possibility of deriving benefits fosters acceptability of activities (Burger and Claudia 2003). 
Effective interaction among stakeholders depends on two-way exchange of 
information and knowledge (both tacit and codified). Two-way information flow is often 
constrained by poor networks, coordination among stakeholders (World Bank 2007) and 
language (Critchley, Verburg, and Veldhuize 2006). Information sharing is also constrained 
by lack of personal motivation to share knowledge (Stenmark 2001). The increasing value 
given to knowledge and the persons possessing the right kind of knowledge create 
perceptions of power around knowledge. If individuals realize that their power results from 
the knowledge they possess, it limits knowledge sharing (Davenport and Prusak 1997; Gupta 
and Govindarajan 2000). Differences in power and status among actors within an 
organization are likely to inhibit the rate of feedback communications between levels and as 
the social distance between organizational levels increases, free flow of information 
decreases (Barnard 1946). On the other hand, reciprocity facilitates knowledge sharing if 
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individuals perceive that the status given to them depends on the knowledge shared 
(Hendriks 1999; Weiss 1999) and if they perceive it as worthwhile to share knowledge with 
others (Schultz 2001).  
Hypotheses tested 
H1: The level of information sharing among actors within an IP is positively associated with 
the degree of vertical and horizontal decentralization in the IP 
H2: The level of trust among stakeholders is positively related to the amount of knowledge 
and information shared 
Figure 2-1: Relationship between structure and information sharing 
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Methods and Data  
The study was conducted in Uganda and Rwanda, two of the three sub pilot learning 
sites (PLS) in Lake Kivu Region between September-December 2010. The region is 
characterized by very steep slopes, a bimodal rainfall pattern, high population density and 
fragmented smallholder plots that are intensively cultivated (FARA 2005; FARA 2009a). 
The nature of the terrain affects interaction between IP members and consequently 
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information and knowledge sharing. In Uganda, the study was conducted in Bubare and 
Bufundi sub-counties in Kabale district and Chahi sub-county in Kisoro district. In Rwanda, 
the study was conducted in Gataraga and Remera sub-counties in Musanze district. Figure 2-
2 shows the location of Rwanda and Uganda. 
Figure 2-2: Map of Africa showing location of Rwanda and Uganda 
 
Five of the 12 IPs in the region were studied to reflect the variation in organizational 
structure and interaction. The IPs studied were Bubare sorghum IP, Bufundi potato IP, and 
Chahi potato IP in Uganda, Isangano Gataraga potato IP, and Remera maize IP in Rwanda. 
Selection was based on date of formation, enterprise of focus, and approach of formation 
(Table 2-1). Figure 2-3 shows the location of IP studied. 
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Table 2-1: Characteristics of the Selected IPs 
Country Name of IP Date 
Formed 
Membership No. of 
parishes 
Approach Sample 
Male Female 
Uganda Bubare sorghum Sept. 2009 83 96 6 Market-led 42 
Bufundi potato Nov. 2008 65 77 5 Research-led 42 
Chahi potato Nov. 2008 62 77 3 Research-led 43 
Rwanda Isangano Gataraga 
potato 
Nov. 2008 160 98 4 Research-led 41 
Remera maize Sept. 2009 29 27 4 Market-led 16 
 
Figure 2-3: Map Showing Location of IPs in Lake Kivu Region 
 
Source: (Farrow, Tenywa, and Nkonya (Submitted)) 
Data were collected using survey, in-depth interviewing and focus group 
methodologies to triangulate the information to improve its validity and reliability 
(Verschuren and Doorewaard 1999). The research protocol was approved for human subjects 
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quality assurance by Iowa State University’s Institutional Review Board. I recruited research 
assistants from Uganda and Rwanda and trained them in data collection. Before participating 
in data collection, research assistants completed the online training on the protection of 
human research participants. My research assistants and I interviewed 184 farmers at the 
lower implementation level (parish/village level) to verify information given by their 
representatives at sub-county level.  We used semi-structured questionnaires, which we pre-
tested with 15 IP members to ensure the effectiveness of the instrument.  Up to date lists of 
IP members were obtained from the IP chairpersons and we randomly sampled from those 
lists.  Semi-structured interviews generated information about: (1) IP representation, (2) 
effectiveness of representatives in giving feedback, (3) frequency of interaction between 
respondents and their representatives, (4) type of information received and whether 
information was delivered in a timely manner and (5) participation in decision-making. We 
used checklists with in-depth interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) to explore 
issues about the structure of the IP, how it changed over time, and interactions among actors 
at the different implementation levels.  
I conducted 34 in-depth interviews with private business operators, researchers, NGO 
staff, IP chairpersons, local policy makers/implementers and extension workers. We 
conducted six FGDs with farmers’ representatives. Interviews were conducted in English and 
local languages. In-depth interviews and focus group discussions were digitally recorded and 
transcribed to permit detailed coding (open, axial and selective coding). I developed the 
initial codes through line-by-line coding. I used the Statistical Package for Social Scientists 
(SPSS) to analyze quantitative data from household surveys. I operationalized structure in a 
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way that captured variation in the vertical and horizontal dimensions. Vertical 
decentralization was measured by the extent to which members in lower level innovation 
clusters were involved in decision making. Horizontal decentralization was measured by the 
involvement of innovation sub-clusters in decision-making. Information sharing was 
operationalized in terms of the frequency of interaction with representatives, and feedback 
exchanges. The following section discusses the findings from the study. 
Results and Discussion 
a) Characteristics of farmer respondents 
A slight majority of respondents were female (54%), with Chahi potato IP being the 
most female dominated. In contrast, most (63%) respondents in Isangano Gataraga potato IP 
were male. The chi-square test shows a significant difference in sex of respondents across IPs 
(p=0.027), which could partially explain variation in interaction. The median age of 
respondents was 45 years (Q1=35 and Q3=52) and the modal age category was 18-39 (35%). 
Gataraga had more members in the lower age category, while Remera had more members 
above age 50. The chi-square test indicates a significant difference in age across the IPs 
(p=0.006). This might partially explain variation in information sharing among IP members. 
Most of the respondents had attained a primary level of education (68%). Compared to other 
IPs, Isangano Gataraga potato IP had more members who had attained secondary education 
(39%). The level of education could influence knowledge and information exchange among 
actors within IPs.  
b) Organizational Structure and Information Sharing 
(i) Organizational structure 
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All the IPs were initially organized using a decentralized cluster approach. The 
structure of older IPs had evolved since inception in 2008. At inception, the older IPs (i.e., 
Bufundi, Chahi and Isangano Gataraga potato IPs) had innovation clusters at two 
implementation levels, i.e., the strategic and operational levels. The strategic level involves 
executives of participating organizations who develop strategies to promote innovation along 
a given commodity chain at national level and also influence policy. Actors at the strategic 
level also facilitate activities at the operational levels. At inception, all actors met at the core 
operational level (i.e., the sub-county innovation cluster) to identify research issues, explore 
opportunities, identify solutions, develop action plans, and implement solutions.  
 At the time of the study, two of the older IPs (Bufundi and Gataraga) had undergone a 
process of re-structuring by creating innovation sub-clusters at parish/village levels to 
facilitate effective knowledge and information sharing among members, and coordination of 
activities (Figure 2-4). This was attributed to the size of IPs (in terms of membership and size 
of parishes), nature of landscape, distance to meeting venue and poor infrastructure (mostly 
mentioned by Bufundi IP members), which made information and knowledge sharing 
inefficient.  Bufundi sub-county had the poorest transportation and telecommunication 
infrastructure of all the sub-counties. Some of the farmers interviewed reported that: 
At first, we had a demonstration and when we used the demonstration for the 
parish, people failed to turn up because they complained that the 
demonstrations where very far. So when we came back, we had to form 
groups that are nearby (FGD participant, Bufundi, Nov. 12, 2010) 
 
Because Gataraga is large, we divided it into groups. Farmers are trained and 
do field demonstrations in those groups. In each group, we divided into other 
smaller groups called PIP Pepiniere d’innovation de Plate-forme  made of 5-
7 persons. We did this because it is easier to work when you are in small 
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numbers than to work when you are in a big group (FGD participant, 
Gataraga, Dec. 17, 2010) 
It was not effective. It was tiresome for farmers. In the meetings at the sub-
county, we had refreshments so we were about 120 and in such gathering it 
was big for the Challenge Program, including inconveniencing farmers. So, 
we said let’s come down to the parish. Maybe it will be more participatory. 
And it is participatory. At least in my parish, the turn up is good (farmer, 
Chahi, Nov. 19, 2010) 
In addition, the training conducted by SCAPRI project (Strengthening of University 
Capacity for Promoting, Facilitating and Teaching Rural Innovation Processes) to sensitize 
farmers about the concept of IPs led to the re-organization of IPs. The training was directly 
provided only to Ugandan IPs, but the knowledge was scaled-out through meetings to IPs in 
Rwanda and Democratic Republic of Congo. 
There was a difference in the level of decentralization (horizontal and vertical) 
between the older and newer IPs. Isangano Gataraga and Bufundi potato IPs were further 
decentralized through formation of innovation clusters at parish/village level (vertical 
decentralization) and innovation sub-clusters within parishes/villages (horizontal 
decentralization). Farmers in Isangano Gataraga potato IP were organized into groups at 
parish/village level composed of 20-30 members (vertical decentralization) and each group 
was further sub-divided into smaller innovation clusters called Pepiniere d’innovation de 
Plate-forme (PIP) (horizontal decentralization). Each PIP was composed of 5-7 farmers. 
4
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Figure 2-4: Overall Structure of IPs at Inception and After Inception 
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Similarly, Bufundi IP had innovation sub-clusters at parish/village level (horizontal 
decentralization). They were organized into groups based on the technologies to be 
promoted. The innovation sub-clusters formed concerned soil and water conservation (also 
called fanya chini and fanya juu group), bean production, potato production, livestock 
production and agro-processing. These sub-clusters were formed to increase access to 
information by farmers who lived far from the originally centralized demonstration plots, 
strengthen group cohesion and increase performance.  Bubare Sorhum IP, Chahi potato IP 
and Remera maize IP did not have smaller innovation sub-clusters at parish/village level. 
However, they had individual farmers who hosted technologies in demonstration plots. This 
could be attributed to the size and age of IPs, with larger and two of the older IPs (Bufundi 
and Gataraga potato IPs) having more innovation clusters and sub-clusters: 
The re-structuring of sub-county IP was due to the number of members which 
was big to contain at sub-county level, like in the meetings. Per now, we have 
reached the parish level and the numbers are still minimal. That is why we’ve 
not gone to village level (FGD participant, Chahi, Nov. 17, 2010) 
Since two of the three older IPs had re-structured to form innovation sub-clusters, it 
implies that age alone may not necessary influence structure of IPs. Size and nature of 
landscape are major determinants of organization structure. However, there might be no 
optimum size of an IP since new stakeholders with relevant skills and opportunities are 
continuously identified while other members may withdraw. As group size increases, the 
range of abilities, knowledge and skills that are available to the group increase. However, 
organizational problems increase due to the greater number of potential interpersonal 
relationships. Larger group size inhibits participation of group members, decreases the rate of 
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communication and interpersonal attraction (Shaw 1976), and management of information 
becomes a challenge (Goetsch and McFarland 1980). Therefore, larger groups are more 
likely to form sub-groups (Shaw 1976).  Table 2-2 presents a summary of structural 
characteristics based on were decisions are made. 
Table 2-2: Summary of Structural Characteristics of IPs 
Name of 
IP 
Vertical Decentralization of 
Innovation Clusters 
Horizontal Decentralization Degree of Decentralization 
Sub-
County  
Parish  Village  Parish / 
Village 
groups  
Parish / Village 
sub-groups 
Vertical Horizontal 
Bubare 
Sorghum 
     Low Low 
Bufundi 
Potato 
     High Moderate 
Chahi 
Potato 
     Low Low 
Gataraga 
potato 
     High High 
Remera 
Maize 
     Low Low 
Decision-making 
Decisions were made collectively within clusters at the different implementation 
levels and decisions that could not be made at lower levels were forwarded to the sub-county 
innovation cluster, e.g., decisions concerning bylaws
3
 for natural resource management.  
                                                          
3 Bylaws are rules made by lower local government councils at village (LC1) and sub-county level 
(LC3) and provide the local policy guidelines to be followed in sectoral developments, such as 
agricultural and natural resource management. Bylaws for natural resource management are now seen 
as viable alternatives for enforcing government policies and rectifying their inefficiencies (Sanginga 
et al. 2004). Policies refer to laws, rules and regulations from public or state or collective decision-
making (Means et al. 2002). 
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We usually identify issues in meetings. Mainly, we focus on issues raised in 
reports from parishes. From the parish reports, we identify areas or problems 
to discuss... Issues are prioritized in our meetings at sub-county level. We 
collect a number of ideas (farmer, Bubare, Nov. 7, 2010) 
The sub county executive makes decisions. The decisions are made annually. 
During monthly meetings in Parishes, members express their needs. What 
they cannot solve, is taken to the sub-county. Things like money or penalty 
can be solved at parish level (local policy implementer, Chahi, Nov. 18, 2010) 
Identification of problems starts at the PIP. They present their problems to the 
group. The group makes decisions. These problems are then presented in the 
meeting involving all groups in the IP (FGD member, Gatarga, Dec. 12, 2010)  
The sub-county innovation cluster was the hub where information collected from all 
other clusters was processed, decisions are made and feedback is given to the members in 
other clusters. Decisions concerning stakeholders to bring on board were made within the 
sub-county innovation cluster and decisions such as problems to address, and use of 
membership fee were made at both the sub-county and parish/village innovation clusters.  
One of the participants emphasized involvement of stakeholders in decision-making 
as a principle of IAR4D, which reflects the potential of IPs to promote participatory decision-
making. Involvement in decision-making encourages actors to willingly share information 
and knowledge. 
IAR4D [Integrated Agricultural Research for Development] talks about 
involving all relevant stakeholders in decision-making...it’s the people who 
come to those meetings to discuss the problems and solutions and decide who 
to bring on board. The list of stakeholders is finalized by the people who come 
to these meetings. It’s not the site coordinator or anybody else who says let so 
and so come on board (researcher, Kabale, Nov. 29, 2010)  
The results indicate that different types of decisions were made at different 
implementation levels. Individuals at higher levels made decisions that had more influence. 
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For instance, in Rwanda the local government made decisions concerning land use and major 
crops to grow in particular areas. This could be attributed to variation in the political 
environment. In Uganda, IP decisions on by-laws were made with the involvement of other 
actors, although dominated by local government officials since it was their role to implement 
by-laws.  
In the meetings, everybody has the right to speak. We make decisions 
democratically. All members participate in decision making but the big 
decision is made by RADA Rwanda Agricultural Development Authority  
(extension worker, Musanze, Dec. 17, 2010) 
This implies that although IPs were decentralized, there was a degree of centralization 
since decisions with major impact were made by individuals at the top of the 
hierarchy.  
Representation  
Farmer representatives served as the link between innovation clusters at sub-county 
and parish/village implementation levels. On the other hand, IP managers linked the sub-
county innovation cluster and the national/region innovation cluster. Representatives were 
responsible for transferring information and knowledge both vertically and horizontally. 
Overall, most (76%) of the respondents across the IPs reported that their representatives were 
voted by farmers (57% in Bubare sorghum IP, 65% in Bufundi potato IP, 88% in Chahi 
potato IP, 92% in Gataraga IP and 92% in Remera IP). However, the chi-square test indicated 
a significant difference in knowledge on selection of representatives (p=0.013). About 31% 
of the respondents from Bubare IP did not know how their representatives were selected. 
This influences the interaction between farmers and their representatives, thereby affecting 
vertical and horizontal knowledge and information sharing. 
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These findings support the literature on multi-stakeholder processes. Ensuring 
representation is recognized as a challenge in facilitating multiple actor learning systems 
(Edmunds and Wollenberg 2001). In system-wide processes of creating change, most of the 
actors who participate are representatives who are supposed to represent their constituencies, 
such as villages. However, representatives are not elected by the constituencies that they 
represent. They are appointed through traditional forms of governance or authority, and often 
are not accountable to their constituencies (Groot et al. 2002). 
The number of farmer representatives ranged between one and four based on the size 
of group (membership), size of parish (no. of villages) and number of issues to be raised. 
More than one-half (58%) of the respondents reported having only male representatives, 19% 
had only female representatives, and 17% had both male and female representatives; some 
respondents did not know their representatives. Poor representation of women in leadership 
was attributed to the high level of illiteracy among women and absence of women in 
meetings during election. 
Men occupy most of the positions in the IP because majority of the women are 
illiterate. Men also have the capacity to lead because they are educated (FGD 
participant, Chahi, Nov. 17, 2010)  
We have eight parishes and each has two representatives. Some are 
represented by male and females. Where you find males only, during the 
meeting at the sub-county, only men attended that meeting (farmer, Bubare, 
Nov. 7, 2010) 
Women from this region are not civilized because they live close to the 
volcano forest. They do not like to go to the sub-county. They are afraid of 
leadership (farmer, Gataraga, Dec. 17, 2010) 
Although women may be well represented as group members, they have a weak 
representation in leadership positions and the number is lower as one moves from lower to 
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upper tiers. The few women leaders at higher levels also have limited ability to effectively 
represent the interests of grassroots women. Therefore, concerns of women are not voiced 
strongly. Consequently, women farmers may not significantly experience the benefits of 
organized action. Involvement of women in decision-making enables them to raise their 
concerns and ensure that they are addressed (Penunia (2011).  
Involvement of women in collective action poses challenges to women themselves 
and facilitators. Women’s productive and reproductive roles constrain their active 
participation. Women experience pressure from the external environment and may lack 
household support due to culture that hinders them from going to public places. Facilitators 
may also lack effective tools and facilities that encourage participation of women. 
Participation of women can be encouraged by bonding social capital at both household and 
community level (Aleman and Flora 2003).  
(ii) Knowledge and information sharing among actors 
There was a hierarchical flow of information between implementation levels where 
information flowed from lower level innovation clusters to upper level clusters and vice 
versa. Information and knowledge were mainly shared through meetings held at the different 
implementation levels.  
We share information through meetings. Reports are brought by 
representatives. Parish representatives take information from sub-county to 
parishes and from parishes to sub-county (farmer, Bubare, Nov. 7, 2010) 
 The information is brought by the parish representatives to the sub-county 
meetings. This system of information flow has its own shortfalls…some of 
their representatives do not communicate (trader, Kabale, Nov. 16, 2010) 
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As a rule, IP members at the different implementation levels had to meet once each 
month. Results from the survey revealed that some (22%) farmers interacted face-to-face 
with their representatives weekly, most (69%) interacted monthly, and only a few (9%) 
interacted yearly to share information. The chi-square test did not show any statistically 
significant effect of age (p=0.692), sex (p=0.312), marital status (p=0.769) or membership in 
organizations (p=0.453) on face-to-face interaction among farmers and their representatives. 
However, there was a significant difference in level of education and the frequency of face-
to-face interaction among farmers and their representatives (p=0.036). Results from in-depth 
interviews with key informants revealed that in Remera maize IP the educated members did 
not want to interact with farmer representatives because they thought farmers did not bring in 
any new knowledge:  
The educated women and men influence mobilization as they tell IP members 
that we are not bringing in any new knowledge. They only want to hear from 
partners and not farmers. They think partners have more knowledge than 
farmers (extension worker, Remera, Dec. 21, 2010) 
In addition, the current structure constrained interaction of farmers in the 
parish/village innovation clusters with diverse actors who were thought to have better 
knowledge. Lack of interaction with other actors was strongly emphasized as a pitfall of the 
current structure of IPs, especially among members of Bubare, Remera and Bufundi IPs. 
The challenge is that farmers want to see partners and talk face to face. They 
minimize the knowledge and information that representatives bring to them. 
They claim that they are not bringing in any new knowledge (extension 
worker, Remera, Dec. 21, 2010)  
 The current structure is not good [shaking head strongly]. This is because we 
do not know the views of those who meet at the sub-county. Even if they 
bring feedback, we are not satisfied. We want to converse with other actors 
that come at the sub county, see each other...we want to be with them but for 
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them, they do not want. It would be good if we meet each other at the sub-
county at least after 2 months (input dealer, Bufundi, Nov. 28, 2010) 
Information Disclosure and Feedback 
Disclosure is the act of making new information known to others. It occurs during 
interaction among actors in different innovation clusters through meetings, trainings, 
informal face-to-face interactions, telephone and reports. The study revealed a difference in 
information shared between representatives and their constituencies. Critical information was 
not shared freely with farmers in the lower clusters such as issues concerning money and 
information about tours. These issues were mainly raised by members of Bubare, Bufundi, 
Chahi, and Remera IPs. 
The treasurer gives us feedback on money we contribute as membership. But 
the money we get from SSA CP…we have no accountability. The chairman 
controls the money. The treasurer also does not know how money is used. 
This is going to spoil the IP (trader, Bubare, Nov. 13, 2010) 
All information that is discussed at the sub-county is taken back to the parish 
level. For the case of money, they do not…we want to go for a tour but if 
those people at the lower level hear about that, they will also want to come to 
the sub-county. So we do not tell them (FGD participant, Chahi, Nov. 17, 
2010) 
This implies that individuals who access critical information possess more power and 
control the distribution of information. This may have influence on proper coordination of 
individuals and activities in IPs.  
Results from the survey showed a significant difference in effectiveness of 
representatives in giving feedback (p=0.036). The majority of members in Bubare, Chahi and 
Remera IPs indicated that their representatives were not very efficient in giving feedback 
(Figure 2-5). In addition, 35% of farmers indicated that information definitely came in time, 
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58% reported that information somewhat came in time and 14% noted that information did 
not come in time. 
Figure 2-5: Effectiveness of Farmer Representatives in Giving Feedback 
 
Results from the in-depth interviews also implied the same: 
 Those who attend sub-county meetings or trainings are not present in parish 
meetings to give feedback. Even the chairperson has been complaining that 
we who attend seminars do not go back to the parishes to teach our 
colleagues….those who go for training have kept the knowledge to 
themselves (farmer, Chahi, Nov. 19, 2010)  
 I’m not a committee member at the sub-county. We meet at the parish. I 
present my problems to the chairman who takes them to the sub-county. He 
does not give feedback (input dealer, Bufundi, Nov. 28, 2010) 
The poor two-way information flow can be explained by poor networks, coordination 
among actors, the nature of information to be disseminated (World Bank 2007) and lack of 
trust (Maskell 2000). The value attributed to knowledge also influences whether and how 
individuals share it. Knowledge is increasingly perceived as commercially valuable (Brown 
and Martyn 1999; Jarvenpaa and Staples 2001; Weiss 1999). When individuals perceive the 
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knowledge acquired or possessed as commercially valuable, they emotionally own it and 
decided what knowledge to share, who to share it with, and when to share it (Andrews and 
Delahaye 2000). In situations where knowledge has high commercial value, individuals 
encounter contradictory incentives on whether to share it or withhold it (Ipe 2003). This 
information asymmetry constrains formation of systems of innovation (Klerkx and Leeuwis 
2009).  
Lack of representatives, the size of parish and the nature of landscape also affected 
two-way information flow. These were major problems in IPs that had no sub-clusters at 
parish/village level. The steep slopes constrained members with information to deliver it to 
members who lived on the upper side of the hills. This implies that lack of group 
organization negatively influences representation, which in turn affects communication 
within IPs. 
We have a very poor terrain in the parishes. In addition, some parishes are big 
and others are smaller. We have the upper and lower parts of the parish. It 
happens that leaders are selected from one area mainly the lower area. This 
happens during meetings. Most homes are located below the hills and the road 
network is in the lower areas and not the upper areas. Therefore, people in the 
upper areas are not represented. It is those close to meeting areas that attend. 
We thought that those chosen in lower areas would go to upper areas to 
disseminate information but they don’t (farmer, Bubare, Nov. 7, 2010) 
The work of the extension worker is good but because the area is hilly and it’s 
always rainy, he cannot reach all villages. It’s the government’s problem not 
providing him with transport (FGD participant, Bufundi, Nov. 12, 2010) 
In contrast, most of the members of Isangano Gataraga potato IP indicated that their 
representatives were very efficient in giving feedback. This could be attributed to the 
extensive level of horizontal and vertical decentralization in this IP. Extensive sub-clustering 
of the IP and the frequency of interaction fostered trust building among members. The 
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literature shows that frequent interaction among actors builds trust (Granovetter 1985; 
Maskell 2000; Tsai and Ghoshal 1998). High level of trust among group members enhances 
exchange of knowledge and cooperation (Putnam 1993).  
Assessment of information flow up the hierarchy indicated a degree of 
misrepresentation of information by farmer representative. This resulted in formation of 
committees to ensure proper coordination and management of information as stated by one of 
the respondents: 
Parish representatives initiated the ideas of committees because during 
reporting in meetings at sub-county, reports were conflicting, e.g., somebody 
would report an issue on a neighboring parish. One would say people in one 
parish are digging trenches and another report would say ‘no.’ So we needed 
committees so that we get proper information (farmer, Bubare, Nov. 7, 2010) 
Results from the survey revealed a significant difference in effectiveness of 
representatives in articulating needs of farmers (p=0.023). Most of the farmers in Bubare 
sorghum IP, Chahi potato IP and Remera maize IP indicated that their representatives were 
relatively good at articulating their needs. However, a majority of farmers in Bufundi and 
Isangano Gataraga potato IPs indicated that their representatives were very efficient in 
articulating their needs (figure 2-6). 
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Figure 2-6: Perceived Effectiveness of Representatives in Articulating Farmers’ Needs 
 
Information Distortion 
Farmer representatives in the sub-county innovation cluster interacted directly with 
diverse knowledge sources while farmers in parish/village innovation clusters interacted 
more with their peers. The study revealed that as information was moved through hierarchies, 
it was more likely to be distorted. This was attributed to the number of hierarchies and nature 
of information shared. Schulz asserts that explicit knowledge (codified knowledge) can be 
easily disseminated and communicated unlike tacit knowledge (Schultz 2001).  
Communication itself is very tricky. Before it reaches the destination, it is 
distorted. Since we do not rely on distributing information through radio, it is 
distorted. From the parish, information that reaches the sub-county is 20% 
less. Even for the farmer who gets information to the village, there is a % of 
distortion. The whole program cannot bring change in one year until the 
technical stuff goes deep down there and meet the local people…Management 
By Walking Around (MBWA). Be with them, show them” (local policy 
maker, Bufundi, Nov. 15, 2010) 
There is lack of proper communication when discussing issues pertaining to 
the IP. Help us to organize another committee so that we can access IP 
information and services” (farmer, Bubare, Nov. 27, 2010) 
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Information distortion may be attributed, in part, to poor feedback mechanisms 
leading to missing information and misinforming farmers. Misinforming farmers contributed 
to unrealistic expectations, discussed in another paper. 
 Conclusion 
There is growing interest in IPs for agricultural research and development during the 
past decade. IPs are seen as a significant improvement over the linear, less inclusive and less 
interactive traditional agricultural research and extension approach. However, ‘innovation 
platform’ is a relatively new concept in agricultural research for development. There is 
limited knowledge and understanding of how best to organize IPs to facilitate numerous and 
multi-directional interaction among diverse stakeholders to collectively generate, share and 
utilize knowledge to address the needs of smallholder farmers. This study analyzed the 
relationship between organizational structure and information sharing within five IPs in the 
Great Lakes Region of Africa. Data were collected from IP members (including farmers, 
NGO representatives, traders, processors, input dealers, researchers local policy 
makers/implementers and extension workers) using semi-structured interviews, in-depth 
interviews, and focus group discussions. 
The size, age and nature of landscape influenced the structure of IPs. Larger IPs had 
more levels in the hierarchy and were more horizontally decentralized into innovation sub-
clusters. Although Bubare sorghum IP was relatively large, it was not highly decentralized. 
This could be because the IP was still at a very early stage of development.  In addition, only 
two of the three older IPs were more vertically and horizontally decentralized. One of the 
older IPs (Chahi potato IP) was not highly decentralized because it was small in size. This 
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implies that several factors influence the structure of IPs. However, as the size of IPs 
continues to increase, more re-structuring is likely to occur. 
IPs that were more vertically and horizontally decentralized had more effective two-
way information flows among and within innovation clusters. The formation of innovation 
sub-clusters strengthens social capital among IP members who are themselves motivated to 
share information and knowledge. Less vertically and horizontally decentralized IPs had less 
effective two-way information flow as measured by the effectiveness of farmer 
representatives in providing feedback up and down the hierarchy. These findings supported 
the first and second hypotheses. Innovation clusters enhance knowledge and information 
flow through networking. Innovation clusters also create and strengthen social capital which 
increases technology transfer (Juma 2011). Effective two-way information flow in these IPs 
with high vertical and moderate horizontal decentralization was influenced by the nature of 
landscape. Although decentralization aids vertical and horizontal information and knowledge 
exchange, decentralization alone is not sufficient. Other factors need to be in place to 
facilitate interaction at all implementation levels such as good leadership and proper 
infrastructure.  
Farmer representatives in the sub-county innovation clusters occupy a higher status 
position since they interact directly with diverse knowledge experts and directly access 
information that is critical to the performance of IPs.  They control the distribution of 
information in their constituencies. Therefore, measures need to be in place to motivate 
actors to freely exchange information and knowledge. There is need to build trust among 
members of IPs to encourage free exchange of information through management of 
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communication and organizing interactive events. It is also imperative that members of these 
IPs establish rules that govern their interactions and conform to those rules. This will 
minimize selfish behavior (e.g., concealing valuable information) and foster action in the 
interest of the collective.  
This paper contributes to organizational theory by identifying structures that promote 
knowledge and information sharing. This study extends innovation systems theory by 
analyzing structural factors which influence effective knowledge and information flow. 
Although vertical and horizontal decentralization may facilitate knowledge and information 
sharing, the quality of information may be distorted as it moves among hierarchies. The 
paper has implications for the methodology used to analyze innovation systems and policy 
for reforming agricultural research that promotes inclusion of the scientific and non-scientific 
communities in research. The information has practical implications for conveners and 
members of IPs to design structures and create favorable conditions that enhance information 
sharing. 
Since the IPs were still at an early stage at the time of the study, the influence of 
structure on performance was not examined.  This research did not explore the types of 
innovations that resulted from interaction with multiple actors along the value chain. Further 
research needs to be conducted to determine the performance of IPs, comparing IPs that 
where formed using the research and market oriented approaches. In-depth research needs to 
be conducted to determine why some IPs flourish while others don’t, and investigate the 
conditions under which highly decentralized IPs function. Studying the relationship between 
information sharing and performance of IPs will be a great complement to this study.  
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CHAPTER 3. A DROP OF WATER IN AN OCEAN: MOTIVATION 
AND PARTICIPATION IN INNOVATION PLATFORMS  
Manuscript prepared for the journal: World Development 
Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between motivation and participation in five 
innovation platforms (IPs) in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. IP participants are motivated 
by different incentives. Although farmers prioritized new knowledge and skills, these were 
not sufficient to foster active participation. Anticipated economic (markets, income and 
credit) and material (inputs) livelihood benefits encouraged active farmer participation. Many 
actors did not mention social incentives (networks and status). Participation of local policy 
makers and the private business sector was limited. Participation was curtailed by: 
expectation of tangible short-term benefits, understanding of IP concept, lack of resources, 
prior commitments and feeling devalued.  
Introduction 
The growing interest in multi-stakeholder innovation platforms (IPs) for agricultural 
research and development during the past decade reflects their potential to address problems 
of smallholder farmers and improve their livelihoods. An IP is an arrangement in which a set 
of relatively interdependent stakeholders are identified and - usually through representatives - 
invited to meet and interact in a forum for conflict resolution, negotiation, social learning and 
collective decision making towards concerted action (Röling 2002). In this paper, an IP is 
defined as a forum in which multiple actors/stakeholders with meaningful interests in a 
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common issue collaborate in identification of problems, share and develop new ideas to 
better solve those problems, and implement creative solutions to improve livelihoods.   
The traditional national agricultural research and extension approach cannot deal with 
the rapidly changing context (dynamic policy, market, technology and environment) of 
agriculture in many countries. The traditional system follows a linear approach where 
researchers and experts produce new knowledge and technology and transfer it to the end 
users who need it to innovate and change (Lundy, Gottret, and Ashby 2005). The linear 
approach assumes that agricultural research, through technology transfer, leads to technology 
adoption and increased productivity. However, realization of this goal depends on the 
capacity of agricultural research, training and extension organizations in the public sector 
(World Bank 2007a).  
The approach lacks interaction among different knowledge sources, and there is 
limited appreciation of local and indigenous knowledge (Lundy et al. 2005). The research of 
most national agricultural systems is not linked to technology users and other actors in the 
sector. Researchers, the end users of research outputs and other providers of services that 
support agricultural production, value addition and marketing, largely work in isolation from 
one another. Therefore, research outputs do not meet the needs of end users. The World Bank 
recognizes that agricultural related problems are complex in nature and need to be addressed 
using a holistic systems approach (World Bank 2007a).  
Designing and implementing a sustainable development intervention requires 
involvement of diverse stakeholders (grassroots groups, non-government organizations 
(NGOs), private business sector and government agencies) in a more collaborative 
participatory process (Brown and Ashman 1996). System-based approaches are thought to 
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provide spaces for value chain actors to interact, communicate, and act to improve the 
performance of the agricultural sector (World Bank 2007a). More recently, the systems-
based Integrated Agricultural Research for Development approach (IAR4D) was designed 
and is implemented by the sub-Saharan Africa Challenge Program (SSA-CP).  The goal is to 
address low agricultural production caused by use of unimproved seeds and improper 
agronomic practices; low soil fertility resulting from a degraded natural resource base; failure 
to link agricultural production to markets; and inadequate and inappropriate policies 
(Mokwunye and Ellis-Jones 2010).  
In this approach, IPs are used to involve relevant actors throughout a specific value 
chain (including producer organizations, researchers, extension agents, development 
specialists, private business sector, and policy makers) to identify and conduct pro-poor 
oriented research (FARA 2007). Research institutions and government agencies consider IPs 
as a significant improvement over the linear and less inclusive traditional agricultural 
research and extension approach. IPs are dependent on participation and the quality of 
engagement affects their effective functioning. However, there is limited understanding of 
what motivates groups or organizations to participate in IPs and the factors that sustain or 
curtail active participation in IPs. This knowledge gap constrains mobilization of relevant 
actors to solve critical problems and preserve their participation. Understanding the interests 
of participants in IPs is very relevant because it enables facilitators/conveners of IPs to 
identify appropriate actors and to craft measures that cater for diverse interests within IPs to 
ensure sustainability. 
This article seeks to address this gap by examining participation in five IPs in the 
Great Lakes Region of Africa. The central questions addressed are:  
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1. What motivates different actors to participate in innovation platforms?  
2. Does active participation enable actors to achieve their desired goals?  
3. What factors sustain or curtain participation?  
I hypothesize that expected development (knowledge and skills) material (inputs), 
economic (market, income and credit) social (networks and status) and purposive benefits 
(pursuit of organizational goals) positively affect the degree of actors’ participation in IPs; 
active participation positively affects benefits derived from IPs, and that lack of short-term 
benefits negatively affects continued participation. I use social capital theory and social 
exchange theory to explain participation in IPs. This paper contributes to the relatively 
understudied field of innovation systems by documenting the factors that motivate actors to 
participate and the conditions that sustain and constrain participation in innovation systems. 
The paper also has practical implications for community organizers and policy makers in 
designing community participatory programs and making participation successful.  
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 defines the concept of participation in multi-
stakeholder processes, outlines how social exchange theory contributes to our understanding 
of participation, and develops a set of hypotheses.  Section 3 describes the data, and the final 
section presents the conclusion and implications.  
 
The Organizational Structure and Purpose of IPs  
An IP constitutes actors with the knowledge and skills required to address key 
constrains in the entire value chain, integrating issues of productivity, environment, policy 
and market. Actors in an IP have incentives to jointly innovate and work in partnership to 
bring about the desired change (FARA 2009b). IPs facilitate integration of perspectives, 
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knowledge and actions of different stakeholders around a common issue and foster learning 
through interaction (Hawkins et al. 2009).  
Twelve IPs were established in Lake Kivu Region, a region where northeastern 
Rwanda, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and southwestern Uganda intersect. 
IPs are facilitated by a team of interdisciplinary scientists (Task Forces) who bring together 
stakeholders with diverse competence to address problems in an entire value chain (FARA 
2007). Seven of the IPs were established during the last quarter of 2008 and five in the first 
quarter of 2009. The process of visioning and stakeholder analysis was either research-led or 
market-led. The older IPs used the research-led approach in which stakeholders were 
sensitized about the agricultural problems and how they could contribute to resolving the 
problems. In the newer IPs, the market–led approach was used in which stakeholders were 
introduced to the available market opportunity and organized to access that market (Tenywa 
et al. 2011). 
Each IP is organized to address problems specific to a given value chain (such as 
potato and sorghum value chains). IPs have innovation clusters at two implementation levels, 
i.e., the strategic level (regional and national level) and operational level (sub-county
4
). An 
innovation cluster consists of groups of actors with similar characteristics, who gather 
together to address common issues. The sub-county innovation cluster is sub-divided into 
innovation sub-clusters at parish and village level. 
IPs have an executive committee (with chairman, vice chairman, secretary, treasurer 
and committee members representing groups from different parishes) supported by sub-
                                                          
4 Sub-county is the third political administrative unit in Uganda and Rwanda. The sub-county is 
subdivided into parishes or cells. Parishes contain villages, the lowest political administrative units. 
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committees (which focus on marketing, research, finance, natural resource management, and 
monitoring and evaluation). The committee, together with other actors, meets at sub-county 
level and makes operational decisions (developing the agenda, convening IP meetings, 
following-up on decisions made, facilitating interaction between different IP members, 
mobilizing important actors who are not present at IP meetings and liaise with national and 
regional partners). Strategic decisions (such as agenda of the country or region and location 
of activities) are made at national and regional levels (Tenywa et al. 2011).  
The governance structure at sub-county level is paralleled at lower implementation 
levels to ensure proper coordination of activities between hierarchies. Members of IPs at the 
different implementation levels meet once a month, with members of the lower level 
(parish/village level) meeting first so that their representatives forward their issues to the sub-
county executive committee. The sub-county innovation cluster is the hub where information 
collected from other implementation levels is processed, decisions are made and feedback is 
given to members in other clusters. A cross-site research support team (CRST) builds the 
capacity of IP members at the operational level by providing technical support in key areas, 
i.e., increasing production, access to markets, natural resource management and policy 
(FARA 2009a). Figure 3-1 shows the IP organizational structure at the time of the study.  
Participation in Development Projects 
Participation of community members in development projects is assumed to integrate 
local people’s knowledge into program planning and implementation. Participation enables 
community members to interact with influential people in society, thereby empowering them 
to voice their concerns (Fox 1996). Although participation is an important ingredient for 
development, it is not easy to attain, especially from marginalized groups (Agarwal 2000). 
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Opening up spaces for participation does not imply that people will be enthusiastic to 
participate. Many opportunities for participation receive little enthusiasm or cooperation 
from community members (Mullen and Allison 1999; Wandersman and Giamartino 1980). 
Figure 3-1: Organization Structure of IPs 
 
Sub-County (operational level) 
innovation cluster 
Committees 
o Executive committee  
o Sub-committees (e.g., market, 
finance, M&E) 
o Members 
IP management committee 
Implementation partners 
IP managers 
National/regional level 
(Strategic level) 
Program coordinators 
Task Force leaders 
Chief executives of 
Stakeholder organizations 
Farmer Representatives 
Parishes/cells/villages clusters 
Executive committee  
Farmer groups 
Individual members 
Multi-stakeholder Forum 
Researchers 
Policy makers 
Farmers  
Private business sector 
Government extension 
NGOs  
 
In participatory programs, some groups of individuals may not be involved (Agarwal 
2001). People can be frustrated into thinking that nothing ever changes, even if they put time 
and effort into participation (Warner 2006). Doubt in ability to effect change is mainly found 
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among the disadvantaged (Wandersman et al. 1987). Conveners of multi-stakeholder 
platforms often under - or over- estimate the abilities and motivations of stakeholders to 
participate (Cooke and Kothari 2001; Warner 2005). In addition, participatory approaches do 
not recognize how different, changing and multiple identities of individuals affect their 
choice about whether to participate and how to participate (Cleaver 2001). Groups may 
exclude themselves from the process when they feel that the benefits do not exceed the costs 
(Warner 2006).  
Stakeholders have different interests and that some may not be as supportive as others 
in pro-poor interventions (Warner 2006). People will engage in and maintain a relationship as 
long as they can satisfy their self-interests and at the same time ensure that the benefits 
outweigh the costs. People will maintain those exchanges that have proven to be rewarding in 
the past and break off those which prove to be costly and establish new relations which have 
a good chance of being more rewarding (Blau 1964). On the other hand, Uphoff (2000) 
claims that people do not engage in collective action only on the basis of self-interest or 
altruism. They combine the two since self-interest and altruism can co-exist in people’s 
minds and motivations. People may derive satisfaction in altruism even if it costs them 
something. Norms that promote pursuit of self-interests can undermine establishment of 
social capital (the features of social organization such as networks, norms and trust that 
facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit (Putnam 1993)). 
a) Factors that motivate participation 
Community members are more likely to participate in collective action if they are 
sure that participation will generate the anticipated benefits (Matta and Alavalapati 2006). 
Widmer (1985) found in a study of board members in non-profit and voluntary organizations 
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that participation was positively correlated to incentives and the value of expected outcomes 
to individuals. Widmer classified incentives to participation into four broad categories - 
material (goods and services), social (networks, status, and honor), developmental 
(opportunity to use or acquire knowledge and skills) and purposive benefits (achievement of 
organizational goals which may not directly benefit participant). In his study, social and 
personal development incentives were more common and effective compared to purposive 
incentives
5
. Other authors include economic incentives, the mechanisms that provide 
financial rewards. 
Participation in development projects is often linked to availability of material 
incentives; short-term material benefit is important to sustain participation (Oakley 1991). 
Other incentives such as recognition, opportunity for social interaction and favorable 
environment foster participation (Prestby et al. 1990). Stakeholders may also be motivated to 
participate in collective action to achieve goals, such as enhancing prestige, acquiring 
knowledge and skills, access and use resources upon which their livelihoods depend (Warner 
2007).  
Individuals’ feelings of belonging and sense of identity influence the extent to which 
they participate (Burke 1968). Stakeholders are more likely to participate if they perceive that 
a problem exists and feel the need to solve the problem. Perception of a real problem is key 
                                                          
55 Material incentives are tangible rewards which have a monetary value or can easily be translated 
into one that has. Social incentives are intangible benefits that have no monetary value and cannot 
easily be translated in one that has. They are derived from the act or socializing. Purposive incentives 
are intangible rewards derived from the goals of the organization. They offer individuals the 
satisfaction of participating in the activities of a group whose goals correspond to their beliefs or 
principles, e.g., adoption of certain practices (Clark and Wilson 1961:134-135). 
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in mobilizing social capital amongst affected people to solve the problem (Mullen and 
Allison 1999). The degree of participation in development programs is a major determinant 
of success or failure. Previous studies have revealed that lack of participation leads to 
inefficiencies in implementation such as problems with enforcing rules, communication flow, 
resource assessments and conflict resolution (Agarwal 2000).  
 
b) Factors that influence participation 
Social exchange theory assumes that all human relationships are formed by the use of 
a subjective cost-benefit analysis and the comparison of alternatives. If the costs of a 
relationship are perceived to outweigh the benefits, an individual will choose to leave the 
relationship. If the benefits outweigh the costs, the individual will chose to maintain the 
relationship and if the costs and benefits are equal, then the relationship is said to be 
equitable (Homans 1964). The cost of participation (in terms of time, labor and resources) is 
one factor that influences participation (Lawrence and Deagen 2001; Negra 1998). 
Participation of low-incomes families may be constrained by work and family priorities 
(Irvin and Stansbury 2004). Rural people who receive tangible material benefits from 
development projects are motivated to participate, and participation declines when there is 
lack of material incentives (Oakley 1991). 
The continuous exchange of goods and services regulates social interaction, thus 
fostering development of network relations and group structure (Blau 1964). Networks are 
held together by mutual expectations of benefit and sustained by expectations or norms of 
reciprocity (Uphoff 2000). Social relations create value through reciprocity, which is related 
to trust (Fukuyama 1995). While reciprocal exchanges can be undertaken on self-interested 
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basis, their sustainability, stability and productivity is enhanced by trust and confidence 
(Frank 1992). Social exchange requires trust among individuals which builds through a 
process of continuous exchange.  
Robinson (1998) found a positive correlation between participation and membership 
in unions. People in municipalities with strong union traditions participated more in decision 
making involving resource allocation unlike people in areas with low organization capacity. 
Women’s productive and reproductive roles and cultural norms and values that hinder 
women from going to public places constrains their active participation. Facilitators may also 
lack effective tools and facilities to enhance participation of women (Aleman and Flora 
2003), such as provision of day care services.  
Large geographical areas also pose challenges for face-to-face meetings (Irvin and 
Stansbury 2004). The timing of meetings (weekdays versus evening or weekends), their 
length and venue may not favor participation of all categories of stakeholders (Griffin 1999). 
Furthermore, the complexity of technical knowledge required to participate can present 
challenges to citizen participation (Irvin and Stansbury 2004). Individuals without the 
required knowledge and skills may devalue their contribution to the participatory process 
(Jonsson 2005). Joint action is built on common vision, goals and values. However, 
stakeholders may have different goals and attitudes towards the central vision (Critchley et 
al. 2006). Lack of shared understanding of the aims of the program affects participation 
(Matta and Alavalapati 2006).  
Political barriers are the most difficult challenges faced in engaging and coordinating 
activities involving multiple stakeholders. The political environment in a particular country 
may or may not be supportive of participatory processes. Countries that do not encourage 
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openness and involvement of community members in decision-making do not provide a 
conducive environment for participation (Oakley 1991). Effective participation calls for a 
favorable environment with carefully selected representatives of stakeholders, a transparent 
process of decision making to build trust among participants, competent and unbiased 
facilitators, regular meetings and adequate financial resources(Beierle 1999; Howell, Olsen, 
and Olsen 1987).  
Social exchange theory asserts that people develop attitudes towards other people and 
things in the context of anticipated benefits and costs to be derived from the relationship.  
Activities that generate net benefits tend to be perceived positively, while activities which 
generate net losses tend to be perceived negatively (Napier and Napier 1991).  Contemporary 
exchange theory stresses that farmers seek the ‘best value’ through participating in the 
programs (Napier, Carter, and Bryant 1986). Consistent with exchange theory, Napier and 
Napier (1991) argue that rural farmers tend to be engaged in programs that have positive net 
benefits.  
The research questions asked are: 
1. What motivates different actors to participate in innovation platforms?  
2. Does active participation enable actors to achieve their desired goals?  
3. What are the factors which sustain or curtain participation?  
The paper seeks to test the following hypotheses: 
H1: Expectation of material, economic, developmental, social and purposive benefits 
positively affects the degree of actors’ participation in innovation platforms. 
H2: Active participation positively affects benefits derived from IPs. 
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H3: Lack of short-term benefits has a negative effect on continued participation of 
actors. 
Figure 2: Relationship between Motivating factors and Participation 
 
 
 
 
 
Methods and Data 
The study was conducted in Uganda and Rwanda, two of the three pilot learning sites 
(PLS) of the SSA-CP in the Lake Kivu Region. The institutional Review Board approved the 
study in 2010. In Uganda, the study was conducted in Bubare and Bufundi sub-counties in 
Kabale district and Chahi sub-county in Kisoro district. In Rwanda, the study was conducted 
in Gataraga and Remera sub-counties in Musanze district. This area is emerging from 
conflict. The region consists of tall volcanic mountains, hills and valleys which may 
constrain active involvement in development interventions. The climate ranges between 
semi-humid (800 mm per year) to humid (2000 mm per year) and the temperatures are mild 
at higher elevations. The average land holding is 0.5 acres (FARA 2005). 
 The study population included members of IPs (including farmers, members from the 
private business sector, researchers, non-governmental organization (NGO) staff, IP 
chairpersons, local policy makers and extension workers). The following five out of the 12 
IPs in the region were studied: Bubare sorghum IP, Bufundi potato IP, and Chahi potato IP in 
Uganda, and Isangano Gataraga potato IP and Remera maize IP in Rwanda. Selection was 
Figur  3-2: Relationship between Motivating Factor and Participation 
Motivating factors 
 Material Motives 
 Economic Motives 
 Developmental Motives 
 Social Motives 
 Purposive Motives 
Active 
participation 
Benefits Received 
 Knowledge  
 Yields 
 Income 
 Inputs 
 
H1 H2 
H3 
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based on date of formation (selecting old and new IPs), enterprise of focus (staple crop – root 
tuber or cereal), approach of formation (market driven or research driven). Table 3-1 shows 
the characteristics of the IPs selected. 
Table 3-1: Characteristics of the Selected IPs 
 
 
Data were collected using semi-structured interviews, in-depth interviews and focus 
group discussions to triangulate the information to improve validity and reliability 
(Verschuren and Doorewaard 1999). The research team consisted of myself and research 
assistants (recruited from Kabale and Rwanda and trained by me).  We conducted interviews 
with farmers at the lower implementation level (parish/village level) to verify information 
provided by their representatives at sub-county level. We used semi-structured 
questionnaires, which were pre-tested with 15 members of IPs to help refine the final 
questions. We randomly sampled IP members from up-to-date membership lists obtained 
from IP chairpersons. The research team interviewed a total of 184 farmers from the five IPs.  
Country Name of IP Date of 
formation 
Membership Approach of 
formation 
Sample 
Male Female 
Uganda Bubare 
sorghum IP 
Sept. 2009 83 96 Market-led 42 
Bufundi 
potato IP 
Nov. 2008 65 77 Research-led 42 
Chahi potato 
IP 
Nov. 2008 62 77 Research-led 43 
Rwanda Isangano 
Gataraga 
potato IP 
Nov. 2008 160 98 Research-led 41 
Remera 
maize IP 
Sept. 2009 29 27 Market-led 16 
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In addition, I used checklists with in-depth interviews and focus group discussions 
(FGDs) to explore issues about participation and the factors which sustain or curtail 
participation. I conducted a total of 34 in-depth interviews with members from the private 
business sector, researchers, non-governmental organization (NGO) staff, IP chairpersons, 
local policy makers and extension workers. Since these actors were few in number they were 
not sampled. Two of the in-depth interviews were conducted with non-members to 
understand why they ceased participation. I conducted six FGDs with farmers’ 
representatives. Interviews and FGDs were conducted in English and the local languages. 
Information generated by the three techniques included: what inspired members to join IPs, 
what members expected from participating in IPs, activities in which they are involved, how 
they would assess their level of participation in IP activities, and perceptions about 
participation of other actors. The in-depth interviews and focus group discussions were 
digitally recorded and transcribed to permit detailed coding (open, axial and selective 
coding). This study was conducted between September-December 2010.  
I analyzed the transcribed interviews qualitatively using line by line coding to identify 
the major themes and categories that emerged. Memos of the major categories that emerged 
were written. Patterns in the data were used to understand the potential of stakeholders to be 
involved in meaningful participation.  The Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS 
version 18) was used to analyze quantitative data. I first coded the open-ended questions in 
the semi-structured questionnaire and analyzed the data using descriptive statistics, 
correlation and linear regression. Multiple linear regression was used to analyze the 
demographic factors (including sex, age, highest level of education, and membership to 
organizations) that affect participation (number of activities involved in).  
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In order to organize my data, I adapted Widmer’s (1985) classification of incentives 
to participate. Board members reflect the diversity of communities they serve and like board 
members, community members may have both individual and collect motives. I group the 
incentives to participate into 5 categories, i.e., developmental benefits (use and acquire 
knowledge and skills in crop and livestock production, soil management and value addition); 
material benefits (access agricultural inputs), economic benefits (access remunerative 
markets, credit and income), social (expand social network, improve social status, group 
membership) and purposive (role fulfillment to achieve organizational goals). Although the 
terms ‘material’ and ‘economic’ incentives tend to be used interchangeably, this paper uses 
‘material’ incentives to refer to tangible items that can be used to generate financial and non-
financial rewards, while ‘economic’ incentives refer to financial rewards. Participation was 
measured by the number of different types of IP activities in which actors are involved. The 
degree of participation was also measured using an ordinal scale (very active, active, 
somewhat active and not active).  
Results and Discussion 
a) Characteristics of farmer participants 
Of the farmers interviewed, 54% were female. The-chi square test shows a significant 
difference in sex of respondents across IPs (p=0.027). Gataraga and Chahi IPs had relatively 
more male and female members, respectively, than the other IPs. The median age of 
respondents was 45 and the modal age category was 18-39 (34.8%). The chi-square test 
indicates a significant difference in age across the IPs (p=0.006). Gataraga had more 
members in the lower age category, while Remera had more members above age 50. This 
may explain the level of participation in IP activities. Overall, 87% of the respondents were 
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married. Most of the respondents had attained primary level of education (68%). Compared 
to other IPs, Isangano Gataraga potato IP had more members who had attained secondary 
education (39%). The level of education could also explain variation in the level of 
participation among farmers. 
b) Motivation to participate 
(i) Farmers 
Results from the survey showed that the 184 farmers were motivated to participate by 
anticipated developmental benefits (95%), material benefits (68%), or economic benefits 
(67%), and some by social benefits (19%). The Pearson chi-square test revealed that farmers 
who had membership in other organizations were motivated by economic incentives such as 
access to profitable markets, increased access to credit facilities, and increased household 
income (p=0.003). A cross tabulation of motivating factors shows that 67% of farmers were 
motivated by development and material incentives, 66% by both development and economic 
incentives, while 79% were motivated by both material and economic benefits.  
The categories were also correlated to determine their relationship. Table 3-2 shows 
that the correlation between social and material benefits was negative and significant. There 
is no significant relationship between development and other motivating factors. Farmers 
with high social expectations had low material expectations but there is a positive 
relationship between economic and material expectations.  
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Table 3-2: Correlation between Factors that Motivate Farmers to Participate (n=184) 
Incentive Developmental Material Economic Social 
Developmental 1.000    
Material  -.020 
(.786) 
1.000   
Economic -.040 
(.589) 
.360 
(.000*) 
1.000  
Social  .053 
(.436) 
-.183 
(. 013*) 
-.124 
(.094) 
1.000 
*p<.05  
In-depth interviews and FGDs also revealed developmental, material, and economic 
factors as the main incentives to participate in IPs as indicated in the quotes below.  
“What motivated me is that in a group you share a lot of information with 
different people and that information can help you. I alone as an individual 
cannot do much, so being in a group is very, very good” (farmer, Gataraga, 
Dec. 14, 2010) 
 
“There are so many partners who interact with us to solve problems. After 
identifying problems, they help us solve them. We share information, increase 
production which is an opportunity to access better markets” (farmer and 
input dealer, Bufundi, Nov 28, 2010) 
 
“People register themselves in the group of IP because they think that when 
there’s a chance of seeds, they will get as registered members but when you 
call for meetings, they cannot attend” (FGD participant, Bubare, Nov. 10, 
2010) 
 
These findings show that farmers where motivated to participate because of the social 
networks through which they exchange information and knowledge. Although some farmers 
were motivated by self-interest such as accessing inputs and elevating social status, farmers 
were also motivated to participate because of the benefits that enhance the wellbeing of many 
other members. 
Social factors such as networking, membership to groups and status enhancement 
where mentioned by a few farmers. One of the farmers mentioned that: 
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“I found myself being involved as a leader or initiator of the idea. I thought 
that if I could lead such a program and it fails, my name would be tarnished so 
you have to work hard so that it does not fail. Its good when you start 
something and it goes through. It improves your name in the society” (Farmer, 
Bubare, Nov. 7 2010) 
 
This could be attributed to the fact that since majority of households in the 
communities studied were poor, the priority was increasing production to improve their 
livelihoods.  
(ii) Extension workers 
The four extension workers interviewed were motivated to participate because they 
felt it was their responsibility to improve farmers’ livelihoods; had expert knowledge and 
skills in agriculture; envisioned that IPs would help them do their work effectively (such as 
mobilizing farmers and disseminating information and technologies); and to motivate 
community members to participate. The participatory nature of the approach also motivated 
extension workers to participate. The extension workers stated that: 
“I’m motivated because this program helps me in my role. If someone can do 
demonstration of some crops and the neighbors see that the yield is high, it 
helps me in many ways, e.g., dissemination of information in agriculture” 
(extension worker, Remera, Dec. 21, 2010) 
 
“As an extension worker, when members see me with them, they get 
motivated…when they see me they are happy that their person is involved” 
(extension worker, Bufundi, Nov. 13, 2010) 
 
“I joined by virtue of being the NAADS coordinator but I also picked interest 
after knowing how it operates…some programs come and impose things on 
farmers but when I realized that it was participatory, I was encouraged to 
participate” (extension worker, Bubare, Nov 16, 2010) 
 
 The results imply that extension workers were primarily motivated by purposive 
benefits to achieve their organization’s goal of improving farmers’ livelihoods. Extension 
workers were not directly paid by the Challenge Program but paid by their host/partner 
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organizations. Although extension workers may be motivated by self-interest, they also 
worked towards the collective good.  
(iii) Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) staff 
Similar to extension agents, representatives from NGOs were primarily motivated by 
the desire to fulfill their roles because they believed that they possessed expert knowledge 
and skills required to improve agricultural production. In addition, they were also motivated 
by development and social incentives because of the desire to acquire knowledge and skills 
on how IPs work and identify future partners.  
“As people who are involved in integrated agriculture, livestock and crops, we 
were identified as service providers who can assist in livestock component 
and sustainable organic agriculture….as experts in that field we ensure that 
their farming is done well” (NGO staff, Kigali, Dec. 22, 2010) 
 
“Our main interest is to learn how these IPs work so that we can also develop 
same projects elsewhere. A platform is an opportunity to identify other actors 
we didn’t know” (NGO staff, Kabale, Nov. 13, 2010) 
 
Well as farmers may be motivated by anticipated benefits that directly improve their 
livelihoods, representatives from organizations were motivated by benefits that directly 
improve performance of the organizations. Developmental and social benefits were also 
important to representatives from organizations such as contributing knowledge and expertise 
to benefit farmers and also engaging in relationships with other partners for further 
collaboration. This could be attributed to the perception of a common problem, thereby 
building social capital to address the problem.  
(iv) Policy makers/implementers (local government staff) 
  Similar to extension workers and NGO representatives, local policy makers and 
implementers were motivated by purposive benefits. They were motivated by virtue of their 
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position in the community (as community developers charged with the responsibility to 
implement programs that improve farmers’ livelihoods) and felt that their participation would 
enable community members to build trust in the new project and actively participate. Policy 
makers stated that: 
“By virtue of me being a sub-county chief, as a policy implementer, I become 
a member because I have to implement all other programs in the sub-county. 
With modern methods of managing programs… you have to move with them. 
You have to be a full participant…”I also feel that we need to uplift the 
standard of our people…to have food security at home. It gives me pleasure 
that my people have taken a better step to move out of poverty” (local policy 
implementer, Bufundi, Nov. 15, 2010) 
 
“As a sub-county chief, I needed to be there because when they see me there, 
they are encouraged to come…when you fully participate, they think its 
authentic” (local policy implementer, Kisoro, Nov. 18, 2010) 
 
v) Private business individuals 
Traders, processers and input dealers across IPs were primarily inspired by material 
and economic benefits (maximizing profit, new market opportunities, easy access of produce 
from farmers, credit and improved equipment/machinery). Other motivating factors were 
social (e.g., strengthening business networks and group membership) and developmental 
(acquire knowledge and skills) as reflected in the following quotes: 
“We already have a chain of supermarkets within our gazette area, so we 
thought it would be easy to penetrate that market…Tuskys supermarket is the 
one that actually kick-started us to join IPs…we got an order from them...” 
(Trader, Kampala, Nov. 19, 2010)  
 
“I wanted to gain knowledge on how to grind sorghum. The way sorghum is 
milled does not make it fine. If it was milled and made fine, we would get a 
lot of profit…we expected to be given grinding mills that grind better than 
what we have and pay in installments...we expected to get mills that use both 
electricity and fuel and also get market for packed flour” (processor, Bubare, 
Nov 13, 2010) 
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“I was waiting for the group to form and crying for the group but my tears 
used to go inside as the Banyarwanda saying goes: Amarira yumugabo 
atembo aja munda (the tears of a man fall while going inside)” (trader, 
Gataraga, Dec 14 2010) 
 
Maximizing profit is key in stimulating private business sector participation in IPs. 
Private sector involvement in the value chain is imperative, as it motivates other actors, 
especially farmers, to engage in activities that improve their livelihoods. Without creating 
opportunities for financial benefit, it is difficult to spur the private business sector to get 
involved.  
c) Participation in innovation platform activities 
The main IP activities mentioned by farmers included crop production (97%), 
demonstration with new technologies (96%), designing action plans (55%), 
trainings/workshops (45%), monitoring and evaluation (45%), and marketing (29%). Other 
activities included soil fertility management, meetings, tours, and livestock and pasture 
management. Assessment of the level of farmer involvement in these activities indicates that 
in crop production, 55% were very active, 33% were active, and 12% were somewhat active. 
In demonstrations, 35% were very active, 37% were active (figure 3-3). In planning, only 
35% were very active, 19% were active and 46% were somewhat active. In training, 41.7% 
of the farmers were very active, 25% were active and 33.3% were somewhat active. 42% 
participated in 0-2 activities, nearly one-half (49%) of farmers participated in 3-4 activities, 
and only 9% participated in more than 5 activities.  
The chi-square test showed that farmers who were motivated by economic benefits 
participated in more activities (p=0.019).  In this study, although most of the farmers claimed 
to be motivated by developmental objectives, acquiring new knowledge and skills alone were 
90 
 
9
0
 
not sufficient to motivate them to actively participate. Economic and material outputs 
motivated them to participate in numerous activities. The more educated participated in more 
activities (p=0.038). 
Figure 3-3: The Level of IP Member Participation in Activities 
 
Results from the hierarchical linear regression (including sex, age, education and 
membership to organizations) showed that education contributed significantly (t=2.599) to 
participation in innovation platforms (table 3-3). Addition of group membership to the model 
did not produce any significant adjustment in R
2
. 
Table 3-3: The Association of Socioeconomic Factors and IP Participation, 
Standardized Coefficients (t-value) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Sex 0.086 (1.117) 0.077 (0.994) 0.017 (0.213) 0.012 (0.150) 
Age   0.082 (1.053) 0.116 (1.503) 0.124 (1.60) 
Education   0.208 (2.599*) 0.201 (2.508*) 
Membership in 
organizations 
   -.093 (-1.221) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.001 0.002 0.036 0.038 
F-statistic 1.25 1.18 3.00* 2.68* 
*p<0.05 
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The relationship between education and participation is significant in Model 3 and 
remains robust after membership in organization is entered in Model 4. Among all the 
variables in Model 4, education explains 20% of the variation in IP participation. Only 4% of 
the variation in participation is explained. Even though the amount of variation explained is 
only 4%, both Models 3 and 4 are significant. Much of the variation may be explained by 
factors not included in the model. There are other factors associated with IP participation that 
are not captured by this analysis. They are captured in the qualitative analysis and include 
factors such as prior experience with rural development projects which raise unrealistic 
expectation, lack of resources, poor understanding of concept and prior commitment. These 
factors are discussed in section (e). 
 Although results from the survey did not exhibit variation in the level of participation 
by gender, in-depth interviews and FGDs revealed that women were more involved 
compared to men.  
“Women are benefiting because they are involved more than men and when 
you go to villages, women are more active” (FGD participant, Bubare, Nov. 
10, 2010)  
 
“We participate in all discussions and in decision making freely. The number 
of women in the group is greater than the number of men. That is why they 
express their ideas in group freely” (female farmer, Gataraga, Dec 17, 2010). 
 
Variation in participation by the two methodologies could be explained by 
participants’ expectations from participation in the study. Respondents could have expected 
to receive benefits by indicating that they were actively involvement in IP activities. The 
study conducted by (Sanginga, Tumwine, and Lilja 2006) also revealed that participation of 
women in farmer participatory research was more than participation of men. Participation of 
men is higher at the beginning of the process but as the group evolves the proportion of men 
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decreases significantly while the proportion of women continues to rise until it dominates the 
group.  
Similar to the results from the survey, very limited farmer participation was strongly 
emphasized by all actors who participated in in-depth interviews. This was in part attributed 
to poor sensitization of community members about the new concept of IPs and lack of 
resources. 
“There is less participation of farmers. Even those who participate, it’s a drop 
of water in an ocean” (local policy implementer, Kabale, Nov. 15, 2010) 
 
“Some participants are not fully active. They do not want to participate and 
leave the burden to others. Many people are still behind and do not want to 
attend meetings” (farmer, Bubare, Nov. 6, 2010) 
 
Besides low levels of farmer participation, other actors who are important links in the 
value chains were not actively involved. Limited participation of individuals from private 
business sector, local government officials (policy makers and implementers) and 
transporters was mentioned several times during in-depth interviews, FGDs, and in 
comments made by farmers during the survey. This was mostly mentioned in four out of five 
IPs. The trader in Gataraga IP was a very active participant not only because of desire to 
network with members but also due to material and economic outputs realized from 
participation such as remunerative markets, access to credit, and new tools and equipment. 
Participants stated that: 
“Private sector does not come to our meetings. Only one comes and it’s 
because he deals in potato. That is why he is interested. Transporters are not 
active. They are not full participants. We only have to convince them. I don’t 
think they are much interested” (FGD participant, Chahi, Nov. 17, 2010)  
 
“The people see that we are not with the government and the government does 
not help us. It could be better if the officials in the government came and took 
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up responsibilities at the sub county but they can’t” (FGD participant, 
Bufundi, Nov. 12, 2010) 
 
Limited participation of traders and transporters could be attributed to them not yet 
realizing how to make a contribution and how they were going to benefit, since a majority of 
the IPs had not started marketing collectively. Spielman and Grebmer (2004) report that 
some of the challenges involved in engaging the private business sector relate to differing 
incentives, cultures and interests. The private business sector can be engaged in projects that 
produce short-term results and products that are appealing to consumers. However, in the 
case of IPs, the overall interest is in conducting research that addresses the needs of small-
scale farmers who have poor market access. In addition, results from these interventions are 
long-term and generate public goods.  
Local policy makers/implementers were expected to participate in policy innovations. 
Policies refer to laws, rules and regulations from public or state or collective decision-making 
(Means et al. 2002). Policies formulated at lower government administrative levels are 
referred to as bylaws.  Bylaws are rules made by lower local government councils at village 
(LC1) and sub-county level (LC3) and provide the local policy guidelines that are followed 
in sectoral developments, such as agricultural and natural resource management (Sanginga et 
al. 2004). During the colonial era, authority to manage natural resources was transferred from 
customary and traditional institutions to the state to avoid destruction of natural resources by 
communities.  
However, the needs and rights of local people were given less consideration. After 
decentralization, government institutions now recognize the importance of involving local 
communities in natural resource management (Place, Ssenteza, and Otsuka 2001).  Bylaws 
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for natural resource management are now seen as viable alternatives for enforcing 
government policies and rectifying their inefficiencies (Sanginga et al. 2004). Within IPs, 
bylaws on soil and water conservation are formulated with the involvement of all actors at 
sub-county level. To institutionalize or scale-out bylaws to community level and ensure that 
they are respected, they need to be approved and enforced by local policy implementers.  
Enforcement of bylaws was very weak, especially in Ugandan IPs. Limited 
participation of local policy makers/implementers in bylaw formulation, approval and 
implementation was further exacerbated by conflicts between political parties e.g., in 
Bufundi IP. Implementation of bylaws was a political issue, which in-turn frustrated the 
active participation of other actors. Literature reveals that when political objectives 
overshadow development objectives, efforts to establish ownership and encourage 
participation are frustrated (MSH 2003).  Political power differences require continuous 
negotiation among parties involved in order to achieve desired goals (Brown et al. 2003; 
Edmunds and Wollenberg 2001).  
 
d) Benefits derived from participation 
Since the IPs were still at an early stage at the time of the study, a majority of the 
actors had not yet realized tangible benefits. Interviews with farmers showed that 30% had 
definitely realized benefits, 57% had benefited somewhat, and only 13% had not benefited at 
all. Farmers who participated in more activities perceived IPs to be rewarding (p=0.01). 
Some of the benefits included acquisition of knowledge on modern methods of crop 
production (61%), accessed agricultural inputs (35%), increased yield (33%), increased 
income (28%), and knowledge and skills in soil and water conservation (21%).  
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Most members from the private business sector had not realized any tangible benefits, 
especially small-scale local traders and processors.  
“I expected three things but have not come to pass e.g. access loans at a lower 
interest rate or without interest, to interact with other traders from Kampala 
and exchange visits. I have not achieved any” (trader, Bubare, Nov 14, 2010) 
 
Relatively large-scale operators had realized economic and material benefits, such as 
new products (sorghum porridge) developed by the processor/trader purchasing sorghum 
from Bubare IP and machinery by the trader from Gataraga IP:  
“I have acquired machines (maize sheller, pasture cutter, sorting machine even 
if its made of wood), running water, now I can pay school fees for the 
university students. I can now interact with many people. I can also go and 
look for market and negotiate with buyers because I no longer fear people” 
(trader, Gataraga, Dec. 14, 2010) 
 
“We have a product on market but the issue is that marketing becomes costly 
this being a new product, promoting it to the required level is limited (trader, 
Kabale, Nov. 16, 2010). 
  
This implies that the scale of operation may also determine the rate at which tangible 
outputs can be realized among traders. Lack of resources to enhance the capacity of small-
scale local traders (who are the majority of traders operating in the areas, and are more 
accessible to farmers) will weaken the value chain and frustrate farmers’ efforts to work 
towards market-oriented production. Enhancing local traders’ access to economic/financial 
resources will enhance their capacity to purchase farmers’ produce, which will in turn 
motivate farmers to increase production and conserve natural resources. 
 
e) Factors sustaining or curtailing participation 
(i) Expectation of immediate material and economic benefits 
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Expectation is a belief that one’s participation will result in realization of desired 
goals. Not meeting expectations of IP members was the most frequently reoccurring theme 
under factors curtailing participation. This was mentioned over 20 times in both in-depth 
interviews and FGDs. Actors had unrealistic expectations and their motives of interaction 
were inconsistent with the intentions of the project. Majority of farmers expected to receive 
immediate material and economic benefits (such as inputs and money). However, the sub-
Saharan Africa Challenge Program does not give material or economic incentives to lure 
people into participation. It aims at nurturing a development mentality whereby all actors 
contribute towards solving a common problem. Since participation in development projects is 
now associated with giving out material and economic incentives, actors devalue projects 
which deviate from this practice, hence withdrawal or reduce their involvement as reflected 
below.  
“Some farmers expected money and free seeds so after failing to get these 
things they disappeared and that was not the target of FARA because FARA 
was interested in giving them knowledge only and then they work for 
themselves” (farmer and trader, Gataraga, Dec. 15, 2010) 
 
“The IP has started not to do well. Nowadays, there is no progress. Some 
members joined the IP to get money or profits but after a few times, they see 
that there is no direct money to them so they decreased their effort” (extension 
worker, Gataraga, Dec. 17, 2010) 
 
“They thought they would get allowances, income…that is why the processor 
left. He thought the project would put him into business immediately. He 
thought his mill would be busy packing, selling sorghum but realized that the 
thing was long distance” (farmer, Bubare, Nov. 7, 2010) 
 
“The processor dropped out because he thought the Challenge Program is 
going to give money for that processing…he thought the business would go to 
him, but also the money for the business would be given to him by the 
program…his interests were not catered for and he dropped out (researcher, 
Kabale, Nov. 29, 2010) 
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High expectation of immediate material and economic benefits may be attributed to 
community members’ prior experience with rural development projects which give farmers 
material or economic incentives to stimulate and sustain participation. In addition, the 
expectation of receiving money at meetings could also have risen by the strategy used at 
initiation of the project when participants were given money to cover transport costs to the 
meeting venue. The expectation are conditioned by experience and reinforced by culture. 
Prior experience influences expectations about how behavior will be rewarded either 
materially or non-materially (Uphoff 2000). Warner (2006) notes that unrealistic 
expectations bring disappointment, which in turn makes it harder to involve people in future 
participatory initiatives. Some stakeholders may not participate because they do not see how 
they benefit or fail to see the gains if there are no quick returns. Sanginga et al. (2007) note 
that high individual expectations led to partnership termination at formation and 
implementation stages. 
Sustaining participation will require changes in attitudes from expecting external 
incentives to more self-efficacious development in which each and every actor believes in 
their ability to contribute towards value chain development to improve the wellbeing of 
smallholder livelihoods. Change in expectations, nurturing of positive attitude and working 
together toward long-term goals had sustained participation of members as mentioned below.  
“I thought that I would quickly get benefits…I would have the enterprise 
modified and get profits. I thought sorghum was going to be improved 
quickly, get money quickly and fees. But when we developed the work plan, I 
knew it was not as quickly as I thought (laughs). I knew that it was going to be 
gradual. But I know, not very long, sorghum will be a very good enterprise. 
More profitable to farmers” (farmer, Bubare, Nov. 7, 2010) 
 
“I also expected seeds and money but when the seeds delayed, I remained in 
the group and now am seeing some fruits such as information on agriculture, 
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and am now the trader of the IP. Instead of giving somebody a fish every day, 
it’s better to teach him how to fish so that he can also fish by himself” (trader, 
Gataraga, Dec. 14, 2010) 
 
 “I thought it was like any other organization that come and then leave. With 
time, I knew that the IP had come to stay. It is farmer centered” (local policy 
maker, Bubare, Nov. 11, 2010) 
 
Furthermore, conveners of IPs need to be clear about the objectives of the process and 
prioritize what can realistically be achieved without significantly raising expectations and, 
thereby, sustain participation. Maintaining participation within IPs requires that project 
managers generate short-term and tangible outputs (such as honoring members by giving 
them products that raise their status in society), craft strategies that cater for the interests of 
all actors, and continue sensitizing participants about the long-term benefits of collaboration. 
Prioritization of issues, which could not be realistically achieved in the short-term led to loss 
of trust in the project and consequently low participation as stated by one of the policy 
implementers: 
“They mentioned construction of store in the sub-county, which was going to 
be a sign of development. I wanted to register success in the sub-county 
within the period of office. However, it did not become a solid reality….we 
did not get what we wanted….now am demoralized of not achieving what I 
had anticipated” (local policy implementer, Kisoro, Nov. 18, 2010)  
 
(ii) Lack of proper understanding of IP concept 
IP is a new concept and many actors do not have a clear understanding of how the 
approach works. Members expressed lack of sufficient information about the concept of IPs. 
The approach has new ways of doing things which creates fear and uncertainty among actors 
as reflected in the statements below: 
 “The problem is farmers. They do not buy into new ideas quickly. But also 
other actors like transporters and input dealers may not easily see how they 
will benefit from the IP because they are exploiters. That is the fear. The 
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trader thinks the prices will be affected if they enter into meetings…the 
culture of working in isolation. IP being a new concept causes those fears 
(NGO representative Kabale, Nov. 13, 2010) 
 
“Traders at the lower level are not with us. Since they are used to exploiting 
farmers, they think that collective marketing will threaten their pricing 
system” (farmer and trader, Bubare, Nov. 13, 2010) 
 
In addition, a lack of clarity regarding some actors’ roles and non-formal partnerships 
among organizations limited their commitment to and integration of IP activities.  
 
 (iii) Lack of resources 
Lack of resources was also mentioned several times in both in-depth interviews and 
FGDs. Extension workers and IP chairpersons lacked resources, in terms of transportation to 
mobilize farmers who live on the upper side of the hills. Therefore, these members did not 
receive information about meetings, which affected their active involvement. In addition, 
chairpersons lacked financial resources to make radio announcements to reach as many 
people as possible. Lack of facilitation in terms of transport and meals during meetings held 
at lower implementation levels (parish/village level) also discouraged farmers at those levels 
from participating. In addition, lack of resources to apply knowledge acquired (such as 
improved seed, fertilizer, tools, equipment and credit) curtailed active participation of 
farmers and individual from the private business sector:  
“Members have started neglecting IP meetings because whenever they come 
to attend, they do not facilitate them e.g. lunch and their transport back” 
(farmer, Bubare, Nov. 6, 2010) 
 
“We in NAADS, as extension workers, we never received any facilitation 
resources  but people think we have a lot of money. Local government 
delayed to release funds for extension workers to do what they are supposed 
to be doing” (extension worker, Bufundi, Nov. 13 2010) 
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“IP has its own technical staff but what is lacking is the other arm of 
government to work with the person of IP. The problem of government is that 
if am not facilitated resources  then I see no reason to be there” (local policy 
implementer, Kisoro, Nov. 18, 2010) 
 
We have no packing materials and we do not know where to purchase them 
e.g., thermometers. We ordinary farmers cannot have the skill to purchase 
them” (trader who quit Bubare IP, Bubare, Nov. 27, 1010). 
 
 (iv) Over-commitment  
Participation requires dedication of time, money and energy, which are costs to 
participating actors. All local government officials interviewed indicated prior commitment 
to many other activities as one of the constraining factors to their full participation in 
innovation platform activities. Engagement in IPs constituted additional roles. This was 
worsened by not integrating IP activities into already existing government programs. This 
was primarily observed in Uganda IPs and it’s reflected in the statements below.  
“I participate once in a while because of the nature of my work. Normally, the 
IP has its activities and I also have NAADS activities but when I have time, I 
participate” (extension worker, Bubare, Nov. 16, 2010) 
 
“I attend few meetings in person. Meetings are scheduled on Tuesday so I do 
not attend. Their fieldwork is done on weekend, so it becomes difficult for me 
to attend. Fieldwork on other days, I find it easier to delegate than me being 
there. If they contacted me early enough, we would agree on the date. If they 
would fully participate in NAADS, I would handle them concurrently. That is 
what we call joint work plan or integrated activity” (local policy implementer, 
Bufundi, Nov. 15, 2010) 
 
“At first I was very active when it had been introduced. I was a secretary for 
atleast 2 months. Thereafter, I realized that I would not have a lot of time and 
also did not know much about agriculture. The sitting would be on Saturday 
when I needed to rest…” I’m now the agricultural officer yet I did history. 
When I call IP members, what will I tell them? Now they are doing things and 
I’m not participating. Sitting with them is not significant. That’s where there’s 
frustration” (local policy implementer, Chahi, Nov. 18, 2010) 
 
101 
 
1
0
1
 
On the other hand, discussions with farmers revealed lack of interest in the program 
by local government officials mainly policy makers and implementers because they lacked 
resources and immediate incentives to motivate them. Warner (2007:58) asserts that 
obtaining and sustaining commitment from political leaders is not easy, since politicians are 
more attracted to initiatives which provide tangible and short-term outputs, and the outcomes 
from integrated and collaborative approaches are often intangible and long term.  
Contrary to the IPs in Uganda, the IP activities in Rwanda were integrated into 
government programs to pool resources and avoid conflicts and violation of government 
policies. IPs in Rwanda operated within the framework of government policies. This implies 
that a favorable policy environment is required to foster active participation of actors. 
Integration of IP activities into existing government programs and activities would foster 
participation of relevant actors to minimize transaction costs in terms of time, energy and 
resources. In the previous section, we noted that policy makers were motivated to participate 
because they believed that their participation motivated other community members to 
participate. This indicates that poor participation of local policy makers may limit 
participation of other community members. 
v) Feeling de-valued 
Feeling devalued limits active participation of members and may lead to withdrawal 
from IPs. The processor who dropped out of Bubare IP felt that facilitators of the program 
devalued his capacity to process quality sorghum product and gave the processing skills to 
the established large-scale processor. The policy maker who dropped out of Bufundi IP felt 
that the IP chairperson did not respect him. In addition, the extension worker in Bubare IP 
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felt that being treated like farmers was devaluing since she was more qualified than farmers. 
The respondents reported that: 
“They trained us only for one week. So I knew that we were going to process by 
themselves…. we knew that Mr. Z was doing processing…but we also wanted more 
skills in processing. We went to Mr. Z’s processing plant and that is where I changed 
my mind. When we reached there I was amazed. I didn’t see much that our ordinary 
farmer can’t do. In my view, we were beating him. I had been processing sorghum for 
12 years and he was new in the industry. I asked Mr. X, why are you giving skills to 
Mr. Z yet farmers are eager to process themselves? Although we are processing 
locally, we can modernize. As processors, what we want are skills. So I said let me 
go” (processor - quit IP, Bubare, Nov. 27, 2010) 
 
“The chairman of the IP does not invite me to meetings. One time, I brought 100 bags 
of potato seed and he chased me. So ever since, I and the chairman do not work 
together” (secretary of production - quit the IP, Bufundi, Nov. 15, 2010) 
 
“This innovation platform is not treating me the way I’m supposed to be treated. The 
way we are treated is the way farmers are treated. Being at the same level with 
farmers is challenging… the way the chairman is involved, he is on top…he is the 
one telling me what we are going to do. Sometimes I have no morale for IP because 
of that” (extension worker, Bubare, Nov. 16, 2010) 
 
“We had training on how to process sorghum for 3 days. We did the processing and 
packaging by ourselves. Mr. Z came in after a month. We were told that he can make 
porridge that can be sold in Kampala. We toured Mr. Z’s industry. He showed us 
machines that make cheese, yoghurt and porridge. The way he made sorghum is the 
way we were taught in the IP. So what made the vice chairman to leave the IP was 
that he was also processing porridge. So he said… you people, you think we are 
ladders to climb on. We make porridge. This man is from town [Mr. Z]. He does not 
come from our village. If you had told us that the machine costs this amount, we 
would have mobilized money to buy it. So he left and handed over everything. He 
said that those who are learned want the lower person to remain at a lower level and 
the upper person to go up. He was encouraged to also process sorghum and give it 
another label but he got so angry and left” (trader, Bubare, Nov. 14, 2010)  
 
It is important to encourage participation from all actors by creating a higher level of 
trust and respect for all actors.  Recognition of existing community assets such as human 
capital and building of these strengths further motivates participation of community 
members. 
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Conclusions and Implications for Future Research 
The increasing interest in IPs reflects their potential for addressing agricultural related 
problems to improve smallholder livelihoods.  However, no studies have previously been 
conducted to understand the relationship between motivation and participation in IPs. This 
study was designed to determine the factors that motivate actors to participate in IPs, 
determine whether full participation helps actors to achieve their desired goals, and identify 
the factors which sustain or curtail participation. The study uses social capital and social 
exchange theory to examine participation in five IPs in the Great Lakes Region of Africa.  
The study demonstrates that actors within an IP have multiple factors that motivate 
them to participate (including development, material, economic, social and purposive). 
Farmers were primarily motivated by factors that directly improve their livelihoods while 
extension workers, NGO representatives and policy makers were motivated by purposive 
incentives, and traders were mainly motivated by economic incentives. Although the 
majority of farmers indicated developmental benefits as the main motivating factor, the 
desire to acquire knowledge and skills alone was not sufficient to encourage active 
participation. Economic and material incentives encouraged farmers to continue 
participating. Farmers who were more educated participated in more actives. However, the 
regression model did not explain much of the variation in participation. Much of the variation 
was explained by qualitative data. Farmers who participated in more activities perceived 
innovation platforms to be rewarding. While the survey results did not reveal differences in 
level of participation between men and women, qualitative interviews revealed that women 
were more active than men.  
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Although private business actors were mostly motivated by anticipated economic 
benefits, they did not participate actively in four of the five IPs. The size of operation 
influenced the extent to which individuals in the private business sector generated tangible 
benefits, with large-scale traders benefiting more and within a shorter time frame. In 
addition, local policy makers were not active participants due to lack of tangible short-term 
benefits to motivate them to participate. The study generated mixed results for hypothesis 1. 
Although expectation of material, economic, development, social and purposive benefits may 
encourage actors to participate in IPs, active and sustainable participation is achieved with 
actual realization of short-term benefits, primarily material and economic benefits. The 
second and third hypotheses were supported. 
Factors that curtailed continued participation were priori experience of receiving 
immediate tangible benefits from development projects which raised unrealistic expectations, 
lack of sufficient knowledge about the concept IPs, lack of resources, over-commitment and 
feeling de-valued. Although IPs have been successful in including diverse value chain actors, 
success in establishing strong value chains and improving smallholder livelihoods will 
depend on active participation of all relevant chain actors and developing common interests. 
This will require changes in attitudes about receiving external incentives, nurturing positive 
attitude and commitment from all stakeholders to contribute to the process.  Social exchange 
theory reflects the iterative nature of social relationships. The feedback loops either reinforce 
continued participation or are a disincentive to participation. Continued participation in 
exchanges is further enhanced by social capital. Although people may engage in collective 
action for self-interest, they are also interested in and willing to contribute to activities that 
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benefit others. Therefore, social exchange theory alone cannot explain participation of 
individuals in collective action. It must be complemented by social capital theory. 
This research has practical implications for community organizers and policy makers 
to determine the advantages of multi-stakeholder participation, design and implement 
inclusive development interventions, and make participation successful. IP members would 
benefit greatly from being trained and sensitized about the expectations supposed to govern 
their behavior. Future research needs to investigate the characteristics of individuals who 
continue or cease participating in IPs, the conditions that facilitate participation, and the 
strategies to cope with obstacles to successful IPs. Future research can also examine how 
intrinsic and extrinsic incentives influence performance of IPs.  
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CHAPTER 4. POWER AND INFLUENCE IN DECISION-MAKING 
WITHIN INNOVATION PLATFORMS  
Manuscript prepared for the journal: Development and Change 
Abstract 
Innovation platforms (IPs) have emerged as important governance structures in the 
agricultural sector to promote collaboration among diverse stakeholders along a commodity 
value chain to address the needs of smallholder farmers. This study was conducted to provide 
an understanding of the power dynamics in IPs, their effect on decision-making and the 
context in which decisions are made. IPs nurtured a consensual and democratic process of 
decision-making. Active involvement of farmers in decision-making enhanced prioritization 
of issues of concern to them. However, concerns of small-scale local traders and women 
were not completely taken into account. Those with more access to information, knowledge, 
and financial resources demonstrated more power and influenced the decision-making, and 
implementation process. Existing hierarchical power structures generated power struggles 
between the empowered farmers and the powerful local government officials. Rigid 
government policies and their implementation may promote collective decision-making but 
also constrain implementation of potential technologies. 
Introduction 
Innovation platforms (IPs) have emerged as important structures in the agricultural 
sector to involve a diversity of stakeholders along the commodity value chain in agricultural 
research to address the needs of smallholder farmers. Platforms are commonly defined as 
decision-making bodies comprising different stakeholders who perceive the same problem, 
realize their interdependence for solving it, and come together to agree on action strategies to 
solve the problem (Steins and Edwards 1998:1). An IP is an informal partnership of 
researchers, extension workers, farmers, development practitioners, individuals from the 
private business sector and policy makers who are motivated to collaborate by the belief that 
increasing agricultural productivity can help improve the welfare of all community members 
(Eicher 2006). In this study, an IP is defined as a forum in which multiple actors with 
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meaningful interests in a common issue collaborate in identification of agricultural problems, 
share and develop new ideas to better solve those problems, and implement creative solutions 
to improve livelihoods. 
Research institutions and government agencies have organized and developed IPs to 
provide a space where different stakeholders (civil society, producer associations, public and 
private business sector) interact to learn about each other’s values and interests, develop 
shared priorities, define roles and agree on joint actions (Hall et al. 2003) to address concerns 
regarding smallholder farmers’ production and marketing of crops. IPs have been designed in 
response to the failure of the traditional agricultural research and extension approach to 
translate research outputs into development and social impacts (FARA 2007) that address 
widespread poverty, hunger and malnutrition in sub-Saharan Africa (Mokwunye 2010).  
The traditional approach of knowledge generation and learning follows a linear 
approach where researchers and experts produce new knowledge and technology and transfer 
it to the end users who need it to innovate and change (Lundy et al. 2005). The research of 
most national agricultural systems is not linked to technology users and other actors in the 
sector.  Researchers, the end users of research outputs and other providers of services that 
support agricultural production, value addition and marketing, largely work in isolation from 
one another. As a result research outputs do not address the needs of end users (FARA 2007; 
World Bank 2007a). Therefore, IPs are seen as a significant improvement over the linear, 
less inclusive and less interactive traditional agricultural research and extension approach. 
The sub-Saharan African Challenge Program (SSA-CP), initiated in 2004, designed 
and implemented the Integrated Agricultural Research for Development (IAR4D) approach 
to respond to the need for innovative and high impact research. The approach aims at 
involving a diversity of actors along a commodity chain to ensure relevance, responsiveness 
of research to stakeholders’ needs, and creating an environment that enhances social learning. 
In this approach, IPs are used as a forum for involvement of diverse actors (including 
farmers, researchers, extension agents, development specialists, input and output traders, 
agro processors, financial institutions, policy makers, and cooperatives), for joint problem 
identification, prioritization and implementation of viable solutions (FARA 2007) that will 
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increase food security, access to markets, reduce poverty and malnutrition, and promote 
sustainable natural resource management (Mokwunye 2010).  
IAR4D implements a decentralized system of governance in which actors at the 
community level, including farmers, are involved in decision-making. Participation of 
community members is assumed to promote democratization and empowerment in decision-
making (Edmunds and Wollenberg 2001). Participatory decision-making is also thought to 
reduce the gap of power inequalities through processes of knowledge production which 
strengthen the voice of marginalized groups (Gaventa and Cornwall 2001). However, IP is a 
relatively new concept in agricultural research for development and there is limited 
understanding of how decision-making processes empower farmers to articulate issues that 
are of concern to them and the context within which decisions are made.  
Many multi-stakeholder processes ignore power differences and inequality among 
participants, which leads to over estimation of the level of consensus. Stakeholders with 
limited power to influence decisions may be manipulated by more powerful stakeholders 
(Edmunds and Wollenberg 2001). Participatory approaches fail to adequately address issues 
of power and control of information and other resources (Biggs 1995). The belief that 
participation is a good practice has resulted into less consideration of power and politics in 
processes (Cleaver 2001). In addition, most of the multi-stakeholder processes are set up in 
environments characterized by high socioeconomic inequalities (such as income levels, 
education attainment, and access to information). Therefore, traditional patterns of power 
tend to persist and manipulate the identification of problems and the definition of agendas 
(Warner 2007:134). Failure to recognize power differences may reproduce power differences 
- thereby reinforcing asymmetric relations that an intervention would seek to change (Brown 
et al. 2003). 
This study was designed to investigate the power dynamics within IPs and the factors 
which influence decision-making (such as knowledge, access to information, control of 
resources, structure and policy) in five IPs in Lake Kivu Region between Sept.-Dec. 2010. 
Both qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection were employed. The research 
questions addressed are: 
1. How are decisions made in IPs? 
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2. Does active involvement of farmers enhance prioritization of issues that address their 
needs? 
3. How do knowledge, access to information and resources influence decision- making?  
4. What contextual factors influence decision-making and implementation of decisions? 
I hypothesize that full participation of farmers in decision-making enhances prioritization 
of issues that address their concerns and that farmers who access more information and 
knowledge exercise more power. I use the theory of power and concept of participation, to 
explain the factors that influence decision-making in IPs. This will facilitate better 
understanding of social and economic inequalities in IPs and development of measures to 
address them. This study extends innovation systems theory and social capital theory by 
explicitly incorporating the concept of power. Innovation systems theory assumes that all 
stakeholders have realistic potential to exert relatively equal influence. This paper has 
practical implications for organizers of multi-stakeholder platforms in addressing power 
relations to ensure that less powerful actors have the ability to raise their concerns. The paper 
also has implications for policy makers in designing policies that facilitate participation of 
community members in making decisions, which directly impact their livelihoods.  The 
findings may be of value to scholars who are interested in understanding the emergency and 
implementation of IPs.   
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the key features of IPs, 
the third section discusses decision-making, participation and power in multi-stakeholder 
platforms, section four reveals the methodology, data, and discussion and finally, section five 
presents the conclusion.  
 
Key Features of Innovation Platforms  
IPs constitute actors with diverse competence working in partnership to address 
problems in the entire value chain (FARA 2009b). IPs are expected to generate better and 
acceptable decisions compared to decisions made without involvement of community 
members (Hemmati 2002). Multiple actors within the IP bring a diversity of knowledge and 
information on which to base decisions compared to a centralized process (Botchway 2001; 
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FARA 2007). Stakeholders are more likely to accept a project or solution to a problem if they 
have been part of the decision-making process (Faysse 2006).  
Twelve IPs were established in Lake Kivu Region. This is the region where 
northeastern Rwanda, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and southwestern 
Uganda intersect. Seven of the IPs were established during the last quarter of 2008 and five 
in the first quarter of 2009 (Tenywa et al. 2011). IPs are facilitated by a team of 
interdisciplinary scientists (Task Forces) who bring together stakeholders along the resource 
to consumption continuum (FARA 2007). Each IP is organized to address problems specific 
to a given value chain (such as potato and sorghum value chains). IPs have innovation 
clusters at two implementation levels, i.e., the strategic level (regional and national level) and 
operational level (sub-county
6
). An innovation cluster consists of groups of actors with 
similar characteristics, who gather together to address common issues. The sub-county 
innovation cluster is sub-divided into sub-clusters of innovation at parish and at village level 
(Figure 4. 1). A cross-site research support team (CRST) builds the capacity of IP members 
at the operational level by providing technical support in selected key areas, i.e., increasing 
production, access to markets, natural resource management and policy (FARA 2009b). 
Governance of multi-stakeholder platforms is ideally based on pluralistic principles 
including democracy, participation, equity and justice, unity in diversity, transparency, 
inclusiveness, legitimacy, and accountability (Schiffer et al. 2010). IPs have an executive 
committee (with chairman, vice chairman, secretary, treasurer and committee members 
representing groups from different parishes) supported by sub-committees (which focus on 
marketing, research, finance, natural resource management, and monitoring and evaluation). 
The committee, together with other actors, meets at sub-county level and makes operational 
decisions (developing the agenda, convening IP meetings, following-up on decisions made, 
facilitating interaction between different IP members, mobilizing important actors who are 
not present at IP meetings and liaise with national and regional partners). Strategic decisions 
(such as agenda of the country or region and location of activities) are made at national and 
regional levels (Tenywa et al. 2011).  
                                                          
6 Sub-county is the third political administrative unit in Uganda and Rwanda. The sub-county is 
subdivided into parishes or cells. Parishes contain villages, the lowest political administrative units. 
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The governance structure at sub-county level is paralleled at lower implementation 
levels to ensure proper coordination of activities between hierarchies. Members of IPs at the 
different implementation levels meet once a month, with members of the lower level  
(parish/village level) implementation cluster meeting first so that their representatives 
forward their issues to the sub-county executive committee. The sub-county innovation 
cluster is the hub where information collected from other implementation levels is processed, 
decisions are made and feedback is given to members in other clusters.  
 
Figure 4-1: Organizational Structure of an IP 
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Participation, Power and Influence in Decision-Making  
Community development approaches are rooted in the inclusion of community 
members in planning and decision-making. It is argued that community members’ 
livelihoods are more likely to be improved if a broad range of stakeholders is included in the 
process of decision-making (Hyman 2002). Improving livelihoods of community members 
does not limit itself to individuals within the community. Both internal and external 
relationships are required (DeFilippis 2001). Transparent and inclusive decision-making 
processes increase the level of trust among stakeholders. Increase in the level of trust can 
potentially increase the ability of stakeholders to implement decisions (Wagner and 
Fernandez-Gimeneza 2008; Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000). Participation and representation 
of all diverse groups in decision-making is believed to generate consensus and social learning 
(Narayan 1999).  
Consensus-based decision-making processes are committed to reaching a mutual 
agreement and seek win-win solutions (Peterson, Peterson, and Peterson 2005).  Susskind et 
al. (1999) claims that consensus-based decisions reach more creative solutions, which are 
more readily implemented compared to those made by non-consensus processes.  However, 
other authors have argued that consensus augments power inequalities in relationships. 
Consensus may favor the status quo and lead to risky decisions. Weaker groups may accept 
decisions contrary to their interest (Cooke and Kothari 2001; Peterson et al. 2005).  Success 
and sustainability of a value chain depends on the existence of suitable governance systems.  
Leaders need to identify governance systems to ensure that partners behave in a manner that 
benefits the entire chain and do not exhibit opportunistic behavior (Gooch, 2005). 
Several authors have argued that participation has not been successful in overcoming 
power relations and has sustained and reinforced inequalities in economic, political and 
social structures. Power remains dispersed between individuals and structures (Cooke and 
Kothari 2001; Hildyard et al. 2001) and affects the choices made within social systems 
(Pfeffer 1981). The level of power and influence depends on the relations that people have 
within social structures (Blau 1964; Marsden and Friedkin 1994). The relations between 
individuals are embedded within social networks. Positions of individuals within networks 
can constrain or enhance their ability to exercise influence. Actors with more opportunities 
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exercise more influence in decision-making. Although multi-stakeholder platforms are 
assumed to have no lines of command, there are actors, such as those in government 
organizations, who may assume that they are the leading decision makers even when a 
democratic decision-making process is in place (Schiffer, Hartwich, and Monge 2010).   
There are multiple sources of power including physical strength, authoritative 
position, wealth, prestige, command of information, and personal traits (Flora and Fora 2008; 
Trounstine and Christensen 1982). Power can be further categorized into five types based on 
their sources: coercive power (due to fear of the consequences of not complying), reward-
based power (ability to distribute or reward benefits), legitimate power (based on one’s 
position in the organization), expert power (based on experience, skills or knowledge) and 
referential power (based on the relationship with someone who possesses desirable resources 
or personal characteristics) (Hall and Tolbert 2005; Pfeffer 1981).  
Actors obtain power from the resources they possess or control such as persons, 
information, and money. Access to resources is influenced by the individual’s position in the 
organization. However, access to resources alone is not sufficient to provide individuals with 
power. The value attached to the resource by others, ease of acquisition and ease of 
substitution determines the power of the individual. Individuals who can provide critical and 
difficult to obtain resources (e.g., money, expertise, and prestige) gain power (Hall and 
Tolbert 2005).  
The amount of power that one person has over another is based on how much each depends 
on the other. Since group members are interdependent, no single group member can control 
all power in the group. However, as the inequity between group members grows, it becomes 
more and more likely that a few members will be able to dominate the group. Since group 
members are interdependent, members of a group always have the ability to exercise power, 
even when one member is dominant (Pfeffer 1981). Power is tolerable only on condition that 
it masks a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own 
mechanism (Foucault 1979:86). 
Different levels of knowledge among stakeholders generate power differences. Power 
cannot be separated from knowledge, and since knowledge requires records and a system of 
communication, it is in itself power (Foucault 1977). Knowledge is used to determine what is 
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possible, for and by whom. Actors who have access to knowledge and participate in its 
production, use and dissemination affect the conceptualization of what is useful knowledge 
and what is possible (Gaventa and Cornwall 2001). In resource poor areas, receipt of funding 
from external sources influences the decision-making process and actions implemented. “The 
ability to give funding is closely linked to the ability to set the agenda, even if the funder is 
located at a distant place. By determining what the funds have to be used for, funders can 
structure the content and degree of activity on the ground” (Schiffer et al. 2010:5).  
Foucault (1982) and Forester (1989) see power as political communication entailing 
information presentation and misrepresentation, interpretation and misinterpretation, 
manipulation and withholding information. Actors who are connected to diverse networks are 
more informed than those who are not. Therefore, more informed actors are more likely to 
influence decisions of less informed actors because those less informed consider the better 
informed as references (Erickson 1988; Sparrowe and Liden 1997; Sparrowe and Liden 
2005). The main obstacle to successful interactive processes is lack of proper 
communication. Participants may not speak openly about their objectives, and may not 
consider other participants’ interests, which creates a barrier to consensus building (Sultana 
and Thompson 2004). Improved access to information and participation in decision-making 
enhances the quality and the implementation of decisions (Warner 2007).  
Although development projects involve women in decision-making, Hildyard et al. 
(2001) noted that women’s voices (especially from lower strata) were still marginalized in 
decision-making concerning forest management. Even where discussions addressed issues 
affecting women, the voices of women were frequently ignored. This was attributed to 
existing power structures within the communities. Cornwall (2003) asserts that women’s 
ability to influence decisions depends not only on having women on committees and 
representing women’s interests but also depends on the good will of group leaders, usually 
men, to listen to women’s voices.  
For multi-stakeholder platforms to be successful, individuals at local level need to be 
empowered to make decisions. Democratization of the process is important to benefit the 
disadvantaged groups. Multi-stakeholder platforms may empower participants who have the 
ability to negotiate, raise their concerns and access new information. However, the process 
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may be disempowering as well. Problems of inequality prevail and marginalized groups may 
remain unheard. Therefore, inclusion alone is not enough because issues that are of concern 
to the poor might not be mentioned, tabled or considered. Powerless groups need to be given 
voice and their claims should be put into consideration (Edmunds and Wollenberg 2001).  
It is important that the process of innovation includes actors across different social, 
cultural and administrative levels to obtain legitimacy. However, facilitators often face 
challenges in striking a balance in the amount of attention dedicated to each level of the 
system. Higher level policy makers (e.g., at national level) are not involved and are reluctant 
to be fully engaged. Facilitation of learning is often limited to grassroots and local levels 
such as village or district level. Therefore, decisions made at the local level have limited 
scope, impact and sustainability due to lack of policy support.  Addressing issues such as the 
land tenure system, prices or subsidies require policy support (Groot et al. 2002). It is critical 
that high level policy makers are involved because they formulate policies which influence 
change at the local level and the sustainability of these changes (Steins and Edwards 1999).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Participation in Decision-making 
H1 
H3 
H2 
Decision-Making 
 Level of 
participation 
Active Participation 
• Frequency of 
involvement in 
decision-making 
Contextual Factors 
• Existing hierarchical 
structures 
•Supportive national 
and local policy 
Access to Resources 
• Knowledge & 
information 
• Financial 
• Material 
Prioritization of 
issues of concern 
to farmers 
123 
 
1
2
3
 
Hypotheses  
The paper tests the following hypotheses 
H1: Active involvement of farmers in decision-making enhances prioritization of issues that 
are of concern to farmers. 
H2: Actors with more access to knowledge, information, and financial resources have more 
influence in decision-making 
H3: Contextual factors such as existing hierarchical structures, supportive national and local 
policies will influence decision-making and implementation of decisions 
Methods and Data  
The study was conducted in Uganda and Rwanda, two of the three pilot learning sites 
(PLS) of the SSA-CP in the Lake Kivu Region (figure 4-3). The region is characterized by 
very steep slopes, a bimodal rainfall pattern, high population density and fragmented 
smallholder plots that are intensively cultivated (FARA 2005; FARA 2009a). The 
agroecology is very fragile and highly degraded. In Uganda, the study was conducted in 
Bubare and Bufundi sub-counties in Kabale district and Chahi sub-county in Kisoro district. 
In Rwanda, the study was conducted in Gataraga and Remera sub-counties in Musanze 
district. Figure 4-3 shows the location of the study area.  
Figure 4-3: Map Showing Location of IPs Studied 
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Source: (Farrow, Tenywa, and Nkonya (Submitted)) 
The study population included members of IPs. Five of the 12 IPs in the region were 
studied to understand decision-making processes and power dynamics. The IPs studied were 
Bubare sorghum IP, Bufundi potato IP, and Chahi potato IP in Uganda, and Isangano 
Gataraga potato IP and Remera maize IP in Rwanda. Selection was based on date of 
formation, enterprise of focus, and approach of formation (market driven or research driven). 
Table 4.1 shows the characteristics of the IPs selected. 
 
Table 4-1: Characteristics of the Selected IPs 
Country Name of IP Date 
Formed 
Membership Approach Sample 
Male Female 
Uganda Bubare 
sorghum 
Sept. 2009 83 96 Market-led 42 
Bufundi potato Nov. 2008 65 77 Research-led 42 
Chahi potato Nov. 2008 62 77 Research-led 43 
Rwanda Isangano 
Gataraga 
potato 
Nov. 2008 160 98 Research-led 41 
Remera maize Sept. 2009 29 27 Market-led 16 
 
Data were collected using semi-structured interviews, in-depth interviewing and focus 
group methodologies to triangulate the information to improve validity and reliability 
(Verschuren and Doorewaard 1999). The Institutional Review Board approved the research 
in 2010. The research team consisted of myself and research assistants (recruited from the 
study area and trained by me). We conducted interviews with farmers at the lower 
implementation level (parish/village level) to verify information provided by their 
representatives at sub-county level. We used semi-structured questionnaires, which were pre-
tested with 15 members of IPs to help refine the final questions. We randomly sampled IP 
members from up-to-date membership lists obtained from IP chairpersons. The research team 
interviewed 184 farmers from the five IPs. Semi-structured questionnaires generated 
information about involvement in problem identification, frequency of participation in needs 
prioritization, perceptions about priority needs vis-à-vis needs addressed by IPs.  
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In addition, I used checklists with in-depth interviews and focus group discussions 
(FGDs) to generate information on the process of prioritizing needs, whose needs are 
prioritized, actors influencing the process and how (exploring the influence of knowledge, 
access to information and other resources on decision-making) and the context within which 
decision-making was made. We conducted 32 in-depth interviews with different IP actors 
who met at sub-county level (Figure 1) and six FGDs with farmers’ representatives. Since 
farmer representatives were few, they were not sampled in order to obtain the number 
required for a FGD. Interviews and FGDs were conducted in English or the local language. 
The in-depth interviews and focus group discussions were digitally recorded and transcribed 
to permit detailed coding (open, axial and selective coding). This study was conducted 
between September-December 2010. I analyzed the transcribed interviews qualitatively using 
line-by-line coding to identify the major themes and categories that emerged. The Statistical 
Package for Social Scientists was used to analyze quantitative data. This paper uses more of 
the data collected using qualitative methods. 
Results and Discussion 
Decision Making in Innovation Platforms  
Reaching Consensus  
Results from FGDs with farmer representatives and in-depth interviews with different 
actors demonstrated a shift in the ladder of participation (Arnstein 1969) from consultative 
meeting to partnership where all actors, especially farmers (the originally excluded group 
from decision making) were actively involved in making decision on issues that affect them 
(including problems to address, actors to bring on board and implementation of bylaws for 
soil and water conservation
7
) and actions to be taken. In all IPs, members revealed that 
decisions were mainly made by consensus or democratically.  
                                                          
7 Bylaws are rules made by lower local government councils at village (LC1) and sub-county level 
(LC3) and provide the local policy guidelines to be followed in sectoral developments, such as 
agricultural and natural resource management. Bylaws for natural resource management are now seen 
as viable alternatives for enforcing government policies and rectifying their inefficiencies (Sanginga 
et al. 2004). Policies refer to laws, rules and regulations from public or state or collective decision-
making (Means et al. 2002). 
126 
 
1
2
6
 
We usually identify issues in meetings. Mainly, we focus on issues raised in 
reports from parishes. From the parish reports, we identify areas or problems 
to discuss... Issues are prioritized in our meetings at sub-county level. We 
collect a number of ideas. Then, we have a general discussion of all issues 
raised in the parishes. They discuss one report and then move to the next. At 
the end of the meeting, we have a resolution. We sometimes generate 
consensus or vote (farmer, Bubare, Nov. 7 2010) 
 
You cannot decide for many. You have to reach a consensus. You have to 
convince members how you reached your decision, unlike in other groups 
where the chairperson becomes the decision maker. You have to convince 
them why one side should win, you do not force them (farmer, Bubare, Nov. 
7, 2010) 
 
In the meeting, everybody has a right to speak. Decision-making is done 
democratically. I normally present my problems to the whole group and 
farmers determine the premium price….the farmers can say…you have to 
give us this amount and they also consider me so that I can also get something 
to eat because for me, I’m not after making a lot of profit. I also want my 
farmers to get something to develop (trader, Gataraga, Dec. 14, 2010) 
 
Lack of Dominance  
Other respondents emphasized lack of dominance in the process of problem or issue 
identification. IPs were perceived to be leveled grounds were all actors had equal chance to 
air out their views as stated by some respondents: 
No one dominates when we meet at the sub-county. We bring problems from 
our people down. Everybody presents their issues and we see what is 
important. The chairman asks what is more important and we vote (local 
policy maker, Chahi Nov. 17, 2010) 
 
We handle issues collectively, then come up with the solution. The way IP 
handles issues is different. It is not like NAADS National Agricultural 
Advisory Services . No one dominates or has power (farmer, Bubare, Nov. 7, 
2010) 
 
No one dominates meetings. No one shows power. We sit and talk properly. 
We feel good when we talk to professors and we are at the same level. They 
do not sit alone. They mix with us (local policy maker, Chahi, Nov. 17, 2010) 
 
People present in the meeting influence prioritization but we agree, e.g., if we 
have 10 challenges, we discuss and agree. Nobody dominates (extension 
worker, Bubare, Nov. 16, 2010) 
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Other actors stated that the process of decision-making was bottom up, empowering 
members at the grassroots to be involved in decision-making. 
The system here is bottom up. We respect farmers most. Those farmers are 
empowered. They are not limited. It’s farmers driving it. It’s farmers who call 
for meetings. NAADS National Agricultural Advisory Services  is top-down 
because we implement decisions from top (local policy implementer, Bubare, 
Nov. 11, 2010) 
 
For us we keep quiet and let those farmers, traders to air out their issues. In 
NAADS, we have the executive which decides what to do, then the farmer 
forum agrees or disagrees. We have the general council, which gives the final 
blessing. In IP, all stakeholders meet and make decisions. In NAADS, some 
meet and think for others (extension Bubare, Nov. 16, 2010) 
 
Similar to the qualitative data, results from the survey conducted with farmers at 
parish/village level showed that 65 per cent of the farmers were involved in identification of 
issues to address. Of these, 29 per cent were always involved, 20 per cent were often 
involved, 35 per cent were involved sometime, and only 16 per cent indicated seldom. The 
issues that were of priority to farmers at parish/village level were: lack of agricultural inputs 
(such as improved seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, tools and implements, and labour) (86 per 
cent), poor soil fertility (77 per cent), lack of profitable markets  (61 per cent) and poor post-
harvest handling practices (38 per cent). The key problems that the IPs were addressing 
included: Low crop productivity (90 per cent), poor soil fertility (70 per cent), low value 
addition 34 per cent, and poor market access (45 per cent). Relating farmers’ priority 
problems with the problems that IPs were addressing, we notice that IPs addressed farmers 
priority needs. 
However, one of the critical issues, i.e., lack of inputs, was not addressed. This could 
be explained by the composition of IPs since three out of the five IPs did not have input 
dealers. Where IPs had input dealers, the inputs were costly. This influenced farmers’ 
decisions to adopt input use. These findings demonstrate the potential of IPs to empower 
farmers to make decisions, which is important for sustainability. By empowering farmers to 
make decisions, IPs are more likely to address their issues.  
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Power Dynamics in the Decision-Making Process  
The Invisible and Unheard  
Although the process of decision-making was mainly by consensus and democratic, 
not all stakeholders had equal bargaining power to have their issues raised and taken into 
account. For instance, local small-scale traders (input and output traders) in Bubare and 
Bufundi IP and millers in Bubare IP felt that their issues were not prioritized because they 
were few in number, lacked purchasing power and that their issues were not visible. Some of 
the traders reported that: 
In the IP meeting, normally they have their own agenda and the problems of 
millers are not there. Issues of farmers are considered most (miller, Bubare, 
Nov. 13, 2010) 
 
Yes, we are involved in defining challenges. Issues prioritized are things to do 
with demonstrations and making porridge because they are visible. Ours, 
which are not seen, are not emphasized a lot.  Even then we have no money to 
buy the sorghum. We cannot write to those people [microfinance] to give us a 
loan so we leave it there (trader, Bubare, Nov. 14, 2010) 
 
They vote when there are many problems to address. Traders would be 
listened to, but there is not much produce at the moment (extension worker, 
Bufundi, Nov. 13, 2010) 
 
Had we to unite ourselves, our problems would be solved. It’s because we do 
not have enough money. Had we had enough money, we would make a 
society to buy Irish potato (trader, Bufundi, Nov. 28, 2010)  
 
Compared to relatively large-scale traders, small-scale local traders felt 
disempowered to raise their voices due to lack of money, an empowering resource. Lack of 
money to purchase farmers’ produce was mentioned several times by small-scale traders and 
considered disempowering. Emphasis on farmers’ issues could also be explained by the fact 
that many households targeted by the program are poor and food insecure. Hence, increase in 
production for food security is central in these areas. In addition, lack of organization of 
small-scale traders into associations limited their bargaining power. Since farmers were the 
majority in number, they controlled the agenda. Therefore, the size of a particular group of 
actors may affect the ability to raise issues even in consensus based decision-making 
processes. In democratic decision-making process characterized by majority rule, actors who 
129 
 
1
2
9
 
are relatively few in number may still lose out. Therefore, smaller and weaker groups such as 
small-scale local traders need to be empowered by linking them to microfinance institutions 
where they can access financial resources, organizing them into associations and enhancing 
their negotiating skills through training.  
Projects that employ participatory approaches assume that bringing all stakeholders 
around the table will result in a consensus being reached that is fair to all. However, these 
assumptions hold only in situations where all actors have equal bargaining power (which 
they usually do not) or if equalities between stakeholders are viewed as technical (Wright and 
Nelson 1995:6). Weaker groups such as local traders may be forced to accept a decision that 
may not benefit them. Since prioritization of issues is based on reports from lower innovation 
clusters, it is imperative that small traders also organize themselves at lower levels so that 
their issues are integrated into the parish reports and presented to the sub-county executive 
committee for consideration. 
Access to adequate and timely financial services for all actors in the chain is a key 
element for successful value chain development. Besides large producers and traders, small 
producers and traders need access to appropriate financial services to make optimal use of 
value addition and income generation. However, linking microfinance institutions to other 
actors in the value chain needs building trust and strong relationships between chain actors 
and financial service providers (KIT and IIRR, 2010). Large-scale traders were empowered 
to raise their issues and have them addressed since they owned empowering resources such 
as money and machinery. They influenced the variety of crops to grow, quality of produce, 
practices or technologies to use, amount to be purchased, and the actors to bring on board for 
expert knowledge to meet the demands of the traders.  
For instance in Gataraga potato IP, the trader purchased only two varieties of potato 
preferred by customers, i.e., Kinigi and Sangema yet the seed was expensive for farmers to 
procure. In addition, the trader purchased potato dehauled using a specific practice. The 
trader had access to credit from a microfinance institution which she loaned to farmers as 
they dehauled the potato. However, the price of the product was negotiated with farmers to 
create a win-win situation. On one incidence during data collection, farmers in Chahi IP 
exercised agency by not selling their produce to a Kampala traders’ association because the 
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association did not meet the minimum initial deposit required by farmers. Some of the 
respondents reported that: 
The trader of IP wants potato harvest at maturity stage, potatoes of good 
quality preferred by their customers. Our market prefers two varieties of 
potato….Kinigi and Sangem and seeds of these varieties are not easily 
available and even if they are available, they are expensive (FGD participant, 
Gataraga, Dec. 17, 2010) 
 
Farmers put up a list of their problems. From those, they were helped by 
actors of the Challenge Program. Together with farmers, they decided to sort 
out what was most important to address. As those issues are addressed, other 
issues emerge, e.g., if you are doing processing, I dictate…I need this kind of 
variety…that drives the shaft in another direction. That is where experts come 
in (trader, Kabale Nov. 16, 2010) 
 
My role is to sell agricultural inputs. I’m close to farmers so they do not spend 
time and money going to town to buy inputs, I do not give any credit because 
I’m looking for money to go and buy other things (trader, Bufundi, Nov. 28, 
2010) 
 
Although women were involved in decision-making, women representatives at sub-
county level, felt that men did not consider their issues.  
Presently, we use gender balance. When a man presents an issue, also a 
woman gives hers. In meetings, women talk but men do not consider their 
issues (FGD participant, Bubare, Nov. 10, 2010) 
 
Women also speak out when addressing their issues but sometimes, when 
other women are absent and there’s only one, their views are not taken 
because she has no support from other women (FGD participant, Bufundi, 
Nov. 12, 2010) 
 
Both men and women participated in identifying problems at parish level. But 
by nature, men dominate (local policy maker, Bufundi, Nov. 15 2010) 
 
The results reflect male dominance in IPs, a common challenge in interactive 
processes. Creating spaces for those less powerful such as women does not imply that their 
voices will be heard. Having women on committees alone is not sufficient to enable women 
to influence decisions. Even where women representatives are able to raise their voices, this 
does not necessarily translate into influence (Agarwal 1997; Moore 1994).  Women are more 
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likely to lose out in participatory decision-making since their issues are marginalized and 
overlooked. Measures such as having women only groups may overcome the silencing of 
women’s voices (Cornwall 2003; Guijt and Shah 1998; Mayoux 1995; Mosse 1994). In 
addition, reconfiguring the rules of interaction in public spaces helps to transform gender 
blindness and address power and powerlessness (Cornwall, 2003). 
 
Access to Information and Knowledge  
The structure of the IPs influenced access to information and knowledge. Information 
in IPs flowed hierarchically among the implementation levels and horizontally within 
implementation levels. Unequal access to information and knowledge created power 
asymmetries within IPs, with farmer representatives in the decision-making group at sub-
county level having more power. In the sub-county forum, farmer representatives interacted 
with diverse actors thereby extending their network of information and knowledge. The 
status of chairpersons was enhanced since they were the contact persons of all other actors 
outside the communities.  
In addition, most trainings were conducted at sub-county level and were attended by 
farmer representatives. However, farmer representatives did not freely share information and 
knowledge acquired from trainings conducted at sub-county level with farmers in their 
constituencies. Farmer representatives controlled information and made decisions regarding 
with whom to share the information how and when. This was a major problem in Bubare, 
Bufundi, Chahi and Remera IPs.  Accessing critical information that is valuable to other 
farmers in decision-making gives representatives power to influence actions of other farmers. 
Some of the respondents noted that: 
Those who attend sub-county meetings and trainings are not present in parish 
meetings to give feedback. Even the chairperson has been complaining that 
we who attend seminars do not go back to the parish to teach our 
colleague….those who go for training have kept the knowledge to themselves 
(farmer, Chahi, Nov. 19, 2010) 
 
There is a chain of command. The chairman is at the top at the sub-county and 
there are sub-committees and then parishes….the chairman has to get a way to 
deliver information at parish level....it is a leveled ground but there should be 
somebody guiding the group. From time immemorial, when someone is an 
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elder of the family he can speak on behalf of the others (extension worker, 
Bufundi, Nov. 13, 2010)  
 
In addition, influence from educated community members was felt in Remera IP.  
 The educated men and those with more income want to use resources the way 
they want. They think no one should influence the way they do their things. 
The educated women are extension workers and they influence mobilization. 
They tell IP members that IP representatives farmers  are not bringing in any 
new knowledge. They want to hear from partners facilitators  and not 
farmers. They think partners have more knowledge (extension worker, 
Remera, Dec. 21, 2010) 
 
Social capital plays an important role in facilitating information exchange. Social 
capital facilitates willingness and cooperation to share information. Individuals decide 
whether to participate in information exchange with others, or whether to acquire or provide 
information (Putnam, 1993). Therefore, increasing the level of trust by fostering two-way 
communication, transparency and teamwork will minimize information asymmetries. Project 
implementers need to put in place a monitoring and evaluation system to ensure that farmer 
representatives provide feedback to their constituencies.  
 
Access to Financial Resources 
Access and control of resources imperative to the proper functioning of IPs caused 
power differences among IP members. External institutions (such as the CGIAR science 
council which approves research) influenced the project design, structure, financing and 
implementation of project activities. This led to modification of the original implementation 
strategy at the time of initiation leading to redundancy in execution of roles by some partners 
who found themselves involved in similar activities. Pressure from donors to show results 
influenced decisions made by facilitators of IPs (researchers) in allocation of resources to 
generate quick and tangible outputs. 
Sometimes, we dream of things and we want them to happen tomorrow. There 
is a time when X came and there was that heat of ‘we must put money in 
farmers’ pockets by December’. If IAR4D is to prove that it’s working, 
whatever activities you do, the farmers should have money in the pocket by 
December.  Then you look at it as a researcher, even in our local government, 
even if you’re to plant sorghum that time how much will you have planted for 
the farmer to be a billionaire or millionaire like that? So, pressure comes in 
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and you find that I’m being ‘forced’ to allocate money or to pay for what was 
not pre-planned (researcher, Kabale, Nov. 29, 2010).   
 
Shortening the process of implementing activities in order to generate quick returns 
compromised use of the appreciative inquiry approach to achieve future goals. The approach 
focuses on understanding and utilizing available community assets and not initially focusing 
problems or needs. In addition, since facilitators controlled the budgets to implement IP 
activities, they influenced the type of activities to be conducted. The site coordinating office 
and taskforce leaders approved implementation of activities from the decisions made by the 
sub-county forum, e.g., demonstrations and field trips, and ensured that activities were 
implemented on time. IP chairpersons received funds to facilitate IP meetings and made 
decisions on how to use the money. This elevated the chairpersons’ status within IPs but also 
created conflicts. Conflicts where settled by researchers using their power as stated by one of 
the farmers: 
The people who came at the district researchers  said that we should not ask 
about money. They told us they would give us 200,000 UGX to facilitate our 
meetings at the sub-county. We have no accountability of this money. The 
chairman controls this money (farmer, Bubare, Nov. 14, 2010) 
 
Contextual Factors Influencing Decision-Making  
Existing Hierarchical Power Structures 
Existing hierarchical power structures play a role in creating power asymmetries and 
generating power struggles within IPs. Although a majority of the originally powerful actors 
(local policy makers, scientists, local government officials and extension workers) felt that 
interacting with farmers at the same level was tolerable, other actors felt that they had been 
stripped of their power since the existing structure gave them more power compared to 
farmers and they were more educated than farmers. This created power struggles between the 
now empowered farmers and the originally powerful actors. Some local government officials 
felt that they needed their power back and were not comfortable having farmers as drivers of 
the process. Such power struggles were observed mainly Bubare and Bufundi and Remera 
IPs. This could be attributed to lack of proper understanding of the IP concept, poor 
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leadership, conflicts between political parties e.g., in Bufundi and differences in level of 
education.  
The way we are treated is the way farmers are treated. Being at the same level 
is challenging. The coordinator should be top...the way the chairman is 
involved, he is on top. He is the one telling/leading the coordinator. He tells 
you...we are going to do this, we are going to do this... it does not make me 
comfortable. Now the farmers are coordinating me. So I say this innovation is 
not treating me the way I am supposed to be treated. The farmer has first-hand 
information and for you, you are just like any other person. We still need our 
power back. If they give power to all farmers it is not good. Sometimes, I have 
no morale for IP because of that (extension worker, Bubare, Nov. 16, 2010) 
 
In addition, although decisions were made democratically, government officials in the 
top hierarchies made some of the major decisions (e.g., land consolidation in Rwanda) as 
stated by some of the respondents: 
I’m involved in identifying problems. Everybody brings an idea. Where there 
are arguments, we vote. We negotiate properly and vote where necessary. 
There is one person people do not argue with. People do respect him. When he 
talks everybody keeps quiet…the X officer. When he talks everybody keeps 
quiet. People think he has much knowledge. He talks with a lot of energy. 
Even the chairman fears him. We go by what he says (farmer, Bubare, Nov. 
14, 2010) 
 
IP report is sent to CIP who then send report to RADA. RADA organizes 
meetings in the district where you find CIP, ISAR, IP members and discuss. 
All of them participate in decision-making but the big decision is made by 
RADA Rwanda Agricultural Development Authority ”. All decisions in 
agriculture come from up not farmers. We technicians comply with all 
decisions (extension worker, Gataraga, Dec. 17, 2010) 
 
Influence from Policy Makers 
Contrary to Uganda IPs, in Rwanda, IPs experienced great influence from national 
and local policies. Policy influence was strongly emphasized by participants in Rwanda. The 
policies influenced decision-making and implementation of activities. For instance, land 
consolidation policies influenced the type of crops grown in particular areas and allocation of 
land to a given crop. Incentives for land consolidation, e.g., agricultural inputs encouraged 
production of crops supported by government. Such policies strengthened social capital as 
farmers consolidated their land and made collective decisions. However, rigidity of policies 
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limited the creativity of IP members to experiment with new technologies.  For input dealers, 
policy intervention enhanced stabilization of prices and supply of authentic inputs.  
We are facing a big problem with policy makers in land consolidation. When 
they decide that this village must grow maize and in that village, there are IP 
members who want to grow potato because ISAR is supplying seeds, you 
cannot grow what policy makers do not want. So you decide to grow maize 
and abandon potato (farmer, Gataraga, Dec. 17, 2010) 
 
There are so many policies in Agriculture. There is no policy constraining the 
IP. The IP must follow government policy so that there are no constraints. To 
do demonstrations, they must ask for permission because there is some land to 
be reserved for crops, e.g., beans or wheat. We give priority to farmers who 
respect government programs, e.g., land consolidation (extension worker, 
Gataraga, Dec. 17, 2010) 
 
There are some policies and rules from government that affect us for example 
we can reserve some plots for growing potato and the government comes in 
and says you grow maize in this area hence affecting us (trader, Gataraga, 
Dec. 14, 2010)  
 
In Uganda IPs, influence from policy makers was mainly experienced in integration 
of IP activities in existing government programs and enforcement of by-laws for soil and 
water conservation. For instance, in Bubare sorghum IP, policy makers facilitated integration 
of IP activities in the government extension systems (NAADs). In Bufundi and Chahi IPs, 
lack of support from local policy makers/implementers constrained integration of IP 
activities in the government extension system. Implementation of bylaws to conserve soil and 
water was the role of policy makers. They used their power to either support or sabotage 
approval and enforcement of bylaws. Well as Rwanda IPs were challenged by rigid 
government policies, IPs in Uganda were constrained by weaker policy enforcement. 
In Rwanda, a law is a law. In Uganda, we are relaxed. In Rwanda, laws come 
both from government and IP or independent society. When the father is very 
strict, the mother becomes strict. In Uganda, when the top system is weak 
even the lower one is weak. In Uganda, it is laissez faire – to whom it may 
concern (local policy implementer, Chahi, Nov. 18. 2010) 
 
The internal dynamics of the value chain and external environment in which the value 
chain operates can positively or negatively affect the chains ability and motivation to acquire 
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knowledge and translate it into operational decisions. The external environment may affect 
the nature, structure and performance of the value chain (VCMC and GMC, 2012).  
Conclusion 
IPs have been designed as a significant improvement over the linear, less inclusive 
and interactive traditional agricultural research and extension approach. IPs are used as a 
mechanism to involve new partners (including farmer’s organizations, non-governmental 
organizations, private business sector and policy makers) in agricultural research.  These 
partners mobilize the key resources (such as scientific expertise, local knowledge, marketing 
channels, and financing) that ultimately benefit smallholder farmers. For IPs to generate 
outputs that directly address the concerns of smallholder farmers, farmers need to be 
empowered to make and implement decisions that impact their livelihoods.  
However, the concept of IPs is relatively new in agricultural research for 
development. No studies have been conducted within the context of IPs to understand the 
power dynamics within IPs, the influence of power on decision-making and the context in 
which decisions are made. Mapping power differences enhances proper understanding of the 
content and context of the negotiation process, stakeholders’ incentives to participate and 
benefits obtained by stakeholders. If facilitators ignore individuals with power, they may not 
fully understand how power relations shape the planning process and its outcomes (Ekboir et 
al. 2009).  The research questions addressed were: (1) How are decisions made in IPs? (2) 
Does active involvement of farmers enhance prioritization of issues that address their needs? 
(3) How do knowledge, access to information and resources influence decision-making and 
(4) What contextual factors influence decision-making and implementation of decisions? 
This study was conducted in five IPs in Lake Kivu Region between Sept.-Dec. 2010.  
The results demonstrate that IPs nurtured a consensual and democratic process of 
decision-making with active involvement of farmers. Identification of issues followed a 
hierarchy where issues where first defined at lower level (parish and village level) and 
forwarded to the core decision-making group at sub-county level. Decisions such as 
problems to address, actors to bring on board and allocation of group resources were made 
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with the involvement of farmer representatives at sub-county level. The results support the 
first hypothesis. IPs empowered farmers to raise their concerns and challenge originally 
powerful actors. However, issues of small local traders and women were not fully taken into 
account.  
Although IPs re-defined the relationships between actors to promote a leveled ground, 
power asymmetries are unavoidable. Stakeholders, who had more knowledge, accessed more 
information and resources exercised more power. Farmer representatives who interacted with 
diverse actors at sub-county level accessed more information and knowledge, and determined 
how, when and whom and to share it with. This finding supports the second hypothesis.  
Existing hierarchical power structures led to power struggles between originally powerful 
actors like extension workers and policy makers, and originally powerless farmers. The 
policy environment also influenced the type of decisions made and implementation. These 
findings supported the third hypothesis.  
Several scholars argue that if weaker groups are empowered, it is possible to set up 
multi-stakeholder platforms were power relations are not overlooked, but promote dialogue 
and social learning (Edmunds and Wollenberg 2001; Leeuwis 2000). This study revealed 
persistence of some traditional partners of power. This will require social learning so that all 
actors appreciate each other’s contributions and their role within IPs. Schiffer et al. (2010) 
argue that different organizational cultures need to be reconciled to foster consensus 
building. The study reveals that social capital and power relations can co-exist. While 
promoting social capital to facilitate collaboration between actors, it’s also important to 
understand how people exercise power because it’s embedded within existing relations.  
Therefore IPs are not perfect leveled grounds without power inequalities but can be 
considered useful approaches that could enhance interactions among value chain actors and 
performance of value chains. Innovation systems theory assumes that all stakeholders have 
realistic potential to exert relatively equal influence. However, this study shows that 
possession of critical information and knowledge generates power asymmetries in innovation 
systems. Therefore, power relations need to be considered during the processing of 
facilitating IPs. 
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The results have practical implications for facilitators of IPs. Facilitators of IPs need 
to consider contextual factors like existing hierarchical power structures and policies and 
design strategies to address them. The paper may have implications for policy makers in 
addressing structural factors, which cause inequalities. The research has implications for IP 
members in considering the potential costs and benefits in engaging in consensus-based 
decision making-processes. Future research can examine processes of inclusion and 
exclusion, and the characteristics of actors included in decision-making. This study did not 
capture the prior interactions between actors and how this could affect interaction in 
decision-making. Further research on how the prior strength of interaction among actors 
influences their interaction in the process of decision-making will complement this study. 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
 
Agriculture is central in achieving the Millennium Development Goal that calls for 
halving the number of people living under extreme poverty and hunger between 2000-2015. 
Over 75% of poor people in developing nations live in rural areas and most of them depend 
directly or indirectly on agriculture for their livelihoods. The contribution of agriculture to 
overcoming poverty and enhancing food security requires increases in productivity. 
However, most developing countries invest less in agricultural research (World Bank 2007b). 
The traditional system of generating research and knowledge is not organized to deal with the 
rapidly changing context for agriculture in many countries. Agriculture is taking place in a 
globalized setting and is driven by markets, both local and external. The private sector now 
plays a prominent role in agricultural sector (World Bank 2007a) 
Approaches that enhance agricultural innovation capabilities have evolved over the 
past 40 years (including National Agricultural Research Systems, National Agricultural 
Knowledge and Information Systems and Innovation Systems).  The sub-Saharan Africa 
Challenge program designed and implemented the Integrated Agricultural Research for 
Development approach in which multiple stakeholders along a commodity value chain are 
identified and involved in collective problem identification and implementation of solutions. 
Innovation platforms are used to bring together diverse stakeholders along the production to 
consumption continuum to share information and develop innovations. IPs have their roots in 
innovation systems and may overcome the limitations of the linear, less inclusive and less 
interactive traditional agricultural research and extension approach.  
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This study examined the relationship between IP organizational structure and 
exchange of information and knowledge, the factors that motivate stakeholders to participate 
and the contextual factors which influence motivation to participate. This study also explored 
the decision-making process and the factors which influence decision-making (such as 
knowledge, access to information, control of resources, and policy) in five IPs in the Lake 
Kivu Region. Data were collected from IP members (including farmers, NGO 
representatives, traders, processors, input dealers, researchers local policy 
makers/implementers and extension workers) using semi-structured interviews, in-depth 
interviews, and focus group discussions. 
The study demonstrates that the level of vertical and horizontal decentralization 
varied across IPs. The extent of decentralization depended on the size of IP, age of IP and 
nature of landscape. IPs that were more vertically and horizontally decentralized had more 
effective two-way information flows among and within hierarchies. The innovation sub-
clusters strengthen social capital among IP members who are themselves motivated to share 
information and knowledge. Less vertically and horizontally decentralized IPs had less 
effective two-way information flow as measured by the effectiveness of farmer 
representatives in giving feedback up and down the hierarchy. Effective two-way information 
flow in these IPs with high vertical and moderate horizontal decentralization was influenced 
by the nature of landscape.  
Although decentralization aids vertical and horizontal information and knowledge 
sharing, decentralization alone is not sufficient. Other factors need to be in place to facilitate 
knowledge and information sharing at all implementation levels such as good leadership and 
proper infrastructure. In addition, decentralization may strengthen the power of local 
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knowledge brokers. Farmer representatives who interacted with diverse knowledge sources 
accessed more knowledge and information and did not share it freely with farmers in their 
constituencies. This was reported in Bubare, Chahi and Remera IPs. Misrepresentation of 
information that was communicated up the hierarchy was also reported in some IPs. 
Social capital and exchange theories were used to examine the relationship between 
motivation and participation. The results revealed that actors within an IP have multiple 
factors that motivate them to participate. Well as farmers were mainly motivated by factors 
that directly improve their livelihoods, extension workers, NGO representatives and policy 
makers were mostly motivated by purposive incentives that contribute to realization of 
organizational goals, and traders were mainly motivated by economic incentives. Although 
the majority of farmers indicated developmental benefits (acquire knowledge and skills) as 
the main motivating factor, the desire to acquire knowledge and skills alone was not 
sufficient to encourage active participation. Anticipated economic (markets, income and 
credit) and material incentives (agricultural inputs) sustained farmers’ participation. Social 
incentives such as expanding social networks and status were mentioned by a few actors. We 
also noted that farmers who were more educated participated in more activities. Farmers who 
participated in more activities perceived IPs as more rewarding.   
Although IPs had promoted inclusion of multiple value chain actors, other important 
value chain actors were not active participants including local policy makers and members 
from the private business sector. Active involvement of actors in IP activities was curtailed 
by expectation of short-term tangible outputs due to prior experience with development 
projects which give tangible material or economic incentives to motivate actors especially 
farmers to participate. Other factors included lack of proper understanding of the concept of 
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IP, lack of resources, prior commitments and feeling devalued. For IPs to establish strong 
value chains, there is need to encourage active participation of all value chain actors, nurture 
positive attitudes and commitment from all stakeholders. Building trust and respect for all 
actors will encourage active participation of actors.  
Furthermore, the results demonstrate the potential of IPs to empower farmers to raise 
their concerns and challenge originally powerful actors. However, issues of small local 
traders and women were not completely taken into account. Although IPs re-defined the 
relationships between actors to promote a leveled ground, power asymmetries are 
unavoidable. Stakeholders who had more knowledge and accessed more information and 
resources exercised more power. Existing hierarchical power structures led to power 
struggles between originally powerful actors such as extension workers and originally 
powerless farmers. 
Practical Implications  
The findings have practical implications for conveners and members of IPs to design 
structures and create favorable conditions that enhance information sharing. Structures which 
enhance social capital among diverse stakeholders may facilitate two-way information 
sharing. Although decentralized structures exhibit more knowledge and information sharing, 
other factors such as size, age, and landscape may influence effective knowledge and 
information sharing. These factors need to be considering in organizing IPs. This research 
has practical implications for community organizers to determine the advantages of multi-
stakeholder participation, design and implement inclusive development interventions, and 
develop a clear understanding of contextual factors which may influence actors’ decision to 
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participate in IPs. Facilitators of IPs need to consider contextual factors such as existing 
hierarchical power structures and policies, and design strategies to address them.  
Organizers of multi-stakeholder platforms need to address power relations to ensure 
that less powerful actors have the ability to raise their concerns. The research has 
implications for IP members in considering the potential costs and benefits in engaging in 
consensus-based decision-making processes. Comparing IPs to the traditional linear approach 
of agricultural research and extension, IPs appear to be more successful in including diverse 
value chain actors in sharing knowledge and information and decision-making to improve the 
performance of a specific value chain. However, ensuring active and sustainable participation 
of actors, and reducing the effects of power inequalities still need to be addressed. Organizers 
of IPs need to focus on strengths within the communities to help community members utilize 
available resources in addressing their problems. 
Policy Implications 
The study has implications for policy makers to reform agricultural research and 
advocate for holistic, and integrative approaches that promote inclusion of the scientific and 
non-scientific communities in research. Support from policy makers is needed in designing 
policies that facilitate participation of community members in making decisions, which 
directly impact their livelihoods.  Policy support is required in formulating, approving and 
implementing bylaws for soil and water conservation. Enforcing soil and water conservation 
policies will contribute towards reduction of runoff on steep slopes thereby increasing soil 
fertility. Policy makers and implementers need to address structural factors (such as decision-
making, access to information, knowledge and resources) that cause inequalities, which in 
turn influence performance in innovation systems. Government support is required for 
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integrating IP activities in existing government programs to pool resources and minimize 
transaction costs.  
Theoretical Implications 
Innovation systems theory assumes that all stakeholders have realistic potential to 
exert relatively equal influence. However, this study shows that power asymmetries exist in 
innovation systems which need to be addressed to facilitate their proper functioning. Results 
showed that farmers who interacted with diverse knowledge sources at the sub-county level 
accessed more knowledge and information compared to other farmers. In addition, actors 
who had more financial resources such as traders, controlled the variety, quantity and quality 
of produce, and required that farmers adopt specific agricultural practices in order to meet the 
quality of produce required by consumers. Some of the originally powerful actors, such as 
government extension workers, felt that their powers had been diminished.  While promoting 
social capital to facilitate collaboration between actors, it is also important to understand how 
people exercise power that is embedded within existing relations. Social exchange theory 
alone cannot explain participation in social relationships. It has to be complimented with 
social capital theory. Social capital fosters continued participation in exchange relationships. 
Areas for Future Research 
Further research needs to explore the types of innovations that resulted from 
interaction with multiple actors along the value chain. Research should be conducted to 
determine the performance of IPs (in terms of innovations generated), comparing 
performance of IPs that where formed using the two different approaches, i.e., research-
oriented and market-oriented approaches. In-depth research needs to be conducted to 
determine why some IPs flourish while others don’t, and investigate the conditions under 
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which highly decentralized IPs function. Studying the relationship between information 
sharing and performance of IPs will be a great complement to this study. Future research 
needs to investigate the characteristics of individuals who continue or cease participating in 
IPs, the conditions that facilitate participation, and the strategies to cope with obstacles to 
successful IPs. Future research can also examine how intrinsic and extrinsic incentives 
influence performance of IPs, examine processes of inclusion and exclusion, and the 
characteristics of actors included in decision-making. This study did not capture the prior 
interactions between actors and how this could affect interaction in decision-making. Further 
research on how the prior strength of interaction among actors influences their interaction in 
the process of decision-making will be great complement to this study. 
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APPENDIX A: HUMAN SUBJECTS QUALITY ASSURANCE REVIEW  
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APPENDIX B: CHECKLIST FOR KEY INFORMANTS  
 
I. Background Information 
a) Name of Respondent………………………………………………………………… 
b) Country……………………….……………………………………………….……… 
c) Name of IP………………………………………………………………….………... 
d) Type of actor………………………………………………………………………….. 
e) Respondent organization……….………..……………………………………….…… 
f) Role of organization……………………………………………….…………..……… 
g) Respondents position in organization………………………………….……………... 
h) Gender of respondent……………………………………………...………………….. 
i) Date of interview……………………………………………………………………… 
j) Name of interviewer…………………………………………………………………… 
 
Question 1: How are IPs organized? How does IP organization influence actors’ 
interactive exchanges for innovation? 
1. What does the term IP mean to you? What inspired you to participate in IPs? 
 
2. What are the types of actors involved in the IPs? Probe: How many actors are they? 
What is the composition by gender? How many represent each organization/group? 
What are their positions?) 
 
3. Are there any changes in the type of actors? Are there any changes in the number of 
actors? Are there actors who have withdrawn or others who have joined? How many 
have withdrawn? How many have joined? Why these changes? 
 
4. What are your roles in the IP? Probe: Are they written anywhere? Any additional 
roles besides what is stated? Have your roles changed since inception? What are your 
key strengths in this IP? What are your key weaknesses? What would be required to 
perform your role (s) better? 
 
5. What are the roles of other actors (farmers, private sector, policy makers, researchers 
and training institutions)? Probe: What are the strengths of other actors? What has 
been most satisfying about the roles played by different actors? What are their 
weaknesses? What has been least satisfying about their roles? What can they be 
strengthened in? 
 
6. To what extent have the roles of all other actors been clearly defined? Do all actors 
know what they are supposed to do? Use a scale of 1 to 10 with 1 being the least and 
10 being most clearly defined. Probe: Have the role of different actors changes since 
inception? If yes how? If no, do you think the roles of other actors need to be 
redefined? Please explain. How often are the roles redefined? 
 
157 
 
1
5
7
 
7. Are there rules governing the IP? Probe: What are the rules? What is the source of 
the rules? Are there any written rules? Do members abide by the rules?  
 
8. What kind of information is required by the farmers? Probe: What is the mode of 
communicating this information? Who passes on the information? In what form is the 
information communicated? How frequent is the information communicated? 
 Find out type of information e.g. IP management, production technologies, 
post-harvest handling, processing, soil conservation, availability of seed, and 
access to credit. 
9. Do you also receive information from farmers? Probe: What kind of information? 
What is the mode of receiving information from farmers? Who delivers the 
information? 
 
10. What are the most pertinent concerns/issue of these IPs? How are the issues 
identified? How are they handled? Probe: Are different issues handled by different 
groups? What issues are handled by different groups? What are their positions, 
qualifications, abilities, sex? How are the groups formed?  
 Example of issues: Lack of knowledge on specific technologies, management 
of IPs, lack of credit, lack of market, poor crop varieties, poor infrastructure 
  
11. Is the type and number of actors participating enough to help solve the 
problems/issues as they arise? As the IP evolves are the actors (type and number) 
enough to address problems/issues that arise? Please explain. Probe: What is the 
optimal number? What problems are identified? How do they determine who is to 
solve what? To what extent have the IPs addressed those problems? How would you 
assess the likelihood of IPs to address smallholder farmers’ problems? 
 
12. How are you integrating indigenous knowledge to increase production, conserve soil 
fertility and add value to agricultural produce? How is it being used? 
 
13. What did the IPs set out to achieve? What successes have the IP realized so far? 
Probe: How do IPs measure success? Who measures it? What are the indicators of 
success? 
 
14. What have you learned in bringing multiple actors together in the different locations? 
Probe: What are you doing differently compared to what was planned at the 
beginning of the IP? What has caused the changes? What had you expected to learn? 
Has it changed the way you do things? What where you expected to do? 
 
15. What challenges have you experienced in forming and managing these IPs? Probe: 
What is the magnitude of the challenges? How have you resolved them? 
 
Do you have any questions or comments about this study?  
 
Thank you very much for your time. 
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APPENDIX C: CHECKLIST FOR IP CHAIRPERSON AND 
SECRETARY 
 
Name of IP…………………………………………………………………….………………. 
Country……………………………District……………………………Sub-county…………. 
Parish……………………………..Village……………………………………………………. 
Date of interview……...………………………Name of interviewer…………..…..………… 
 
Background information 
1. Respondent’s ID………………………………………………….…………………… 
2. Gender of respondent…………………………………………………………………. 
3.  Respondents position in IP…………………………………………………………... 
4. Type of actor: i) Farmer ii) Input dealer iii) Trader/marketer iv) 
Transporter 
5. When did you join the IP?............................................................................................... 
 
Objective 1: How are IPs organized? How does the IP organization influence actors’ 
interactive exchanges for innovation? 
6. What do IPs mean to you? Probe: Objectives of your IP? How enterprise was 
selected, activities carried out?  
7. Who are the key actors in this IP? Probe: How many are they? Gender? What are 
their positions? What was the original number? Who were the actors?. How many 
have joined? Type of actors who have joined? How many have withdrawn? Type of 
actors who have withdrawn? Reason for change? how many represent each category? 
8. What are the committees in this IP? Probe: How committees were they formed? Are 
there any sub committees? Size? Gender? What are the qualifications of the 
members? How have they evolved? How are they ruled/managed? Who initiated the 
idea of committees? How often do they meet? 
9. What are the roles of each committee? Who defines the roles of the committees? 
Rank the extent to which the roles of different committees are clearly defined from 
using a scale of 1 to 10 with 1 being the least and 10 being the highest? Have the 
roles changed? If yes, how? Why have they changed? Do the roles of committees 
need to be redesigned? If yes, how? 
10. How do actors and committees carrying out different roles share information? What 
kind of information is required by each committee? What kind of information do they 
share? How often? What don’t they share? Describe in what way the method used to 
share information has helped all members gain access to and comprehend the 
information shared. Describe how it has hindered access to and comprehension of 
information shared. Rank the extent of sharing information using a scale of 1 to 10 
with 1 being the least and 10 the highest. Explain. 
11. What are the rules governing interaction among actors/committees? Are they written 
or unwritten? Do members abide by the rules? 
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12. What are your roles in this IP? Who defines your roles? Rank the extent to which 
your roles are clearly defined using the scale of 1 to 10, with one being the least and 
10 being the highest. Please explain. Have your roles changed since you first engaged 
in the IP? If yes, how have they changed? Why? Probe: what are your strengths? 
What are your weaknesses? What would be required to perform your roles better? 
13. What type of information is required by farmers? What kind of information and 
knowledge is shared with farmers? Information not shared? How is information and 
knowledge shared with farmers? In what form is the information communicated? 
Who delivers the information? How often do you share each kind of information? 
Please rank the extent of sharing information from 1 to 10 with 1 being the lowest and 
10 being the highest. 
 Find out type of information e.g. IP management, production technologies, 
postharvest handling, processing, soil conservation, availability of seed, and 
access to credit, money, field trips. 
14. What are the kinds of decisions made in the IP? What are the important decisions? 
Who defines the level of importance of decisions? Who makes the most important 
decisions in the IP? Probe: What are their positions, qualification, sex, role in IP?  
15. Who implements the most important decisions? What is required to implement the 
decisions (e.g. approval, resources, etc? 
16. Within the last 12 months, what are the names and roles of people in the IP with 
whom you: 
a. Discuss issues pertaining to the I. Probe: What are the issues discussed? 
Frequency? 
b. From whom you seek advice. Probe: Type of advise sought 
c. You come up to when you have a problem. Probe: For what kind of problem 
d. You can count on; is this a person you can trust? Probe: Extent of trust  
e. You have talked with over the past 12 months when you wanted to make a 
decision. Probe: Type of decision  
f. You are very good friends with 
17. Are there rules within or outside the IP that are influencing the functions of the 
actors? If yes, what are they? 
 
Objective 2: What are the factors that motivate key actors to participate in IPs? Does 
full participation help each actor achieve their respective goals?  
18. What are the goals/objectives of this IP?  
19. What are the factors that inspired you to join the IP? Probe: What are your 
expectations? How have your expectations change from the time in engaged in the 
IP? 
20. What are members’ expectations from participating in this IP? 
21. How have members’ expectations changed over time as a result of experiences during 
earlier stages of IP development? 
22. What activities are being carried out to achieve the objectives of the IP? 
23. What IP activities are you actively involved in? How are you involved? How are 
other IP members involved in different activities? 
24. Has participation in the IP enabled you to achieve your goals? 
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Question 3: Does the composition of IPs at the stage of formation influence articulation 
of priorities that address the concerns of smallholder farmers? As the IP evolves, do 
any associated changes in composition affect the focus on concerns of smallholder 
farmers? 
 
25. What are the priority needs/concerns of farmers? Have these changed over time? 
Probe: What were the initial priorities at IP formation? What are the priorities 
currently? What are the causes of change ----change in actors? 
26. What research problems/issues is the IP addressing now? Probe: How are IP research 
problems/issues identified? Who is involved? What are their qualifications, positions, 
sex, roles in IP? Do all members have equal chance to voice their concerns?  
27. Are there rules governing prioritization of needs? If yes, what are the rules governing 
prioritization of needs? What is the source of the rules? Do members abid by the 
rules? 
28. Who are the key implementers of IP priorities? What are their qualifications, 
positions, sex, roles in IP? How do they influence the implementation? Probe: Are 
there issues addressed by different groups? What are the issues? How are the groups 
formed? 
29. To what extent have the different concerns of smallholder farmers been addressed? 
List concerns and use the scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being the least and 10 being the 
highest. Is the composition of IPs enough to address the concerns of smallholder 
farmers as they evolve? Do actors bring in the kind of learning that members expect? 
30. To what extent have the concerns of other actors been addressed? Probe about: 
Traders/marketers, input dealers, transporters, and local leaders. Who has been served 
most?  
31. What has been your experience so far from participating in the IP? Probe: What is the 
extent of trust among members? 
32. What successes has the IP realized so far? How do you measure success? Who 
measures success? What are the indicators of success?  
33. What are the challenges that the IP is facing? What is the magnitude of each 
challenge? How have you addressed the challenges? What has not been addressed? 
34. What opportunities do you foresee from participating in this IP? 
35. Do you have any questions or comments about this study?  
 
 
 
Thank you very much for your time. 
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APPENDIX D: CHECKLIST FOR FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS 
WITH FARMERS 
 
Name of IP………………………………………Country….…………………..………………. 
District……………………………Category of actors interviewed………….………………… 
Composition of the group: No. of males………No. of females………………………………... 
Date of interview……………………………………………………………………………….. 
Name of interviewers……………………………………………………………………………. 
Duration of interview: Start time…………………End time………………………………….. 
 
1. What does this concept of IPs mean to you? Could you please map out what these IPs 
mean to you? Draw linkages among actors (dominant, weak, average) 
2. What do you think about the process of forming this IP? Probe: What inspired you to join 
the IP? What are your expectations from participating in this IP? 
3. What are the roles of (category of actors) in this IP? Are they written anywhere? What 
are your key strengths in the IP? What are your key weaknesses? What would be required 
to perform your roles better? Have your roles changed since IP inception? If yes, how? If 
no, do think your roles need to be redefined? 
4. What are the roles of other actors in this IP (farmers, researchers, private sector, 
extension, training institutions, etc)? How did the IP come up with the different roles 
carried out by different actors? How were the roles distributed? What are the strengths of 
different actors? What are the weaknesses of different actors? How have the roles of 
other actors changed since inception of the IP? Why? 
5. How do different actors and committees carrying out different roles interact? What kind 
of information do they share? How do they share information with the people they 
represent? How are they ruled/managed e.g. self managed, or directed? 
6. What are your concerns/needs? Describe how the IP prioritizes the research 
problems/issues to address? Are you involved in defining research challenges? How are 
you involved? Does the process allow (mention the type of actor e.g farmers) to voice 
their concerns? If yes, how? Are men and women able to voice their concerns? Has the 
process changed over time? If yes, how? How often are issues defined? 
7. What decisions are made in the IP? How are decisions made in the IP e.g. participatory or 
concentrated? How were decisions made before formation of the IP? Probe: What are the 
most important decisions? Who defines the level of importance of decisions? Who makes 
the most important decisions? Who implements the most important decisions? What does 
it require to implement them e.g. approval? 
8. Is the number and type of actors adequate to enable IPs to generate and utilize knowledge  
a. that enables farmers to increases production? Do the actors bring in a kind of 
learning that members expect? (consider gender aspects). Explain  
b. that enables farmers/traders/marketers to obtain quality produce and access 
profitable markets? Do they bring in a kind of learning that members expect? 
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c. that enables farmers to conserve the natural resource base? Do they bring in a 
kind of learning that members expect? Explain.  
d. Policy makers to come up with policies that improve agricultural and livestock 
production, and natural resource management? Explain.  
e. Probe about the extent to which the concerns mentioned the group have been 
addressed. 
9. What are the changes that have occurred within the IP since inception? What is being 
done differently? Which changes represent improvements? What changes do not 
represent improvement? What has caused the changes? If membership has changed, does 
it present an opportunity to better address the concerns of smallholder farmers, 
trader/marketers, policy markets, and private sector? If yes, how?  
10. What kind of information do you request for? How do you decide on which information 
to seek? What information do you receive? Who delivers the information? How is it 
delivered? In what form is it delivered? Are you all able to access the same information? 
Count those that are able to access or not access information. How do you utilize the 
information?  
11. What is the level of trust among members of the IP? Rank the level of trust between 1 
and 10, with 1 being the lowest and 10 being the highest. 
12. What successes has the IP achieved so? Who defines success? How is it measured? What 
has not been successful, or successful enough? Why? What challenges is the IP facing in 
collectively solving problems? Do you think the IPs will make a difference? 
 
 
Thank you very much for your time! 
Interviewer’s observations 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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APPENDIX E: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR HOUSEHOLD INTERVIEWS  
 
Name of IP…………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Country……………………………District…………………………Sub County……………. 
Parish……………………………..Village……………………………………………………. 
Date of interview……...………………………Name of interviewer…………..…………… 
Start time………………………………………End time…………………………………… 
Instruction: Circle all appropriate responses 
        Leave no question unanswered 
        Use N/A for not applicable 
 
I. Background Information 
1. Respondent ID……………………………………… 
2. Sex of respondent: (1) Female  (2) Male 
3. Marital status (i) Married (ii) Single  (iii) Divorced   (iv) Widowed  
 (v) Separated 
4. Age………………………………. 
5. Main occupation…………………………………………………………………….. 
6. Highest level of education ….…………………………………………..……….….. 
7. Type of actor: i) Farmer  ii) Input dealer iii) Trader/buyer iv) 
Transporter v) other (specify)……………………………………………….……… 
8. Membership to another group/association (name of group)….………………… ..... 
9. Position in IP…………………………………………………..……………………… 
10. When did you join the Innovation Platform (month and year)?..................................... 
 
II. Objective 2: To determine what motivates the key actors to participate in IPs 
11. How did you first learn about this IP? 
i) IP member (specify position………………………………)   
ii) Facilitator 
iii) Extension worker 
iv) Other (specify)…………………………………………………………............ 
 
12. What are the objectives of the IP? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………...…………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
13. What inspired you to participate in this IP?  
i) To acquire more knowledge and skills in increasing crop and livestock 
production 
ii) To acquire more knowledge and skills in soil fertility improvement 
iii) To access agricultural inputs (specify inputs)…………………… 
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iv) To access better market 
v) To access credit 
vi) Widen social network 
vii) Other 
(Specify)………………………………..…………………………………….. 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
14. What are your expectations from participating in the IP 
i) Gain knowledge and skills in increasing crop and livestock production 
ii) Gain knowledge and skills in improving soil fertility 
iii) Access credit 
iv) Access agricultural inputs (specify)…………………………………………… 
v) Access better markets 
vi) Interact with other people 
vii) Other (specify)………………………………………………………………… 
 
15. Have your expectations changed from the experience of participating in the IP? 
i) Yes  0) No 
 
16. If yes, how have your expectations changed from the experience of participating in 
the IP? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………..………………………………………………………………
………………….………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………...………….. 
 
17. What are the key activities that the IP is carrying out to achieve the desired goals? 
i) Designing the action plan 
ii) Crop Production 
iii) Marketing of produce 
iv) Experimentation with new technologies 
v) Monitoring and evaluation 
vi) Other (Specify)………………………………………………..……………………. 
 
18. May you please tell me some of the IP activities in which you are involved 
i) Designing the action plan 
ii) Crop Production 
iii) Marketing of produce 
iv) Experimentation with new technologies 
v) Monitoring and evaluation 
vi) Other (Specify)…………………………………………………………………. 
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19. How would you assess the extent to which you are involved in the activities 
mentioned above? Use the codes below  
Activity Level of involvement  
1.  
2.   
3.  
4.  
5.  
6.  
 
Activity: i) Designing the action plan ii) Crop production iii) Marketing of produce   
iv) Experimentation v) Monitoring and evaluation vi) Other (Specify)…………………….  
Level of involvement: i) Very active ii) Active iii) Somewhat active iv) Not at all 
active  
 
III. Objective 3: To understand the influence of IP organizational structure and composition 
on articulation of IP priorities that address the concerns of smallholder farmers.  
 
In this section, I would like you to tell me how the issues addressed in the IP are identified 
and your involvement in the activity. 
  
20. What needs/issues are of priority to you? 
i) Lack of better yielding varieties 
ii) Poor soil fertility 
iii) Lack of access to profitable markets 
iv) Poor post-harvest handling practices 
v) Other (specify)………………………………………………….…………….. 
 
21. What problems/issue is the IP addressing now? 
i) Low crop productivity 
ii) Poor soil fertility 
iii) Low value addition 
iv) Poor market access 
v) Other (specify)……………………….………………………………………. 
 
22. Are you involved in identifying the problems/issues that the IP is addressing? 
i) Yes  0) No 
 
22(b) If yes, how often are you involved in identification of problems/issues to address? 
i) Always 
ii) Often 
iii) Sometimes 
iv) Seldom (rare) 
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23. If not, who identifies the problems/issues to address? 
i) IP chairperson (Parish) 
ii) Facilitators 
iii)  Sub county committee 
iv) Parish committee 
v) I don’t know 
vi)  Other (specify)……..…………………………………………………………. 
 
24. (a) Do you know the person (s) representing your needs/issues to the sub-
county/secteur committee? 
i) Yes……  0) No……. 
 
25. What are their positions in the IP? Specify the sex of the representative (s) 
i) Chairperson 
ii) Secretary 
iii) Treasure 
iv) Member 
v) Other 
(specify)………………………………………………………………………. 
 
26. How are/were they selected to represent the IP at sub-county/Secteur level? 
................................................................................................................................................ 
…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
27. How often do you interact face to face with your representative (s)?............................. 
 
28. What information/skills/materials do you seek from the sub-county/Secteur 
committee? 
i) Planting new crop varieties 
ii) Post-harvest handling practices 
iii) Value addition 
iv) Use of agricultural inputs 
v) Agricultural inputs  
vi) Tools and equipment  
vii) Market for produce 
viii) Other (specify)…………………………………………………………………. 
 
29. Is the information/skills/materials received what you ask for?  
i) Yes, definitely 
ii) Yes, somewhat 
iii) No, not at all 
iv) No, definitely not 
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If yes, does the information/materials come in time? 
i)  Yes, definitely 
ii) Yes, somewhat 
iii) No, not at all 
iv) No, definitely not 
30. Who delivers the information/materials and how is it delivered? Use codes below 
Type of 
information/material 
Who delivers the 
information/materials 
How is the 
information/material 
delivered 
How often 
do you 
receive the 
information 
How is the 
information 
utilized  
     
     
     
 
Type of information/materials: i) Planting new crop varieties ii) Post harvest handling 
practices iii) Value addition iv) Use of agricultural inputs  v) Improved seed vi) 
fertilizers vii) Tools and equipment  viii) Market for produce  ix) Other 
(specify)…………….. 
Who delivers information: i) IP Chairperson ii) IP secretary iii) Publicity secretary iv) 
trainer of trainers  v) member vi) IP Facilitator  vii) Others (Specify)…… 
How information is delivered: i) Meetings ii) Contact individuals iii) leaflets/brochures  
iv) Other (specify)………………..…………………………………………………………… 
How often information is received: i) Every day  ii) Once a week  iii) Once a 
month  iv) other (Specify)…………………………………………………………………….. 
How information is utilized: i) Determination of needs  ii) Comparing alternative options  
iii) Implementation of solution  iv) Share with other IP members v) Have not utilized it
     vi) Other (specify)…………………………………………………………………… 
 
31. How efficient are your representatives in articulating your needs? 
i) Very efficient   
ii) Moderate   
iii) Poor   
iv) Very poor 
 
32. How efficient are your representatives in bringing feedback? 
i) Very efficient   
ii) Moderate   
iii) Poor   
iv) Very poor 
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33. What are your other sources of information? What information do you obtain from 
the different sources?  ( Use the codes below) 
Sources of information Type of information received How the information is 
utilized 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
Source of information: i) Government extension (e.g. NAADS)  ii) NGO Extension  iii) 
Fellow farmer but non IP member  iv) Newspaper  v) Radio vi) Other 
(specify)………………….. 
Type of information: i) Planting new crop varieties ii) Post harvest handling practices
 iii)Value addition iv) Use of agricultural inputs  v) Markets for produce  
  
vi) Other (specify)……………………… 
How information is utilized: i) Determination of needs ii) Comparing alternative options  
iii) Implementation of solution iv) Share with other IP members  v) Have 
not utilized it  vi) Other (specify)…………… 
 
34. Please rank the level of importance of all your sources of information, 1 being the 
most important 
Source of information Rank 
IP  
Government extension (e.g. NAADS)  
NGO extension  
Other non-IP farmers  
News papers  
Radio  
Other (Specify)  
 
 
35. Has participation in the IP activities enabled you to achieve your goals? 
ii) Yes, definitely 
ii)  Yes, somewhat 
iii) No, not much 
iv) No, definitely not 
 
36. If yes, what are some of the rewards realized from participating in this IP? 
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…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………….……………………………………………………..……………… 
37. What challenges are you facing in this IP? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………….……………..…………………………………………………
………………………………………….………..……………………………………
……………………………………………………….…..…………………………… 
 
 
 
38. Do you have any questions or comments? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
Thank you very much for you time! 
 
 
Interviewer’s observations 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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APPENDIX F: EXAMPLE OF BYLAWS 
  
A) BYLAWS FOR ISANGANO IP/ GATARAGA 
 
ARTICLE I 
Purpose of  ISANGANO IP Name, Location, Objective, Duration 
 
Section I.03 Purpose. The Purpose of ISANGANO IP/ GATARAGA is to fight against 
poverty through joining togther to engage in the production of agricultural products 
especially irish potato and strengthen the market power by adding value to irish potato. 
 
Section I.02 Name. The name is ISANGANO IP/ GATARAGA   
 
Section I.03. Location. The principal office of ISANGANO IP/ GATARAGA shall be 
located at GATARAGA Sector office. IP ISANGANO/GATARAGA will be operating its 
activities within GATARAGA Sector in the Cells of ; 
 
Mudakama 
Murago 
Rubindi and 
Rungu,  but it may be expanded to other Sectors depending on how farmers receive the 
approach. The office of ISANGANO IP/ GATARAGA may be designated  by the agreement 
of  2/3 of all IP memebers. 
 
Section I.04 Duration. ISANGANO IP/GATARAGA has no time when  to end. 
 
ARTICLE II 
 
2.1.1 Stakeholders/ Members  
 
Section 2.0I  Members of ISANGANO IP  are farmers who sign these bylaws and will 
promote development through using the IAR4D approach. 
 
Section 2.02 Members who will join ISANGANO IP later will be accepted as long as they 
work togther with others to promote development in Gataraga Sector. 
 
Section 2.03 Stakeholders outside Gataraga will join the ISANGANO IP/GATARAGA . 
These staholders will help members to resolve some of the Agricultural problems that face 
farmers in Gataraga. 
 
ARTICLE III ISANGANO IP ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE 
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Section 3.01 General meeting The general meeting is the highest level of power of the 
ISANGANO IP/ GATARAGA and it’s this level the decisions are made. 
Section 3.02 General meeting is composed by all members of ISANGANO IP/GATARAGA 
 
Section 3.03 Monthly Meetings, The monthly meetings of the members of the ISANGANO 
IP shall be held in Gataraga Sector in the morning hours on every  Friday for the last week of  
each month. 
 
Section 3.04 Special meetings, The committe may call special meetings of the members at 
any time upon written request by at least 10% of the stekahoders. The request shall state the 
time , place and the purpose of the meeting. 
 
Section 3.05 Notice of the meetings, Written and printed notice all meetings except the one 
specified above, shall be prepared  and delivered to each member’s last known adress not less 
than 7 days before the meeting. Also phone calls will be used to deliver the message to some 
members who seem to live far. 
 
Section 3.06 Recalling the meeting, when the meeting is not attended by ½ of the memebers 
there is need to recall a meeting and this meeting should take place after 8 days. 
 
Section 3. 07 Voting, Voting takes place by show of hands, unless a majority of the 
members present at the meeting decide to do otherwise. 
 
ARTICLE IV COMMITTEES  
Section 4.01 the committee of ISANGANO IP/GATARAGA is composed of nine people: 
President 
V/President 
Secretary 
Treasurer 
3 Advisers  
Section 4.02 Committees are elected by ISANGANO IP/GATARAGA for one mandate of 2 
years and they are allowed to be elected for the second term only. 
 
Section 4.03 Powers and Duties 
The powers and duties of ISANGANO IP/GATARAGA shall be as follows: 
a)  The president shall preside over the general meetings of the members; President shall play 
a role of resource development and representing the ISANGANO IP/ GATARAGA within 
and outside the community, President shall chair the committee. 
 
b) Vice President. In case of absence of the President, or of her/his inability from any cause 
to act, the Vice President shall perform the duties of the office. Like President, the 
V/President shall play a role in resource development and representing the ISANGANO IP/ 
GATARAGA within and outside the community 
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c) The secretary shall be responsible for keeping records of all meetings, also Secretary shall 
be in charge of communications – e.g., notices of meetings, official communications. 
 
d) Treasurer will be in charge of financial management, including keeping all appropriate 
fiscal records and ensure that all funds are recorded, spent and monitored consistent with 
funder requirements, legal requirements, and sound financial management. 
 
e) Advisers shall advise the committee to work according to what they are assigned.  They 
will be in charge of discipline in ISANGANO IP/GATARAGA.  
 
ARTICLE V ASSET AND PROPERTIES OF THE IP 
 
Section 5.01  
The funds of ISANGANO IP come from: Membership fee, gifts and the funds from donors in 
terms of agricultural materials. 
 
Section 5.02   
The funds or propertiers of ISANGANO IP is used to to prepare, Meetings, agricultural 
trainings, farmer exchange visits and prepare small agricultural projects. 
 
ARTICLE VI  AMENDMENT OF BYLAWS 
The bylaws of ISANGANO IP/GATARAGA may be adopted, amended or repealed by the 
majority vote of the members of the ISANGANO IP/ GATARAGAthen in the office, 
provided that at least ten days’ written notice has been given each member of the IP of the 
intention to adopt,amend, or repeal the bylaws. 
 
These bylaws approved by the members of ISANGANO IP/GATARAGA 
 on 27/05/2009 
 
 
B) BYLAWS FOR SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION 
 
Some of the bylaws mentioned by farmers in Bubare IP: 
 Construction of water trenches: if someone does not construct a trench, they should 
not cultivate 
 If a person steals someone’s crop and is caught, she or he will pay a certain amount of 
money 
 no person should rear bees near somebody’s land of cultivation 
 When planting trees, you should leave a boundary 
 Everybody planting trees should construct trenches 
 Cattle grazers should not let their cows to destroy water trenches 
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